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Erschienen in: Theory and Decision 4/2016

18.05.2016

Optimal group composition for efficient division of labor

verfasst von: Takuya Sekiguchi

Erschienen in: Theory and Decision | Ausgabe 4/2016

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Abstract

This study examines a group performing multiple tasks, with each subgroup performing each task expressed as a binary choice problem. Each subgroup uses the simple majority rule; a correct decision benefits the subgroup. This study demonstrates that, assuming all individuals’ equal competence for all tasks and a sufficiently large group size, when each individual’s probability of making a correct decision exceeds one-half, the optimal group composition is an equal number of individuals per subgroup. Conversely, it is less than one-half, the assignment produces the lowest benefit. We also find that when decision-making costs exist, if the competence is greater than one-half, the possibility that the performance of division of labor outweighs that of plenary voting increases as the cost increases. On the other hand, if the competence is less than one-half, division of labor is always more beneficial than plenary voting. The optimal group compositions for the cases where the group size is not sufficiently large are also discussed.

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Fußnoten
1
But if a single voter with competence \(p(>\)1/2) is added to an odd-sized group in which voters with competences p and 0.5 are mixed, the majority vote accuracy of the group increases (Ben-Yashar and Zahavi 2011).
 
2
The intuition for this fact can be obtained immediately by analyses in Berg (1997) even though he deals with the performance of a group using hierarchical nested majority rule.
 
3
The algorithm to find these actual thresholds is as follows: First, we check which case occurs when the cost takes the value of approximated result. In the case of \(p = 0.7\), we found that \(c = 0.3316\) causes Case 3, i.e., \(D( m )>0\) for all m. Second, to know a rough threshold value, we decrement the figure of the order of \(10^{-2}\) of c by one until Case 2 is caused. In the case of \(p= 0.7\), we found that when c ranges from 0.3316 to 0.3016, \(D( m )>0\) for all m, but when \(c = 0.2916\), \(D( m )<0\) for some m. This means that the actual threshold should be located between 0.2916 and 0.3016. Thus, we start the next step from the value closer to the approximated threshold (in the current case, 0.3016 is selected). Continuing this procedure also for \(10^{-3}\) and \(10^{-4}\), we will obtain the threshold shown in the main text. If in the first step Case 2 occurs, we search a rough value by increasing the figure of the order of \(10^{-2}\) until Case 3 is caused.
 
4
A model in Section 2 of Bovens and Beisbart (2007) also indicates that the equal-sized group division leads to both high expected benefits of members and the equality among subgroups’ expected benefit under the assumption of more sophisticated agents although the framework of the model is different from that of Condorcet’s jury theorem.
 
5
By interpreting the notion of voting not as an aggregation of self-interested preferences, but as a process of searching for truth, which leads to the common good of society, Rousseau considered that the voting result declares the general will (Groman and Feld 1988). However, he did not formulate this argument. Groman and Feld (1988) insist that Condorcet’s jury theorem shares some assumptions with Rousseau’s argument and is helpful to clarify the theory of the general will. Ladha and Miller (1996) put their theorem in the context of this relationship between Rousseau’s general will and Condorcet’s jury theorem. For that reason, their study focuses not on the decision accuracy of subgroups but on that of the entire society.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Optimal group composition for efficient division of labor
verfasst von
Takuya Sekiguchi
Publikationsdatum
18.05.2016
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Theory and Decision / Ausgabe 4/2016
Print ISSN: 0040-5833
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7187
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-016-9552-1

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