To show how courts may use pragmatic argumentation, and how they instantiate the general prototypical argumentative patterns, in this section I give an exemplary analysis of the way in which in which the U.S. Supreme Court in the Holy Trinity case uses pragmatic argumentation to justify its decision. I show how the court implements the general prototypical argumentative patterns. Since in U.S. law the ‘core’ of the decision is formed by that part that constitutes the ‘ratio decidendi’ of the decision that is important from the perspective of the decision as precedent, I concentrate on the first part of the decision that ends with ‘We find, therefore…’.
In the famous case of
Holy Trinity Church v. U.S. (143 U.S. 457) from February 29, 1892 the U.S. Supreme Court had to decide whether or not the act prohibiting the importation of foreigners and aliens under contract to ‘perform labour’ in the United States (chapter 164, 23 St. p. 332) was applicable to an English Christian minister who had come to the United States to enter into service of the Protestant Episcopal Holy Trinity Church in the city of New York as rector and pastor.
14 The question was whether, as was decided by the District Court, the contract signed by the church was forbidden by chapter 164, 23, St. P. 332 according to which it is ‘unlawful for any person to assist or encourage in any way the importation or migration of any alien or foreigner into the United States to perform labour or service of any kind’.
According to the United States and the circuit judge the church was in error because the contract was forbidden by chapter 164, 23, St. P. 332, according to which it is ‘unlawful for any person to assist or encourage in any way the importation or migration of any alien or foreigner into the United States to perform labour or service of any kind’. The opinion of the Supreme Court, delivered by justice Brewer, is that this immigration statute should, in the concrete case, not be applied to the act of the church, although the act is within the letter of this section. Brewer states that application in the broad meaning would have an absurd result, that is that the contracts for the employment for ministers, rectors and pastors would be included in the penal provisions of the act. He argues that the congress never had in mind any purpose of prohibiting ‘the coming into the U.S. of ministers of the gospel’. He maintains that the meaning of a statute can be found in the evil which it is designed to remedy, in this case the practice of large capitalists who contracted their agents abroad for the shipment of great numbers of ‘an ignorant and servile class of foreign labourers’ under contracts by which the employer agreed to prepay their passage and the labourers agreed to work after their arrival for a certain time at a low rate of wages.
In its decision the U.S. Supreme Court uses argumentation referring to the absurd consequences of applying the rule in the standard meaning. In its evaluation of the consequences the court refers to the purpose of the rule, that is to prevent the influx of cheap labour under contracts with poor conditions, as it can be reconstructed from the intention of the legislator in the parliamentary discussion that can be found in the reports of the committees. On the basis of this purpose, the court is of the opinion that the consequences would be absurd because they are not in line with what the legislator intended with the rule.
The Supreme Court decides that the decision of the District Court has to be reversed because the contract was not forbidden. In its view the rule regarding the prohibition is not applicable in the specific case because the meaning of the term ‘labour’ should be taken in the restricted sense of ‘manual labour’, which implies, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, that it does not concern the activities of a Christian minister. The Supreme Court justifies this interpretation by referring to the purpose of the rule as intended by the legislator, the U.S. Congress, that is to stay the influx of cheap unskilled labour:
‘We find therefore, that the title of the act, the evil which was intended to be remedied, the circumstances surrounding the appeal to Congress, the reports of the committee of each house, all concur in affirming that the intent of Congress was simply to stay the influx of this cheap unskilled labor’.
This case constitutes a hard case because different interpretations of the rule are presented, and as the highest court the Supreme Court has to decide which of the interpretations is correct from a legal point of view. As has been explained in Sect.
2, such a hard case requires a complex argumentation in which the court must react to certain forms of criticism. In what follows, in Sect.
3.1, I address the justification of the appropriateness of the use of pragmatic argumentation that is presented in that part of the justification that begins with ‘It must be conceded that…’. Then, in Sect.
3.2, I address the justification of the application of pragmatic argumentation that is presented in the following part of the justification that begins with ‘It will be seen that words…’, and explain how the Supreme Court instantiates the prototypical argumentative pattern in which it refers to the consequences of application of the rule in light of the purpose as it is intended by the legislator.
3.1 The Justification of the Appropriateness of Pragmatic Argumentation
In this case, to justify its decision that the act prohibiting the importation of foreigners does not apply to foreigners who perform labour as ministers of the gospel, the Supreme Court uses pragmatic argumentation. Since pragmatic argumentation, as a specific form of teleological-evaluative argumentation, as is explained in Sect.
2.1, is ‘lower’ in the hierarchy of interpretation methods, the court will have to refer also to other authoritative sources that support the same interpretation. In this case the court refers to such authoritative sources: the title of the act, the evil which was intended to be remedied, the circumstances surrounding the appeal to Congress, the reports of the committee of each house. The court explains that these sources support also the given interpretation. It explains that the language of the title indicates an exclusion from its penal provisions of all contracts for the employment of ministers, rectors and pastors. Then the court explains that the evil which the statute was designed to remedy also supports this interpretation. Finally the court refers to the legislative history by explaining that the committees of the U.S. Congress were asked to prevent the influx of cheap unskilled labour, and that nobody suggested that there would be a surplus of ‘brain toilers’, and that least of all the market for the services of Christian ministers was depressed by foreign competition. These authoritative sources constitute a reference to a grammatical interpretation method (the language of the title of the act), an subjective-teleological interpretation method (the evil which was intended to be remedied as referred to in the discussion in the U.S. Congress) and a historical interpretation method (the circumstances surrounding the appeal to Congress and the reports of the committees).
The argumentation in defence of the appropriateness of the interpretation forms part of a complex argumentation that can be reconstructed as a form of coordinative argumentation described in Sect.
2.1, showing that different interpretation methods point in the same direction. In this way, the appropriateness of pragmatic argumentation referring to the absurd consequences in relation to the purpose of the rule is shown to be in line with other forms of argumentation that point in the same direction.
In its argumentation the Supreme Court not only shows that other interpretation methods support the given interpretation, but defends also the acceptability of the argumentation by reacting to various forms of critique that might lead to the conclusion that it would not be allowed to depart from the clear meaning of a rule. In the part of the decision beginning with the formulations ‘It must be conceded that the act of the corporation is within the letter of this section (…)’ the court gives various counter-arguments that are directed at various forms of critique. First, the court reacts to possible critique that it would be problematic to refer to the intention of the legislator and the purpose of the rule to establish the meaning of a legal rule. To this end the court refers to relevant legal provisions in which it is stated that to establish the meaning of a rule it is allowed to consult the intention of the legislator. Then the court reacts to possible critique that it would not be allowed to substitute the will of the judge for that of the legislator, and rejects this critique with the following formulation:
This is not the substitution of the will of the judge for that of the legislator; for frequently words of a general meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include the particular act.
The court puts forward coordinative compound argumentation in which it shows that different interpretation methods all support the given interpretation of the term ‘labour’ in the context of the statute. In doing so, it aims at making the justification fit within the legal system and tradition of the U.S. by putting forward arguments that make the justification coherent and consistent with the institutional requirements of the law in the U.S. as I have described at the end of Sect.
2.1.
3.2 The Justification of the Applicability of the Argument Scheme of Pragmatic Argumentation
The argumentation of the Supreme Court that is put forward to justify the applicability of the pragmatic argumentation in the concrete case can be found in the parts of the decision where the Supreme Court defends its narrow interpretation R’ by referring to the absurd consequences of applying the rule in the broad interpretation R” in light of the purpose of the rule. As has been explained in Sect.
2.2, in this case the Supreme Court has to defend a standpoint that concerns a preference for an adapted interpretation of the rule (R’) and a rejection of a broad interpretation (R”):
1.
In the concrete case, rule R should applied adapted interpretation R’ (with a narrow interpretation of the term ‘labour’ that makes an exception for a Christian minister), implying that the rule does not apply to foreigners who perform labour as ministers of the gospel, and not in the standard interpretation R”, (with a broad interpretation of the term ‘labour’) implying that the rule applies to all foreigners who perform labour
The court acknowledges that the statute was applicable because the intention of the legislator was clear, but argued that an exception should be made. The court states that if the legislator had known the present situation, it would have made an exception for the concrete case on the basis of the absurd consequences in relation to the purpose of the rule and the values of the U.S. as a Christian nation. Since the court departs from the acknowledged standard interpretation of the rule and makes an exception for this case, it had an obligation to justify why this exception is justified.
The justification offers a good example of how a court implements the prototypical argumentative patterns as described in Sect.
2 in hard cases because the different levels of argumentation are represented. In what follows, for the different levels of the argumentation distinguished in Sect.
2.2 I explain how the various arguments are implemented in this case.
On the level of the main argumentation the justification of the Supreme Court can be reconstructed as a complex argumentation, consisting of the positive and negative variant of pragmatic argumentation as described in scheme 3 in Sect.
2.2.1. With argument 1.1a and 1.1b the court puts forward pragmatic argumentation in which it refers to the result of application in interpretation R’ and states that this result would be desirable (the desirability is, as will be explained below, defended on a lower level of the argumentation). With argument 1.1c and 1.1d the court puts forward pragmatic argumentation in which it refers to the result of application in interpretation R” and states that this result is undesirable (absurd). This result would be that in interpretation R’ the contracts for the employments of ministers, rectors and pastors would be excluded from the penal provisions of the act and that in interpretation R” the contracts for the employments of ministers, rectors and pastors would be included in the penal provisions of the act.
1.
In the concrete case, rule R should be interpreted as R’, implying that the rule does not apply to foreigners who perform labour as ministers of the gospel, and not as R”, implying that the rule applies to all foreigners who perform labour
1.1a
In the concrete case, application of rule R in interpretation R’ would have result Y’, that the contracts for the employment of ministers, rectors and pastors are excluded from the penal provisions of the act
1.1b
Result Y’ is desirable from a legal point of view
1.1c
In the concrete case, application of rule R in interpretation R” would have result Y”, that the contracts for the employment of ministers, rectors and pastors are included in the penal provisions of the act
1.1d
Result Y” is undesirable from a legal point of view
6: Argumentation justifying the applicability on the level of the main argumentation
To justify that result Y’ is desirable and result Y” undesirable, on the level of the subordinate argumentation the argumentation put forward by the Supreme Court can be analysed as a reaction to doubt with respect to the first critical question, whether result Y’/Y” is (un)desirable from a legal point of view. As has been described in Sect.
2.2, in its justification the court will have to deal with certain forms of doubt that are relevant from a legal perspective, in pragma-dialectical terms with the critical questions that are relevant for the specific implementation of pragmatic argumentation. The argumentation that the Supreme Court puts forward in defence of argument 1.1b and argument 1.1d, that the result Y’ would be desirable and result Y” undesirable or ‘absurd’, can be considered as a reaction to the first critical question with respect to the desirability of result Y’ and the undesirability of result Y”.
In the argumentation consisting of 1.1b.1a and 1.1b.1b the court justifies the desirability of the result in light of the compatibility with purpose P of the rule mentioned in the conclusion of the decision (at the end of VI) that is ‘to stay the influx of this cheap unskilled labour’, pointing out that this purpose is intended by the legislator. In this case the court uses subjective-teleological argumentation by referring to the purpose as intended by the historical legislator.
To support argument 1.1b.1b, that purpose P is intended by the legislator, the court puts forward argumentation referring to certain authoritative sources from which the ‘spirit of the statute’ and the ‘intention of its makers’ can be inferred. First, the court explains the intention of the legislature by referring to the common understanding of the words ‘labour’ and ‘labourers’ used in the first section of the act and by concluding that on the basis of the words it is clear that Congress had in mind only the work of the manual labourer as distinguished from that of the professional man, so that an exception for a Christian minister can be justified because the legislator has intended this. As a support the court uses a selection of citations from precedents to justify its interpretation.
Second, the court explains the intention of the legislator on the basis of the legislative history by referring to the evil which the act was designed to remedy from the perspective of the situation ‘as it was pressed upon the attention of the legislative body’. In the court’s view the intent of Congress can be found in the evil the statute is designed to remedy, which can be found in the contemporaneous events, the situation as it existed, and as it was pressed upon the attention of the legislative body. The appeal to Congress was made ‘to raise the standard of foreign immigrants and to discountenance the migration of those who had not sufficient means in their own hands (…) to pay their passage’. The court adds that it appears also from the petitions in the testimony before the committees of Congress that it was this cheap unskilled labor which was making the trouble, and the influx of which Congress sought to prevent. Finally the court states that the extract from the report of the Senate committee (…) reveals also that ‘It seeks to restrain and prohibit the immigration or importation of laborers who would have never seen our shores but for the inducements and allurements of men whose only object is to obtain labor at the lowest possible rate, regardless of the social and material wellbeing of our own citizens, and regardless of the evil consequences which result to American laborers from such immigration.’
In its conclusion the court stresses that all these sources, ‘the title of the act, the evil which was intended to be remedied, the circumstances surrounding the appeal to congress, the reports of the committee of each house concur in affirming that the intent of congress was simply to stay the influx of cheap, unskilled labor’.
Using the conventions of the prototypical argumentative pattern described in Sect.
2.2, the argumentation in which the applicability of the argumentation scheme is justified can be analysed as follows:
1.1b
Result Y’, that the contracts for the employment of ministers, rectors and pastors are excluded from the penal provisions of the act, is desirable
1.1b.1a
Result Y’ is compatible with purpose P, to stay the influx of cheap unskilled labour, that is to prevent large capitalists from shipping great numbers of ignorant and servile foreign labourers to the U.S. who agreed to work after their arrival for a certain time at a low rate of wages
1.1b.1b
Purpose P, to stay the influx of cheap unskilled labour, is desirable from a legal point of view
1.1b.1b.1
Purpose P is intended by the legislator
1.1b.1b.1.1a
The language of the title indicates an exclusion from its penal provisions of all contracts for the employment of ministers, rectors and pastors
1.1b.1b.1.1b
Reference to purpose P can be found in the documents from the discussion in the congress. It appears from the circumstances surrounding the appeal to congress, the reports of the committee of each house that it was this cheap, unskilled labor which was making the trouble, and the influx of which the congress sought to prevent which constituted the evil the statute was designed to remedy
1.1d
Result Y”, that the contracts for the employment of ministers, rectors and pastors are included from the penal provisions of the act, is undesirable (or ‘absurd’)
1.1d.1a
Result Y” would be incompatible with purpose P, to stay the influx of cheap unskilled labour, that is to prevent large capitalists from shipping great numbers of ignorant and servile foreign labourers to the U.S. who agreed to work after their arrival for a certain time at a low rate of wages
1.1d.1b
Purpose P, to stay the influx of cheap unskilled labour, is desirable from a legal point of view
1.1d.1b.1
Purpose P is intended by the legislator
1.1d.1b.1.1a
The language of the title indicates an exclusion from its penal provisions of all contracts for the employment of ministers, rectors and pastors
1.1d.1b.1.1b
Reference to purpose P can be found in the documents from the discussion in the congress. It appears from the circumstances surrounding the appeal to congress, the reports of the committee of each house that it was this cheap, unskilled labor which was making the trouble, and the influx of which the congress sought to prevent which constituted the evil the statute was designed to remedy
7: Argumentation justifying the applicability of the argument scheme on the level of the subordinate argumentation
The way in which the Supreme Court instantiates the prototypical argumentative pattern reflects the preconditions for the argumentative activity in legal justification in the U.S. in the historical context of this decision.
The justification of the appropriateness and the applicability of the argument scheme of pragmatic argumentation concern the common starting points that can be considered as accepted in U.S. law. In the U.S. normally an exception to a rule or statute based on an interpretation that departs from the literal interpretation is not allowed, so an interpretation that departs from the literal meaning will have to be justified in an extensive way. The justification of the appropriateness of the argument scheme of pragmatic argumentation that is used to justify the exception on the basis of the absurdity of result Y”, and therefore the undesirability of application of rule R in interpretation R”, is defended by referring to the tradition in U.S. law with respect to the acceptability of the methods for establishing the meaning of a statute for a specific case. The justification of the applicability of the argument scheme of pragmatic argumentation is based on the hierarchy of interpretation methods that define the authoritative sources that can be used to justify an interpretation.
15 To justify the interpretation of the statute the court refers to the purpose of the statute as it can be inferred from the intention of the historical legislator, in this case U.S. Congress. To this end, the court refers to certain authoritative sources from which the will of the legislator can be inferred. In this case it refers in section III, IV and V to the various authoritative sources that can be used as a ‘guide’ to the meaning of a statute as cited at the end of section VI: the title of the act, the evil which was intended to be remedied, the circumstances surrounding the appeal to Congress, the reports of the committee of each house. Those references are reconstructed as parts of the subordinate argumentation in defence of argument 1.1b and 1.1d.