1994 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Practical and Provably Secure Release of a Secret and Exchange of Signatures
verfasst von : Ivan Bjerre Damgård
Erschienen in: Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT ’93
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Enthalten in: Professional Book Archive
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We present a protocol that allows a sender to gradually and verifiably release a secret to a receiver. We argue that the protocol can be efficiently applied to exchange secrets in many cases, for example when the secret is a digital signature. This includes Rabin, low-public-exponent RSA, and El Gamal signatures. In these cases, the protocol requires an interactive 3-pass initial phase, after which each bit (or block of bits) of the signature can be released non-interactively (i.e. by sending 1 message). The necessary computations can be done in a few seconds on an up-to-date PC. The protocol is statistical zero-knowledge, and therefore releases a negligible amount of side information in the Shannon sense to the receiver. The sender is unable to cheat, if he cannot factor a large composite number before the protocol is completed.We also point out a simple method by which any type of signatures can be applied to fair contract signing using only one signature.