Persian Gulf 2018 | springerprofessional.de

Springer Professional

nach oben

2019 | Buch

Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

Persian Gulf 2018

India's Relations with the Region

verfasst von: Prof. P. R. Kumaraswamy, Dr. Md. Muddassir Quamar, Dr. Manjari Singh

Verlag: Springer Singapore

Buchreihe : Persian Gulf

Enthalten in: Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" , Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Einloggen, um Zugang zu erhalten

Über dieses Buch

The Persian Gulf 2018 is sixth in the series published by MEI@ND and examines India’s bilateral relations with the countries along the Persian Gulf, namely, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Yemen. It focuses on developments during 2017 and offers a comprehensive account of the strategic, political, economic and cultural aspects of bilateral developments along with specific policy recommendations for India.The book also provides an in-depth analysis of internal dynamics of these countries.

Anzeige

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter

Chapter 1. Introduction

Abstract

The Persian Gulf is not just another geopolitical bloc or a cluster of countries but the key to India’s growth story. India’s sustained economic development and the resultant social progress and political ascendance are intrinsically linked to its strategic relations with the region. This recognition is reflected by the increased engagements with these countries since Narendra Modi became prime minister and this journey serves well for the larger foreign policy interests. The region’s strategic importance far outweighs other parts of the world, including the immediate neighbourhood. In sheer economic terms, during 2016–2017 India’s trade with the Persian Gulf countries stood at US$123 billion or 18 per cent of its total foreign trade and the region supplies nearly 55 per cent of India’s total energy imports. In addition, the Gulf Arab countries host over 8.5 million expatriates who send home about US$30 billion in remittance and this was half the amount that India received during the year.

P. R. Kumaraswamy, Muddassir Quamar, Manjari Singh

Chapter 2. Bahrain

Abstract

Bahrain, one of the smaller Gulf Arab economics, has received meagre and inadequate attention in India’s foreign policy formation. This pattern continued even after the change of government in New Delhi in May 2014 and despite his frequent visits, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had not visited the Kingdom of Bahrain. His personal engagement with Manama has been confined to him hosting the Foreign Minister Khalid bin Mohammed al-Khalifa in February 2015. This was despite Bahrain being of one of the tolerant countries towards its expatriate population, especially the Hindu migrants from India and is taking tangible measures towards economic diversification. International assessment of the Bahraini economic situation has been positive with the country figuring high on a number of indicators of greater public space. India’s only political engagement came towards late 2017 when the Minister of State for External Affairs M.J. Akbar attended the 13th Manama Dialogue in December. Bahrain’s depleting oil resources got a boost with the discovery of new fields off the Western coast, thus enabling it in becoming an attractive option for India’s oil imports and overseas investments.

P. R. Kumaraswamy, Muddassir Quamar, Manjari Singh

Chapter 3. Iran

Abstract

The non-Arab and Shia-majority Iran is one of the most important countries of the Middle East and is a regional power in the Persian Gulf. The Islamic Republic of Iran sees and depicts itself as a peaceful country which has never been aggressive towards its neighbours and wishes to be recognized as a legitimate actor in all the regional affairs. On the contrary, its Gulf Arab neighbours, especially Saudi Arabia and Bahrain perceive Iran as a regional hegemon that aspires to ‘Persianize’ the Gulf and to undermine the Sunni Arab monarchies and even the Saudi control over the Two Holy Mosques. These place India in a quandary.

P. R. Kumaraswamy, Muddassir Quamar, Manjari Singh

Chapter 4. Iraq

Abstract

In the wake of the military defeat of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in December 2017, the Republic of Iraq has been slowly recovering towards reconstruction and restoration of normalcy. At the same time, sectarian divide and ethnic tensions continue to plague the state and society. The referendum for independence in Kurdistan held on 25 September had sharpened the old fault lines between the central government in Baghdad and the Kurdish capital of Erbil spilling into confrontation between the Iraqi and Kurdish security forces. Asserting its authority and power, Baghdad moved to take control of airports and oil installations in the Kurdish autonomous region but the security situation and reconstruction efforts remain the major challenges facing Iraq. Given the situation, India’s role in the rebuilding of that country is limited and its enthusiasm for an active participation in the economic activities of Kurdistan has taken a beating. At the same time, Iraq has re-emerged as one of the largest oil suppliers of India and the political contacts between the two are growing. With the improving security situation, New Delhi could be able to play a larger role in the economic reconstruction, a pre-condition for Iraq’s political stability.

P. R. Kumaraswamy, Muddassir Quamar, Manjari Singh

Chapter 5. Kuwait

Abstract

During 2017, the Emirate of Kuwait appeared to have fallen off the Indian radar. Their friendly ties were dealt with a severe blow during the crisis of Kuwait (1990–1991) when New Delhi was seen to be siding with the Iraqi invasion. This perception resulted in India investing considerable political and diplomatic capital and warmth was restored, thus leading to the visit of Emir Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah to India in June 2006. Since then the bilateral relations have been flourishing as has been testified by the presence of 900,000-strong Indian expatriate community in the Emirate. At the same time, Kuwait is the only country in the Persian Gulf region—except for the War-torn Yemen—which was not visited by senior Indian leaders or by the External Affairs Minister since Narendra Modi became prime minister in May 2014. The only high-level exchange was the December 2016 meeting of the Joint Working Group on labour, employment and manpower in New Delhi.

P. R. Kumaraswamy, Muddassir Quamar, Manjari Singh

Chapter 6. Oman

Abstract

Despite being one of the smaller economies of the region, the Sultanate of Oman has multispectral ties with India encompassing trade, commerce, energy and defence as well as strong expatriate linkages. During 2017, bilateral trade had increased marginally and the much anticipated visit of Prime Minister Modi to Muscat took place in early 2018. Viewed in the larger context of the regional tension, rivalry and public acrimony, Oman has been politically stable and peaceful. As the Omani economy is showing signs of recovery, the vexed question of succession is increasingly becoming clearer, thereby requiring a demonstrative Indian engagement with it.

P. R. Kumaraswamy, Muddassir Quamar, Manjari Singh

Chapter 7. Qatar

Abstract

The Emirate of Qatar is the only country with which India has a long-term energy import agreement. Under a deal signed in 2004, Qatar is committed to supplying 7.5 million tonnes of natural gas per year to India for 25 years. After the international oil prices tumbled in mid-2014, Qatar agreed to the Indian request for re-negotiating the price for LNG, thus, enabling the latter to save US$588 million (Rs 4000 crore) for its import of LNG from the Emirate. This was in contrast to the demands of some of the other countries which sought an upward revision of gas prices when the oil prices rose. This gesture underscores the importance Doha attaches to India and was crucial in the wake of the Qatari crisis, which unnerved many countries in the Persian Gulf and beyond. Though the Saudi-led politico-economic boycott of Qatar had no direct impact upon the Indo-Qatari relations, it would be difficult for New Delhi to maintain its neutrality should the crisis escalate. In such a situation India might revise its non-interventionists policy and try to be a facilitator of a Saudi-Qatari dialogue.

P. R. Kumaraswamy, Muddassir Quamar, Manjari Singh

Chapter 8. Saudi Arabia

Abstract

The Indo-Saudi relations are passing through an exceptional transformative phase. Without much public statement and declaration, both have been conveying the importance they attach to the other and are developing a holistic and strategic partnership. Trade, energy, expatriates, haj, and remittances have been the core of bilateral relations but during the past four years, two-way investments and security cooperation have emerged as priority areas. The change of guard in India (May 2014) and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (January 2015) has resulted in a fresh dynamics in understanding each other’s concerns, leading to greater political engagements, and accommodations. Though 2017 was a relatively quieter year with regard to high-level exchanges, the contours of the bilateral relations are marked towards strengthening security and defence cooperation and enhancing of the two-way investments.

P. R. Kumaraswamy, Muddassir Quamar, Manjari Singh

Chapter 9. UAE

Abstract

The Indo-Emirati relations have been on the ascendance since Narendra Modi became prime minister and between 2014 and early 2018, the two leaderships have met as many as four times. If the Indian leader visited the UAE in August 2015 and February 2018, Vice-President and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan (also the de facto ruler of the UAE) visited India twice, in February 2016 and in January 2017. This, indicative of the emerging bond between the two leaders, is even reflected in some of the economic agreements between the two countries. During 2017, the UAE agreed to award 10 per cent participation for an Indian consortium in the Lower Zakum offshore oil field, which has a production capacity of 3.5 million barrels a day and offered to help in the strategic oil reserves in Mangalore. The crowning moment came in January when the Crown Prince al-Nahyan attended India’s Republic Day celebrations as the chief guest.

P. R. Kumaraswamy, Muddassir Quamar, Manjari Singh

Chapter 10. Yemen

Abstract

The on-going Civil War in Yemen has escalated into a humanitarian crisis of indefinite proportions. Since 2011, more than 10,000 people have been killed, nearly 50,000 have been injured or maimed and over three million are displaced. In November 2017, the United Nations humanitarian agencies have warned that the country is on the verge of facing the largest famine the world has seen in decades and that 17 million Yemenis are food insecure. Differences amongst the warring factions have increased and international efforts towards a negotiated settlement have not progressed. The assassination of the former President Ali Abdullah Saleh in December 2017 exacerbated the situation. Regional interventions on behalf of various warring groups has led to a stalemate which could not be overcome. There is a serious possibility that the civil war could escalate into a regional confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which support the governments of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and Houthi rebels, respectively. Under these circumstances there are no political, economic, or trade relations between India and Yemen and the Indian mission in Sana’a had to be shifted to Djibouti in April 2015. Despite the successful evacuation carried out in 2015 through Operation Rahaat, media reports speak of a small Indian community that continues to reside in Yemen due to economic or social compulsions. The continuation of the Yemeni crisis poses a serious diplomatic and security challenge to New Delhi and its interests in the Persian Gulf region.

P. R. Kumaraswamy, Muddassir Quamar, Manjari Singh

Chapter 11. GCC

Abstract

The year 2017 was the toughest year for the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE since its founding in 1981. While internal differences were not uncommon, in June, they resulted in the three member countries led by Saudi Arabia on imposing a political, diplomatic, and economic boycott upon the fourth member, Qatar. The gas-rich tiny Emirate was accused of funding terrorism, harbouring extremism, and interfering in the internal affairs of its neighbours, and thereby destabilizing them. These charges were severe and if Qatar adopted a defiant position, meagre efforts by Kuwait proved unsuccessful in minimizing the tension. The wide split within the GCC led to the fear of ending of the most successful and envious regional economic bloc in the world. India has huge stakes in the GCC and about 8.5 million its citizens are gainfully employed in the GCC countries, including Qatar. The initial fears of a major evacuation of its nationals soon subsided and aware of the delicacy of the situation, India settled for a balanced policy and hoped for a ‘swift’ resolution of the crisis through mutual consultations.

P. R. Kumaraswamy, Muddassir Quamar, Manjari Singh

Chapter 12. Policy Options

Abstract

The chapter offers specific policy options for India in the light of the recent regional developments and the current status of bilateral relations.

P. R. Kumaraswamy, Muddassir Quamar, Manjari Singh

Backmatter

Titel: Persian Gulf 2018
verfasst von: Prof. P. R. Kumaraswamy
Dr. Md. Muddassir Quamar
Dr. Manjari Singh
Copyright-Jahr: 2019
Verlag: Springer Singapore
Electronic ISBN: 978-981-13-1978-5
Print ISBN: 978-981-13-1977-8
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1978-5

Premium Partner