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Erschienen in:
LP Solutions of Vectorial Integer Subset Sums – Cryptanalysis of Galbraith’s Binary Matrix LWE Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Non-malleable Codes with Split-State Refresh

verfasst von : Antonio Faonio, Jesper Buus Nielsen

Erschienen in: Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2017

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Abstract

Non-Malleable Codes for the split state model allow to encode a message into two parts such that arbitrary independent tampering on the parts either destroys completely the content or maintains the message untouched. If the code is also leakage resilient it allows limited independent leakage from the two parts. We propose a model where the two parts can be refreshed independently. We give an abstract framework for building codes for this model, instantiate the construction under the external Diffie-Hellman assumption and give applications of such split-state refreshing. An advantage of our new model is that it allows arbitrarily many tamper attacks and arbitrarily large leakage over the life-time of the systems as long as occasionally each part of the code is refreshed. Our model also tolerates that the refreshing occasionally is leaky or tampered with.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Structure-Preserving Chosen-Ciphertext Security with Shorter Verifiable Ciphertexts
Nächstes Kapitel Tight Upper and Lower Bounds for Leakage-Resilient, Locally Decodable and Updatable Non-malleable Codes
Fußnoten
1
Notice that tampering does not overwrite the codeword. This is called non-persistent tampering and is stronger than persistent tampering in the split state model as the set of tampering functions is closed under composition—subsequent tamperings can just first reapply all previous tampering functions (cf. Jafargholi and Wichs [32]).
 
2
We also are assuming that the NIZK system is not succinct.
 
3
Notice we assume perfect correctness of \(E\).
 
4
In particular, the reduction in Lemma 7 in steps 5c can leak \((1,\mathsf {PK}'(T_{i+1}(\cdot )))\) and then, in step 5d, we need to modify the function \(\mathbf{V}_{T^0_{i+1},r_i, pk , pk '}\) to check if \(e(\tilde{ pk },h)= pk '\) and the function \(\mathbf{M}_{T_{i+1},r_i, pk }\) to check if \(e(\tilde{ pk },h)=\mathsf {PK}'( sk ')\).
 
5
See full version for the formal definition.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Non-malleable Codes with Split-State Refresh
verfasst von
Antonio Faonio
Jesper Buus Nielsen
Copyright-Jahr
2017
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Buch
Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2017

Print ISBN: 978-3-662-54364-1

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-662-54365-8

Copyright-Jahr: 2017

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54365-8_12

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