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Erschienen in: The Review of International Organizations 3/2016

25.07.2015

Promoting trade through private law: Explaining international legal harmonization

Erschienen in: The Review of International Organizations | Ausgabe 3/2016

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Abstract

A large body of research examines states’ efforts to increase international trade through public law, that is, by forming preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that lower governmental barriers to trade. Scholars, however, have overlooked another mechanism through which states seek to facilitate trade: international harmonization of private law. Underlying legal harmonization is the assumption that cross-national variation of commercial law impedes trade; by contrast, similarity of laws across countries encourages trade by reducing uncertainty and transaction costs. I argue that the harmonization of private law acts as a substitute for the public-law channel of stimulating trade: countries with limited PTA partnerships make up for this deficiency by joining initiatives for private-law harmonization. This argument is tested by analyzing the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods-one of the primary instruments of legal harmonization. Indeed, countries that are party to shallow PTAs or have few PTA partners are more likely to ratify this private-law convention. Overall, this article urges scholars of trade and international law to broaden their research agenda to include private law.

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Fußnoten
1
General Assembly Resolution 2205 (XXI), December 17, 1966.
 
2
Two conventions established by UNIDROIT in 1964 achieved few ratifications: Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods and Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. UNIDORIT – International Institute for the Unification of Private Law – is an IO that promotes legal harmonization.
 
3
See, for example, an analysis of the difficulties in harmonizing contract law across the European Union. Low (2012); O’Connor (2012).
 
4
Article 6 of the CISG.
 
5
Articles 92–96 of the CISG. See Gillette and Scott (2005), 471, 476–477.
 
6
See, for example, Articles 37–39 of the CISG; Van Alstine (1998); Stephan (1999).
 
7
On substitutes in trade policy see, for example, Pelc (2011).
 
9
Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators; values are in constant 2005 USD.
 
10
Preamble of the CISG.
 
11
Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
 
12
Source: Polity IV.
 
13
Source: Henisz’s Political Constraint Index.
 
14
Source: La Porta et al. (2008).
 
15
The percentage of countries in one’s region that have ratified the CISG, lagged one year.
 
16
Source: WTO website.
 
17
Source: Database of Political Institutions.
 
18
Source: Cingranelli-Richards human rights dataset.
 
19
Source: International Country Risk Guide.
 
20
Source: Database of Political Institutions.
 
21
Note that an increasing number of PTAs cover e-commerce. Mattoo and Sauvé (2011), 259.
 
22
The model controls for the number of internet users per 100 people. Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
 
23
Data on the number of BITs that a country has signed are from UNCTAD’s database of international investment agreements. The model also controls for a country’s status as a major financial center (defined as membership in the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) and for the ratio of FDI inflows to GDP (source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators).
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Promoting trade through private law: Explaining international legal harmonization
Publikationsdatum
25.07.2015
Erschienen in
The Review of International Organizations / Ausgabe 3/2016
Print ISSN: 1559-7431
Elektronische ISSN: 1559-744X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-015-9231-y

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