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Erschienen in:
Dynamic Management of Fossil Fuel, Biofuel, and Solar Energy Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2014 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

3. On the Dynamics and Effects of Corruption on Environmental Protection

verfasst von : Elvio Accinelli, Laura Policardo, Edgar J. Sánchez Carrera

Erschienen in: Modeling, Dynamics, Optimization and Bioeconomics I

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This paper studies the joint dynamics of corruption and pollution in a model of evolutionary game theory, where firms face a given pollution standard and the government must check the compliance to this standard by means of public officials who can be honest or not. A novelty of our paper is that officials decide to be honest or not by imitation, while firms are assumed to be inter-temporal profit maximizers. One of the main findings of the paper is that one possible “bad” outcome characterized by a whole society of polluting firms and corrupt officers can be sustained by rational agents who learn by imitation, despite the existence of multiplicity of equilibria of a perfectly honest population and a more realistic simultaneous presence of honest and dishonest agents. Moreover, we show that the firm’s discount rate is an important decision factor that influences the environmental pollution.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Optimal Localization of Firms in Hotelling Networks
Nächstes Kapitel A Bayesian Pricing Model for CAT Bonds
Fußnoten
1
Evolutionary analysis is well-documented in the game theory literature (see [19]).
 
3
See [13] for a definition of imitative behaviour.
 
4
Evolutionary game theory considers populations of decision makers, while analysing the player profiles within these populations, instead of single players. We can therefore identify a population game, where N large populations strategically interact, as an N-player form game, where each player has a large population behind him (see [10]).
 
5
This is the “behavioral rule with inertia” (see [5, 14, 15, 19]) that allows an agent to reconsider her action with probability r ∈ (0, 1) each round.
 
6
For simplicity, we assume that the production’s capacity is always fully exploited, so x(t) can be interpreted as both capacity and level of production.
 
7
Notice that, if p 0 = 0 then: \(\dot{p}_{2} = -\frac{\partial H} {\partial z} = 0 \Rightarrow p_{2}(t)\) is a constant. From the transversality condition it follows that p 2(t) ≡ 0. From the maximum principle is necessary that: \((p_{0},p_{1}(t),p_{2}(t))\not =(0, 0, 0)\;\forall \;t\), then p 1(T) ≠ 0, but this contradicts the transversality condition.
 
Literatur
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2.
Accinelli, E., Brida, J.G., Carrera, E.S.: Imitative behavior in a two-population model. In: Breton, M., Szajowski, K. (eds.) Advances in Dynamic Games, Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games 11. Springer, New York (2010)
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Carilllo, J.: Graft, bribes, and the practice of corruption. J. Econ. Manag. Strat. 9, 257–286 (2000)CrossRef
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Mishra, A.: Persistence of corruption: some theoretical perspectives. World Dev. 34(2), 349–358 (2006)CrossRef
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Rose-Ackerman, S.: The political economy of corruption. In: Elliott, K.A. (ed.) Corruption and the Global Economy. Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC (1997)
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Sanditov, B.: Essays on social learning and imitation. Ph.D. thesis, Maastrictht University (2006)
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Schlag, K.H.: Why imitate, and if so, how? a boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits. J. Econ. Theory 78(1), 130–156 (1998)CrossRefMATHMathSciNet
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Svensson, J.: Eight questions about corruption. J. Econ. Perspect. 19(3), 19–42 (2005)CrossRef
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Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.: Politicians and firms. Q. J. Econ. 1094, 995–1025 (1994)CrossRef
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Tirole, J.: A theory of collective reputations (with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality). Rev. Econ. Stud. 63(1), 1–22 (1996)CrossRefMATHMathSciNet
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Weibull, J.W.: Evolutionary Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (1995)MATH
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Metadaten
Titel
On the Dynamics and Effects of Corruption on Environmental Protection
verfasst von
Elvio Accinelli
Laura Policardo
Edgar J. Sánchez Carrera
Copyright-Jahr
2014
Buch
Modeling, Dynamics, Optimization and Bioeconomics I

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-04848-2

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-04849-9

Copyright-Jahr: 2014

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04849-9_3

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