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Abstract
At EUROCRYPT 2013, Garg, Gentry and Halevi proposed a candidate construction (later referred as GGH13) of cryptographic multilinear map (MMap). Despite weaknesses uncovered by Hu and Jia (EUROCRYPT 2016), this candidate is still used for designing obfuscators.
The naive version of the GGH13 scheme was deemed susceptible to averaging attacks, i.e., it could suffer from a statistical leak (yet no precise attack was described). A variant was therefore devised, but it remains heuristic. Recently, to obtain MMaps with low noise and modulus, two variants of this countermeasure were developed by Döttling et al. (EPRINT:2016/599).
In this work, we propose a systematic study of this statistical leakage for all these GGH13 variants. In particular, we confirm the weakness of the naive version of GGH13. We also show that, among the two variants proposed by Döttling et al., the so-called conservative method is not so effective: it leaks the same value as the unprotected method. Luckily, the leakage is more noisy than in the unprotected method, making the straightforward attack unsuccessful. Additionally, we note that all the other methods also leak values correlated with secrets.
As a conclusion, we propose yet another countermeasure, for which this leakage is made unrelated to all secrets. On our way, we also make explicit and tighten the hidden exponents in the size of the parameters, as an effort to assess and improve the efficiency of MMaps.
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In an algebraic context, this would be more naturally described as the norm of x relative to the maximal real subfield of K, yet for our purposes it is more adequate to use the vocabulary of statistics.
Remark that we could define encodings of level \(\varvec{v}\) even if \(\varvec{v}\) is not binary (but still has non negative integer coefficients). This is not necessary for a honest use of the GGH13 map, but we will use it in Sect. 4 for our attack.
Recall that the original proposal was setting E and therefore q to be super-polynomial even for bounded degree \(\ell \) because of the drowning technique for publicly sampling encodings. Since then, attacks using encodings of zero [13, 24, 34] have restricted encodings to be private, allowing polynomially large E.
We also change a bit the point of view by fixing n first and then obtaining an upper bound on \(\ell \) (which will appear because \(\nu \ne 0\) in E), while the authors of [15] first fix \(\ell \) and then increase n consequently.
The idea of the proof is the same as in [15, 18], in a much simpler context (this is based on a generalized version of the Schwartz-Zippel lemma from [34]).
We can view the variables \(c^*_{i, \varvec{v}}\) as being independent of the variables \(z_ {\varvec{v}}\) because the standard deviation of the Gaussian distribution is larger than the smoothing parameter (see Lemma 1).
The value of the scalar \(\mu \) can be obtained from the parameters of the multilinear maps. If we do not want to analyze the multilinear map, we can guess an approximation of \(\mu \) with a sufficiently small relative error, by an exhaustive search.
Again, if we do not know \(\mu \), we can guess an approximation of \(\mu \) with relative error at most \(\sqrt{8\ln n/|\mathcal {A}|}\) (so that it has no influence on our approximation of \(\mathfrak {L}\)), with an exhaustive search.
Note that if we recover the exact value of \(A(h z^*/g)\), then its denominator is a multiple of g and this is considered as a success of the attacker in the weak multilinear map model.
Note that this bound does not depends on q but only on E. This is why our attack still works even if q is exponential in n, as long as E remains polynomial in n.
For this to be true, we need h and g to be co-prime. But as the ideal \(\langle g \rangle \) is prime, this will be true unless h is a multiple of g. And the case where h is a multiple of g is not a problem, as we can easily recover multiples of h (and so multiples of g).