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2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

2. Performativity Rationalized

verfasst von : Francesco Guala

Erschienen in: Enacting Dismal Science

Verlag: Palgrave Macmillan US

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Abstract

Economic sociologists have been criticized for using the term ‘performativity’ in a way that seems unfaithful to Austin’s notion. In this paper, I defend this usage against Uskali Mäki’s challenge, in particular, his claim that economic theories cannot constitute illocutionary acts. To counter this claim, I argue that performative speech acts play primarily a coordinating role by manipulating agents’ beliefs, and this is the same role that theories like the Black–Scholes model of option pricing play in financial markets, if MacKenzie’s historical reconstruction is right.

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Vorheriges Kapitel After the Turn: How the Performativity of Economics Matters

Nächstes Kapitel Performative Mechanisms

See e.g. Callon (1998), MacKenzie (2006, 2009), Callon et al. (2007), MacKenzie et al. (2007).

In the sense that it is not creating any institutional fact; it is not misfiring as a piece of gameplay, of course.

The agreement may or may not be sanctioned by legislation; the important point in any case is that the rules do not hold by natural necessity.

Many philosophers consider the linguistic approach to social ontology based on constitutive rules incompatible with the scientific approach of game theory. This is not true, however, as Guala and Hindriks (2015), Hindriks and Guala (2015), and Hédoin (2015) try to explain.

See also Sugden (1986), for example.

The interpretation of Lewis’ conventions as correlated equilibria is due to Vanderschraaf (1998). Correlated equilibria were introduced in the game-theoretic literature by Aumann (1974).

Something similar may have happened with promises: perhaps they began as rules that allowed Jill to punish Jack if Jack did not do what he said he would. In The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche (1887) outlines an intriguing story about the emergence of sociality based on this simple mechanism.

On the importance of public rituals for coordination, see Chwe (2001). Chwe emphasizes that the coordination device (or ceremony) must be common knowledge, so that the right system of mutual beliefs is in place. For a sceptical view on common knowledge requirements, see e.g. Binmore (2010).

Austin and Searle have stressed that a promise is not just a prediction (I’m not just saying ‘I believe that I will give you ten euro next week’). The key point is that it creates an obligation that did not exist before. The obligation implies that if I will not give you ten euro next week, then you will be entitled to punish my behaviour—either informally (e.g. by reproach or ostracism) or formally (calling the police, or taking me to court). So the promise, if successful, changes a wide set of beliefs, for example, the expectation that other parties will help you get the money back if I do not return it.

See, for example Schiffer (1972) and Bach and Harnish (1979).

Since it is commonly known as the Black–Scholes theory or model, I shall use for simplicity that expression from now on. Scholes and Merton received the Nobel Prize in 1997 (Black had died two years earlier). The key publications are Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973).

From now on, I will take the publication of a scientific model to be analogous to the performance of a speech act. This is potentially contentious, especially for those philosophers who take models to be non-linguistic entities. These philosophers agree, however, that models are routinely used to construct or derive linguistic statements (predictions, hypotheses), and that these statements in turn guide the behaviour of scientists and practitioners. For our purposes, we only need to claim that models provide signals and that these signals can be used for coordination.

At some point during the 1987 financial crisis, the theory seemed to work as a self-defeating prophecy—in the sense that it invited traders to take actions that increased the spread between predicted and actual market prices (MacKenzie calls it ‘counterperformativity’).

On this point, see also Brisset (2014).

For two notable exceptions, see Thomasson (1999) and Epstein (2015).

The idea is originally in Lewis (1969) but has been further articulated by Sugden (1986, 1998), Bicchieri (2006), and others.

Aumann, Robert. 1974. Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies. Journal of Mathematical Economics 1(1): 67–96.

Austin, John. 1962. How to Do Things with Words. The William James Lectures Delivered at Harvard University in 1955. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bach, Kent, and Robert M. Harnish. 1979. Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Bicchieri, Cristina. 2006. The Grammar of Society. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Binmore, Ken. 2010. Do Conventions Need to be Common Knowledge? Topoi 27(1–2): 17–27.

Black, Fisher, and Myron Scholes. 1973. The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities. Journal of Political Economy 81(3): 637–654.

Brisset, Nicolas. 2014. Performativité des énoncés de la théorie économique: Une approche conventionnaliste. PhD dissertation, Université de Lausanne and Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne.

Callon, Michel. 1998. The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics. In The Laws of the Markets, edited by Michel Callon, 1–58. Oxford: Blackwell.

Callon, Michel. 2007. What Does It Mean to Say that Economics is Performative? In Do Economists Make Markets? On the Performativity of Economics, edited by Donald MacKenzie, Fabian Muniesa, and Lucia Siu, 311–357. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Callon, Michel, Yuval Millo, and Fabian Muniesa (eds.). 2007. Market Devices. Oxford: Blackwell.

Chwe, Michael Suk-Yong. 2001. Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Conte, Amedeo G. 1988. Semiotics of Constitutive Rules. In Semiotic Theory and Practice: Proceedings of the Third International Congress of the IASS, edited by Michael Herzfeldand and Lucio Melazzo, Vol. 1, 141–150. Berlin: DeGruyter.

Epstein, Brian. 2015. The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of Social Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Guala, Francesco, and Frank Hindriks. 2015. A Unified Social Ontology. Philosophical Quarterly 65(259): 177–201.

Hédoin, Cyril. 2015. Accounting for Constitutive Rules in Game Theory. Journal of Economic Methodology 22(4): 439–461.

Hindriks, Frank. 2009. Constitutive Rules, Language, and Ontology. Erkenntnis 71(2): 253–275.

Hindriks, Frank, and Francesco Guala. 2015. Institutions, Rules, and Equilibria: A Unified Theory. Journal of Institutional Economics 11(3): 459–480.

Lewis, David. 1969. Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

MacKenzie, Donald. 2006. An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

MacKenzie, D. 2007. Is Economics Performative? Option Theory and the Construction of Derivatives Markets. In Do Economists Make Markets? On the Performativity of Economics, edited by Donald MacKenzie, Fabian Muniesa, and Lucia Siu, 54–86. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

MacKenzie, Donald. 2009. Material Markets: How Economic Agents are Constructed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

MacKenzie, Donald, Fabian Muniesa, and Lucia Siu (eds.). 2007. Do Economists Make Markets? On the Performativity of Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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Titel: Performativity Rationalized
verfasst von: Francesco Guala
Verlag: Palgrave Macmillan US
Buch: Enacting Dismal Science
Print ISBN: 978-1-137-49210-4

Electronic ISBN: 978-1-137-48876-3

Copyright-Jahr: 2016
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-48876-3_2

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