Partial Relationships and Epistemic Injustice

Excerpt

Partiality in philosophy generally refers to a special kind of concern for the interests of certain people over others (Stroud, 2010, p. 134), which can involve “preference or fondness or affection for a particular person.” (Scheffler, 2010, p. 99) This version of partiality – that which might apply to our friends, intimates, and family members – can be distinguished from something like egoism, which is “an extreme form of partiality…that…gives overriding importance to just one individual’s welfare.” (Hooker, 2013, 710) It can also be distinguished from something like preferential commitments to one’s own nation-state, which might typically ground debates regarding our local versus global moral responsibilities. (Tronto, 2012, p. 310) And the moral status of our partial relationships can vary accordingly: for instance, we might have the intuition that special moral attention to family members are generally acceptable, but that the same could not be said in regards to a racist group with whom one is associated, given the “pervasive injustice” that characterizes the latter. (Miller, 2005, p. 66) Still, the idea that certain partial ties – in particular, like those involving loving and caring familial relations – can be specially morally valued holds significant sway in ethical literature. Special partial relationships of this kind, it is said, may transform what is required of you morally: in the case of parents and children, for example, perhaps you have duties to provide for your own children, but not for all children. (Keller, 2013, p. 2) …