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Erschienen in:
2007 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
New Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks on NTRU
verfasst von : Nicolas Gama, Phong Q. Nguyen
Erschienen in: Public Key Cryptography – PKC 2007
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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We present new and efficient key-recovery chosen-ciphertext attacks on
NTRUencrypt
. Our attacks are somewhat intermediate between chosen-ciphertext attacks on
NTRUencrypt
previously published at CRYPTO ’00 and CRYPTO ’03. Namely, the attacks only work in the presence of decryption failures; we only submit valid ciphertexts to the decryption oracle, where the plaintexts are chosen uniformly at random; and the number of oracle queries is small. Interestingly, our attacks can also be interpreted from a provable security point of view: in practice, if one had access to a
NTRUencrypt
decryption oracle such that the parameter set allows decryption failures, then one could recover the secret key. For instance, for the initial NTRU-1998 parameter sets, the output of the decryption oracle on a single decryption failure is enough to recover the secret key.