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2015 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Private and Secure Public-Key Distance Bounding

Application to NFC Payment

verfasst von : Serge Vaudenay

Erschienen in: Financial Cryptography and Data Security

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Abstract

Distance-Bounding is used to defeat relay attacks. For wireless payment systems, the payment terminal is not always online. So, the protocol must rely on a public key for the prover (payer). We propose a generic transformation of a (weakly secure) symmetric distance bounding protocol which has no post-verification into wide-strong-private and secure public-key distance bounding.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Relay Cost Bounding for Contactless EMV Payments

Nächstes Kapitel Purchase Details Leaked to PayPal

The GOR protocol is a bit different from others as it provides anonymous authentication. The verifier does not identify the prover in the protocol.

The key generation algorithms accepts as input a security parameter \(\lambda \) which is omitted for simplicity reasons. Hence, \(\Pr [\mathcal {V}\mathsf {\ accepts}]\) is a function of \(\lambda \). We say that \(f(\lambda )\) is negligible if for every integer d we have \(f(\lambda )=\mathcal {O}(\lambda ^{-d})\) for \(\lambda \rightarrow +\infty \).

In a previous version, N was part of the plaintext. At the conference, Erik-Oliver Blass suggested to remove it. This required to adapt the proofs.

KK-UF-1CMA was added in the final version of this paper after having removed N from the plaintext. It was necessary due to the adversary getting \(\mathsf {sk}_P\) by corruption.

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Titel: Private and Secure Public-Key Distance Bounding
verfasst von: Serge Vaudenay
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Buch: Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Print ISBN: 978-3-662-47853-0

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-662-47854-7

Copyright-Jahr: 2015
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47854-7_12

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