Promoting Functional Distributive Justice in the Nigerian Sovereign Wealth Fund System: Lessons from Alaska and Norway

See National Assembly, Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority Bill, 2010 SB 457 <http://​www.​nassnig.​org/​document/​download/​1332> accessed 29 November 2015; also Africa Research Bulletin, ‘NIGERIA: Sovereign Wealth Fund— It will not replace the ECA Buffer as Intended’ (Blackwell 2012); also Oserogho & Associates, ‘Nigeria Sovereign Wealth Fund Law’ (2011) <http://​www.​jdsupra.​com/​legalnews/​nigerian-sovereign-wealth-fund-law-06187/​> assessed 1 June 2016.

See National Assembly, Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority Bill 2010 (n 1); see also Cynthia Ugwuibe, ‘Strengthening the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority: A Policy Analysis of the Nigerian Excess Crude Account and the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority Act’ (MA thesis, University of California Los Angeles 2012); John St. Claret Ezeani, ‘An Overview of the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority’ (The Sovereign Wealth Fund Initiative of the Fletcher School 2012) <http://​fletcher.​tufts.​edu/​~/​media/​Fletcher/​Microsites/​swfi/​pdfs/​2012/​NigeriaSWFFinal.​pdf> accessed 1 June 2016; Chiazor Ezenwa, ‘Nigeria’s Sovereign Wealth Fund and Inter-generational Equity’ Thisday Live (Nigeria, 13 October 2013); ‘Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority’ (Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute 2015) <www.​swfinstitute.​org/​swfs/​excess-crude-account/​> accessed 1 June 2016.

See Long Title to the Sovereignty Investment Authority (Establishment etc) Act 2011; see also A Brown Bassey et al, ‘Excess Crude Account and Sovereign Wealth Fund as Strategic Tools for Sustainable Development in Nigeria’ (2014) 5(2) Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development 57.

See Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority, ‘Sovereignty Investment Authority (Establishment etc.) Act 2011, Cap N166 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 [Sovereign Investment Authority Act]; also B Brown (n 3).

See for example, Tony Odiadi, ‘The Constitution and Sovereign Wealth Fund: Matters Arising’ The Guardian (Lagos, 7 August 2012); also Solomon E Ekokoi, ‘Legal and Constitutional Evaluation of the Nigerian Sovereign Wealth Fund’ (2015) Afe Babalola University Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy 101; Ezeani (n 2).

The resource control issue has been extensively debated in Nigeria since the seminal case of A-G Federation v A-G Abia State (No 2) [2002] All NLR 72. See for example Mukhtar Abdullahi, ‘Politics of Resource Control and Revenue Allocation: Implications for the Sustenance of Democracy in Nigeria’ (2014) 7(4) Journal of Politics and Law 176; Sylvester Adejoh Ogba, ‘Nigerian Offshore Seabed: The Challenges of Ownership and Resource Control’ (2014) 2(1) American Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 13; AS Antai & Bassey Anam, ‘Resource Control and Grassroot Development in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria’ (2014) 5(20) Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development 1; also Ekokoi (n 5); Odiadi (n 5).

Ekokoi (n 5); Ezeani (n 2).

See Temitope Tunbi Onifade, ‘Peoples-based Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Toward Functional Distributive Justice’ (2014) 16(4) Human Rights Review 343.

For specific discussions on FDJ, see Onifade (n 8). For general discussions on distributive justice, Michael Allingham, Distributive Justice (Routledge 2014); Ross Zucker, Democratic Distributive Justice (Cambridge University Press 2000); Peter Vallentyne, ‘Distributive Justice’, in RE Goodin, P Pettit and T Pogge (eds) A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, vol 2 (2nd Wiley-Blackwell 2007). For rights-based approach to environment and development generally, see United Nations Practitioners’ Portal on Human Rights Based Approaches to Programming, ‘The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation: Towards a Common Understanding Among UN Agencies’ (n.d.) <hrbaportal.​org/​the-human-rights-based-approach-to-development-cooperation-towards-a-common-understanding-among-un-agencies> accessed 2 December 2015; Gina Castillo and Marjolein Brouwer, ‘Reflections on Integrating a Rights-Based Approach in Environment and Development’ (2007) 15 Policy Matters: Conservation and Human Rights 153.

Onifade (n 8).

Norway ranks as the world’s seventh largest oil exporter. In 2012, Norwegian petroleum production totalled approximately 225 million standard cubic meters of oil equivalents. See The Norwegian Economy – Key Facts <https://​www.​regjeringen.​no/​conten–tassets/​455b1741a3814eb8​823ce404fc0de3a0​/​norwegian_​economy_​2013.​pdf> accessed December 02, 2015.

The oil and natural gas industry dominates Alaska’s economy. Alaska’s waters are believed to contain more than 30 percent of the USA’s known recoverable offshore resources. Specifically, Alaska’s Prudhoe Bay field is one of the largest oil fields in the US. Alaska’s oil and gas industry has produced more than 17 billion barrels of oil and 13 billion cubic feet of natural gas. See US Department of Energy, ‘Top 100 U.S. Oil & Gas Fields’ (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2015), p. 5, 8 < https://​www.​eia.​gov/​naturalgas/​crudeoilreserves​/​top100/​pdf/​top100.​pdf> accessed September 16, 2016.

Oil production in Nigeria has been closely associated with concerns of environmental pollution, human rights violations, governmental corruption, inequitable wealth distribution and inadequate accommodation of oil producing communities. See generally Olubayo Oluduro, ‘Oil Exploitation and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria’s Oil Producing Communities’ (2012) 25(2) Afrika Focus 160 at 165 (providing an account of the nature and scope of the problems discussed); see also Human Rights Watch, ‘The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria’s Oil Producing Communities’ (Human Rights Watch 1999) at 47: <hrw.​org/​reports/​1999/​nigeria/​nigeria0199.​pdf> accessed 1 June 2016. (Discussing the impact of governmental corruption in the forms of systematic kickbacks for the award of contracts, special bank accounts in the control of the presidency, and fraudulent allocation of oil or refined products to political favorites, on sustainable resource governance in Nigeria).

For a detailed account of human rights issues in oil and gas development in Norway see Middlesex University Department of Law, Indigenous Peoples Links and the Irish Centre for Human Rights, ‘Submission to the UN Committee on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination with regard to Norway’s responsibility to ensure respect indigenous peoples rights overseas in the context of its investment and transnational corporate activity impacting on them <http://​tbinternet.​ohchr.​org/​Treaties/​CERD/​Shared%20​Documents/​NOR/​INT_​CERD_​NGO_​NOR_​78_​9789_​E.​doc> accessed September 17, 2016.

<http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/NOR/INT_CERD_NGO_NOR_78_9789_E.doc> accessed 1 June 2016. For a summary of how oil and gas development projects affect the lives and lands of indigenous peoples of Alaska, see Arctic Leaders to Congress, ‘Oil Development in Alaska is a Human Rights Issue’ (Arctic Leaders to Congress 2015) <http://​thinkprogress.​org/​climate/​2015/​09/​18/​3703004/​indigenous-leaders-arctic-refuge-protection/​> accessed November 21, 2015.

See Adam D Dixon and Ashby HB Monk, ‘The Design and Governance of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Principles and Practices for Resource Revenue Management’ (2011) <www.​ssrn.​com/​abstract=​1951573> accessed 1 June 2016; Paul Segal, ‘How to Spend It: Resource Wealth and the Distribution of Resource Rents’ (2012) 51 Energy Policy 340.

Norway’s sovereign wealth fund was launched in 1990 and is currently one of the largest in the world at about $600 billion. Alaska’s Permanent Fund was established in 1976 and currently has about $37 billion. See Gary Flomenhoft, ‘Applying the Alaska Model in a Resource-Poor State: The Example of Vermont’ in Karl Widerquist and Michael W Howard (eds), Exporting the Alaska Model: Adapting the Permanent Fund Dividend for Reform Around the World (Palgrave Macmillan 2012) 85-108; Scott Goldsmith, ‘The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend: An Experiment in Wealth Distribution’ in G Standing (ed), Promoting Income Security as a Right: Europe and North America (Anthem Press 2005) 553, 563.

In the literature on peoples’ rights over resources, the meaning of ‘people’ itself is contested. While some scholars understand peoples’ rights to mean individual rights held by all human beings, other scholars take the view that although all peoples have human rights, certain human rights are commonly held by vulnerable and marginalised groups whose identity, life and existence depend on such unique rights. This article will not delve into this debate on this distinction between individual and community rights. Rather this article takes the view that distinctions between individual and collective rights are artificial, and fail to recognise the indivisible and interdependent nature of human rights. Peoples in this article therefore refers to all individuals in a sovereign state, who by virtue of being humans, have legal rights to freely access and enjoy resources located in that sovereign state. For the debates on individual versus community rights, see Helen Quane, ‘Further Dimension to the Interdependence and Indivisibility of Human Rights? Recent Developments Concerning the Rights of Indigenous People’ (2012) 25(1) Harvard Human Rights Journal 49; Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (2nd edn, CUP 2003), 27-33; Garry Teeple, The Riddle of Human Rights (University of Toronto Press 2004), 24; James Nickel, ‘Rethinking Indivisibility: Towards a Theory of Supporting Relations between Human Rights’ (2008) 30(4) Human Rights Quarterly, 984, 985.

See Onifade (n 8).

See Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1962) 162 Science (3859), 1243-1248.

See for example Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Reprint, Oxford University Press 2009) chs 10-14, (stating that without law and regulation, society could easily regress to the ‘state of nature’, i.e. a state characterised by perpetual strife, in which according to Hobbes, human life will be ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’).

Scott H. Scott Gordon, ‘The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery’ (1954) 62(2) Journal of Political Economy 124.

Hardin (n19).

Onifade (n 8).

See Anna Di Robilant, ‘The Virtues of Common Ownership’ (2011) 91 Boston University Law Review 1359-1347; Anna Di Robilant, ‘Common Ownership and Equality of Autonomy’ (2012) 58(2) McGill Law Journal 263-32; Allingham (n 9); Hans Morten Haugen, ‘The Right to Self-determination and Natural Resources: The Case of Western Sahara’ (2007) 3(1) Law, Environment and Development Journal 72; Hans Morten Haugen, ‘People’s Right to Self-determination and Self-governance over Natural Resources: Possible and Desirable?’ (2014) 8(1) Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics 3.

For discussion on global rights over natural resources, see Mathias Risse, ‘Common Ownership of the Earth as a Non-parochial Standpoint: A Contingent Derivation of Human Rights’ (2008) 17(2) European Journal of Philosophy 277; Chris Armstrong, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds and Global Justice’ (2013) 27(04) Ethics and International Affairs 413. For discussions on global responsibilities over natural resources, see Bernard Boxill, ‘Compensation and Past Injustice’, in A Cohen and C Heath Wellman (eds) Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics (2nd edn, Wiley Blackwell 2014); Nahshon Perez (2014), ‘Must We Provide Material Redress for Past Wrongs?’ in A Cohen and C Heath Wellman, ibid.

Generally, in many dominial regimes such as Nigeria and Norway, there is no private ownership of subsurface oil and gas. Oil and gas ownership is vested in the state, while members of the public can only acquire the right to use, manage, control or enjoy benefits of oil production. In less dominial jurisdictions such as Alaska, USA and Alberta, Canada, subsurface petroleum and natural gas ownership could be both freehold and leasehold (i.e. a majority owned by the government, while some are privately owned). In Canada for example, apart from crown leases, oil and gas rights to a particular parcel may be owned by private individuals. Individuals who are the assigns or descendants of Alberta’s original homesteaders are the registered owners of the petroleum and/or natural gas beneath approximately 6.0 million acres (four percent of the Province’s surface area). See Damilola S Olawuyi, ‘Legal Strategies and Tools for Mitigating Legal Risks Associated with Oil and Gas Investments in Africa’ (2015a) 39(3) OPEC Energy Review 247, 350.

See Onifade (n 8).

Damilola S Olawuyi, Principles of Nigerian Environmental Law (Revised edn, Afe Babalola University Press 2015b) 271; also United States Environmental Protection Agency <http://​www.​epa.​gov/​environmentaljus​tice/​> accessed 1 June 2016.

Bunyan Bryant and Paul Mohai (eds) Environmental Racism: Reviewing the Evidence (Westview Press 1992) 204.

For an excellent and detailed consideration of the concept of environmental justice, see Rhuks Ako, Environmental Justice in Developing Countries: Perspectives from Africa and Asia-Pacific (Routledge 2013) 1-20, see also, Environmental Governance (United Nations Environment Program 2009) 1 at 2 <http://​www.​unep.​org/​pdf/​brochures/​EnvironmentalGov​ernance.​pdf> accessed 1 June 2016.

Haugen, ‘The Right to Self-determination and Natural Resources’ (n 24); Haugen, ‘People’s Right to Self-determination and Self-governance’ (n 24).

Allingham (n 9).

Spencer Banzhaf, ‘Regulatory Impact Analyses of Environmental Justice Effects’ (2011) 27(1) Journal of Land Use and Environmental Law 1.

Zucker (n 9).

Ako (n30).

Jérémie Gilbert, ‘The Right to Freely Dispose of Natural Resources: Utopia or Forgotten Right?’(2013) 31(2) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 314.

General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources’ <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/1803%28XVII%29> accessed 1 June 2016.

For a detailed review of this, see Lillian Aponte Miranda, ‘The Role of International Law in Intrastate Natural Resource Allocation: Sovereignty, Human rights, and Peoples-based Development’ (2012) 45 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 785.

Article 1, General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 (n 38).

ibid.

Gilbert (n 37); Segal (n15).

Miranda (n 39) 785.

See Onifade (n 8).

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (ICCPR); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (ICESCR); and Universal Declaration on Human and Peoples Rights, 10 December 1948 G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71.

United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 13 September 2007, UN Doc/A/61/L.67.

See Ulrike Barten, ‘What’s in a Name? Peoples, Minorities, Indigenous Peoples, Tribal Groups and Nations’ (2015) 14(1) Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 1.

Robert McCorquodale and Raul Pangalangan, ‘Pushing Back the Limitations of Territorial Boundaries’ (2001) 12(5) European Journal of International Law 867.

Haugen, ‘The Right to Self-determination and Natural Resources’ (n 24); Haugen, ‘People’s Right to Self-determination and Self-governance’ (n 24).

See generally Barten (n 47) (asserting that minorities are precluded from bearing the right to self-determination).

John Burrit McArthur, ‘International Environmental Law: Can it overcome its Weaknesses to Create an Effective Remedy for Global Warming?’ (2013) 10(2) Santa Clara Journal of International Law 253.

Michael Alexeev and Robert Conrad, ‘The Elusive Curse of Oil’ (2005) 91(3) Review of Economics and Statistics 586-598; Paul Stevens, ‘Resource Impact: Curse or Blessing? – A Literature Survey’ (2003) 9(1) J of Energy Lit 3, 42; see also Antonio MA Pedro, Mainstreaming Mineral Wealth in Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategies (Economic Commission for Africa 2004) <http://​repository.​uneca.​org/​bitstream/​handle/​10855/​5565/​Bib-39857.​pdf?​sequence=​1> accessed 1 June 2016, 2015; Jeffrey D Sachs & Andrew M Warner, ‘The Curse of Natural Resources’, (2001) 45 European Econ Review 827, 827; Leif Wenar, ‘Property Rights and the Resource Curse’ (2008) 36 Philosophy and Public 2 Affairs, 5-7; Xavier Sala-i-Martin and Arvind Subramanian, Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria (International Monetary Fund 2003) 13-15 <https://​www.​imf.​org/​external/​pubs/​cat/​longres.​cfm?​sk=​16582.​0> accessed 1 June 2016.

See Risse (n 25); Robilant, ‘The Virtues of Common Ownership’ (n 24); Robilant ‘Common Ownership and Equality of Autonomy’ (n 24).

See Francis Onojiribholo, ‘Kwale Chief Laments Plight of Communities’, Daily Independent (Nigeria, 16 August 2011) discussing how local communities in Nigeria’s Niger Delta are denied practical opportunities to participate in decision-making processes for energy projects in Nigeria. See also Sheila Foster, ‘Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement’ (1998) 85 California Law Review 775, 812.

See for example Gregory H Fox, ‘The Right to Political Participation in International Law’ in Gregory H Fox and Brad R Roth, (eds) Democratic Governance and International Law (CUP 2000) 48-55, Fox questioned whether the international community is prepared to accept a right to participation in practice. See also Maria Lee, Chiara Armeni, Javier de Cendra, Sarah Chaytor, Simon Lock, Mark Maslin, Catherine Redgwell and Yvonne Rydin, ‘Public Participation and Climate Change Infrastructure’ (2013) 25(1) Journal of Environmental Law 33, where the authors discuss how untempered public participation might become a ‘simple bureaucratic hurdle, frustrating for all concerned’. See also Maria Lee and Carolyn Abbot, ‘The Usual Suspects? Public Participation under the Aarhus Convention’ (2003) 66 Modern Law Review 80; Cass R Sunstein, ‘Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go To Extremes’ (2000) 110 Yale Law Journal 71; Julia Black, ‘Proceduralizing Regulation: Part I’ (2000) 20(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 597; Julia Black, ‘Proceduralizing Regulation: Part II’ (2001) 21(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 33.

For a review of the history of oil production in Nigeria, see Olawuyi (n 28) 173; also S Tamuno and JM Felix, ‘Crude Oil Resource: A Blessing or Curse to Nigeria - The Case of the Niger Delta’ (2006) 4(2) African Journals Online 53; Aniefiok E Ite, Udo J Ibok, Margaret U Ite, and Sunday W Petters, ‘Petroleum Exploration and Production: Past and Present Environmental Issues in the Nigeria’s Niger Delta’ (2013) 1(4) American Journal of Environmental Protection 78.

Ugwuibe (n 2) 5.

See also ibid 1.

See Emeka Duruigbo, ‘The World Bank, Multinational Oil Corporations, and the Resource Curse in Africa’ (2005) 26(1) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 1; Michael Watts, ‘Resource Curse? Governmentality, Oil and Power in the Niger Delta, Nigeria’ (2010) 9(1) Geopolitics 50; Terra Lawson-Remer and Joshua Greenstein, ‘Beating the Resource Curse in Africa: A Global Effort’ (Council on Foreign Relations, August 2012) <www.​cfr.​org/​africa-sub-saharan/​beating-resource-curse-africa-global-effort/​p28780> accessed 1 June 2016.

Ikemefuna S Nwoye, ‘Nigeria Sovereign Wealth Fund: A Road Map to Avoid the Oil Curse’ (Council on African Security and Development 2015) <www.​casade.​org/​nigeria-sovereign-wealth-fund-a-road-map-to-avoid-the-oil-curse/​> accessed 1 June 2016.

See Ekokoi (n 5) 105.

See The Economist Explains, ‘What Dutch disease is, and why it’s bad’ The Economist (5 November 2014) <www.​economist.​com/​blogs/​economist-explains/​2014/​11/​economist-explains-2> accessed 1 June 2016.

BudgIT, ‘Falling Oil Prices: An Opportunity for Reforms’ (2014) <www.​yourbudgit.​com/​wp-content/​uploads/​2014/​12/​FALLING-OIL-PRICE_​BudgIT_​Nigeria.​pdf> accessed 1 June 2016.

Federal Republic of Nigeria, ‘Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 CAP. C23 L.F.N. 2004’, section 162(1).

See Akpo Mudiaga-Odje, ‘Excess Crude Oil Account’ ThisDay (Nigeria, 5 September 2005 <http://​allafrica.​com/​stories/​200509060429.​html> accessed 1 June 2016.

See Ekokoi (n5) 105.

ibid 106.

See generally Ekokoi, ibid (providing an analysis of the roles of a constitutional amendment).

See also Ade Ogidan and Wole Shadare, ‘Analysis: Nigeria’s Sovereign Wealth Fund’ The Guardian (Nigeria, 28 June 2012) <http://​www.​proshareng.​com/​news/​Nigeria%20​Economy/​Analysis:​-Nigeria-s-Sovereign-Wealth-Fund/​17588> accessed 1 June 2016.

Sovereignty Investment Authority Act (n 4).

See O Oluduro (n 13).

The design and enactment of the sovereign wealth fund instruments as well as the creation of the relevant regulatory institutions were done within government circles, and as such did not involve the public directly. Following this foundation, the trend has thus been to take decisions within government circles without any form of consultation.

Odiadi (n5).

ibid. See also Ekokoi (n 5) 108-110.

Odiadi (n 5). See also Patick Keenan ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds and Social Arrears: Should Debts to Citizens be Treated Differently than Debts to Other Creditors?’ (2009) 49(2) Virginia Journal of International Law 431, 432.

See Sovereign Investment Authority Act, sections 3 (a) and 4 (2) (a).

ibid.

ibid, sections 39, 41 and 47.

ibid.

In Nigeria, savings are often depleted to pay for political patronage just before major elections. For example, reports indicate that the withdrawal of over $2bn from the excess crude revenue account (ECA) was unilaterally approved by the Government of former President Goodluck Jonathan in December 2014, close to the presidential elections in which the former president was an unsuccessful candidate. See Bassey Udo ‘$2bn ECA Fund: Okonjo Iweala Shifts; Says Jonathan Unilaterally Approved Withdrawal’ Premium Times (Abuja 9 July 2015) <www.​premiumtimesng.​com/​business/​186365-2bn-eca-fund-okonjo-iweala-shifts-says-jonathan-unilaterally-approved-withdrawal.​html> accessed 1 June 2016.

See ‘Stabilisation Fund Investment Policy Statement’ (Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority 2013) <http://​nsia.​com.​ng/​wp-content/​uploads/​2013/​08/​Investment-Policy-Statement-for-Stabilisation-Fund.​pdf> accessed 1 June 2016.

See ibid.

Sovereign Investment Authority Act (n 76).

See Flomenhoft (n 16); Goldsmith (n16) 563; also Alanna Hartzok, ‘Citizen Dividends and Oil Resource Rents: A Focus on Alaska, Norway and Nigeria’ (2004) < http://​www.​earthrights.​net/​docs/​oilrent.​html> accessed 1 June 2016; Erling Røed Larsen, ‘Escaping the Resource Curse and the Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway Caught up with and Forged ahead of its Neighbours’ (2004) 65(3) The American Journal of Economics and Sociology 605; Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene, Ragnar Torvik, ‘Mineral Rents and Social Development in Norway’ (2011) <https://​ideas.​repec.​org/​p/​hhs/​osloec/​2011_​014.​html> accessed 1 June 2016; Christopher L Griffin Jnr, ‘The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend and Membership in the State’s Political Community’ (2012) 29 Alaska Law Review 79; Larry Persily, ‘Norway’s Different Approach to Oil and Gas Development’ (Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Projects Office of the Federal Coordinator 2011); Paul Segal, ‘Resource Rents, Redistribution, and Halving Global Poverty: The Resource Dividend’ (2011) 39(4) World Development 475; Karl Widerquist, The Alaska Model: A Citizen’s Income in Practice (Open Democracy 2013).

Larsen, ibid, also Onifade (n 8).

Larsen ibid, also Kamma Thordarson, ‘The Wealth of a Nation: How Norway Escaped the Oil Curse’ (Future Challenges 2012) <https://​futurechallenges​.​org/​local/​the-wealth-of-a-nation-how-norway-escaped-the-oil-curse/​> accessed 1 June 2016.

Dixon and Monk (n15)

Ministry of Agriculture and Food, ‘Act No. 23 of 12 May 1995 relating to Land’, section 1 <https://​www.​regjeringen.​no/​en/​dokumenter/​The-Land-Act/​id269774/​> accessed 1 June 2016.

See Norges Bank Investment Management, ‘History’ (n.d.) <www.​nbim.​no/​en/​the-fund/​history/​> accessed 1 June.

ibid.

Norges Bank Investment Management, ‘Government Pension Fund Act No 123 of 21 December 2005’ (2015), section 2 (Government Pension Fund Act); Norges Bank Investment Management, ‘About the Fund’ (2011) <http://​www.​nbim.​no/​en/​the-fund/​about-the-fund/​> accessed 1 June 2016.

ibid.

Government Pension Fund Act, section 5.

ibid section 6.

Persily (n 84).

ibid; see also Hartzok (n 84).

ibid.

See also Armstrong (n 25).

Persily (n 84).

See Norges Bank Investment Limited, ‘Holdings’ (2015) <www.​nbim.​no/​en/​the-fund/​holdings/​> accessed 1 June 2016.

See Norges Bank Investment Limited, ‘Principles for Risk Management in Norges Bank Investment Management’ 2016) <https://​www.​nbim.​no/​en/​the-fund/​governance-model/​executive-board-documents/​principles-for-risk-management-in-norges-bank-investment-management/​>.

Alaska History and Cultural Studies, ‘Modern Alaska: Oil Discovery and Development in Alaska’ (2015) <www.​akhistorycourse.​org/​articles/​article.​php?​artID=​140> accessed 1 June 2016.

Karl Widerquist and Michael W Howard, Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend: Examining its Suitability as a Model (Palgrave Macmillan 2012b) 1.

Office of the Lieutenant Governor, ‘The Constitution of the State of Alaska, Constitutional Convention February 5, 1956’ (2012) Article 8(1) (Alaskan Constitution).

See Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation, ‘What is the Alaska Permanent Fund’ (n.d.) <www.​apfc.​org/​home/​Content/​aboutFund/​aboutPermFund.​cfm> accessed 1 June 2016.

Griffin (n 84).

cf Widerquist (n 84).

See Alaska Department of Revenue Permanent Fund Dividend Division, ‘Historical Timeline’ (2015) <https://​pfd.​alaska.​gov/​Division-Info/​Historical-Timeline> accessed 1 June 2016.

ibid.

ibid.

‘What is the Alaska Permanent Fund’ (n 105).

See ibid.

See Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation, ‘Investments’ (2009) <www.​apfc.​org/​home/​Content/​investments/​investIndex2009.​cfm> accessed 1 June 2016; see also Alaskan Constitution 1956.

State of Alaska Department of Revenue Permanent Fund Dividend 2015, ‘Statutes and Regulations 2015’ <https://​pfd.​alaska.​gov/​LinkClick.​aspx?​fileticket=​w2wistFJR8E%3d&​portalid=​6> accessed 1 June 2016.

Federal Republic of Nigeria, ‘Land Use Act’ (1978) Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990, Chapter 202 <http://​www.​nigeria-law.​org/​Land%20​Use%20​Act.​htm> accessed 1 June 2016.

Sovereignty Investment Authority Act, section 32.

See Onifade (n 8).

See Ekokoi (n 5).

See Zobel v Williams 457 U.S. 55 (1982).

See Ezeani (n 2).

See Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority, ‘Governing Council’ (2015a) <http://​nsia.​com.​ng/​governing-council/​> accessed 1 June 2016.

See Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority, ‘Nigeria Infrastructure Fund’ (2015b) <http://​nsia.​com.​ng/​nigeria-infrastructure-fund/​> accessed 1 June 2016.

See Ezeani (n 2).

ibid.