Realizing Alternative Energy Futures: From the Promise of a Petroleum Future to Imagining Lofoten as the Green Islands

One of the most polarized debates in Norwegian oil policy centered around the oil industry’s expansion northward and into the Arctic (Dale & Farquharson, 2021). The debate dates to the late 1970s but came to a standstill mostly due to an abundance of mature, more easily accessible fields further south on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. However, from the mid-1990s onwards, a higher extraction rate, not least driven by the intent to build up a sovereign pension fund based on oil and gas revenues, was prioritized in Norwegian oil politics (Bang & Lahn, 2020; Andersen, 2017). As a result, pressure once again mounted to expand oil and gas exploration northward, and by the turn of the twenty-first century, Arctic oil was seen as the next big frontier for the oil and gas industry (Korsnes et al., 2023).

There were several main drivers for expanding oil exploration into the north within the Norwegian context. First, concerns regarding the declining production of the mature oil fields in the North Sea was seen as threat to Norway’s economy and the future of the welfare state (At the time, more than 200,000 Norwegian jobs were directly or indirectly tied to the petroleum industry) (Dale et al., 2019). The industry sought to meet the output decline of mature fields through two mechanisms: (1) an international expansion of Norwegian oil companies (with Statoil, now Equinor, at the forefront) and (2) by accessing unexploited fields in the north (Dale et al., 2019). Second, technological advances in hydrocarbon recovery coupled with declining sea ice cover made oil and gas activity in the north a more reliable and cost-effective enterprise for industry (Gautier et al., 2009). Oil and gas fields in places like the Arctic, that were previously inaccessible thus became viable investment options. Third, expanding Norwegian oil and gas northward was also framed within the context of Russian presence in the Arctic, and the future potential for large-scale development by both the Russian and Norwegian oil and gas sector in the area (Moe et al., 2011). In 2011, Norway and Russia resolved their 40-year long delimitation dispute in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, ending a moratorium on all forms of exploration in the disputed areas in the process. There was thus a sense of urgency to solidify the presence of the Norwegian oil and gas sector in the Arctic before the Russians. Finally, oil in the north was promoted as a “solution” to regional development needs and it was argued that it was finally northern Norway’s turn to experience the petroleum adventure firsthand. Most powerfully, perhaps, was the view of petroleum production as a regional development pathway that would reverse population decline in northern Norway through the creation of jobs (Dale, 2012).

Plans to expand oil and gas activities northward included opening areas in the seas outside of the Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja regions (LoVeSe). However, over the years, these plans became increasingly divisive and polarizing. While those in favor of oil argued that oil and gas would bring vitally needed economic prosperity to a region experiencing rapid out-migration, rural decline and economic challenges, opponents voiced concerns about the potential environmental risks associated with drilling activities. Opponents were particularly concerned about risks to the North Atlantic cod, which spawns in the Lofoten area during the winter months and has been an integral component of the region’s livelihood and cultural heritage for centuries (Dale & Kristoffersen, 2018).

Through the dispute, coalition of fishermen, environmental activists, and residents emerged and later evolved into a broad-based social movement, The People’s Action for an Oil Free Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja, which fought against petroleum activities in the region for over a decade. In addition to grassroots-driven civil society engagement, politically elected municipal decision-makers, most of whom were staunchly pro-oil in the early days of the debate, eventually “switched sides” and opposed the plans for oil and gas extraction in the region. In 2001, the Norwegian parliament postponed the decision to open the areas and has since then continued—albeit begrudgingly—to extend a de facto ban on drilling in the region one election cycle at a time. A watershed moment then took place in 2019, when the Norwegian Labour Party, a long-time supporter of the oil and gas industry, announced that it was withdrawing support for drilling off the coast of the LoVeSe region. The move marked the end of political support for further exploration in the Arctic waters and was seen as a major blow to Norway’s oil and gas industry, which has for a long time viewed access to the region as a holy grail. In June 2022, the People’s Action declared victory in its campaign for a permanently oil-free Lofoten Vesterålen and Senja and unanimously voted to disband the organization. Today, a new regional development plan centered on green growth and decarbonization has replaced oil and gas aspirations in the region.

The Lofoten dispute in many ways mirrors other grand challenges in the Arctic and the sub-arctic in that they often involve dimensions of national and international energy security and revenues, the livelihoods and prospects of a thriving, year-round tourism industry and protecting cultural heritage, traditional coastal fisheries, and sustainable local livelihoods (Arbo & Thủy, 2016). As Kaltenborn (2017, p. 3) points out, these are all elements in the larger picture of dramatic on-going changes in northern coastal regions, where political, societal, and natural drivers of change across different scales act in tandem to produce complex socio-political landscapes that are often difficult to navigate from the perspectives and positions of divergent stakeholders.

In what follows, we briefly describe the Lofoten region, where alternative trajectories to futures beyond oil were present throughout the entire period, and where these alternatives materialized in specific ways.

Our analytical framework draws on emerging scholarship on social tipping processes understood as a specific type of social change (e.g., Fesenfeld et al., 2022; Milkoreit, 2022; Tàbara et al., 2022; Winkelmann et al., 2022). According to Milkoreit et al. (2018), a tipping point can be understood as a critical threshold crossed when a small quantitative change results in fundamental, non-linear qualitative changes in the configuration and dynamics of a given system. This process is triggered by internal feedback mechanisms, which may lead either to a new stabilized state, or to further destabilization. Other scholars have further elaborated on these ideas and introduced the notion to ‘socio-ecological tipping points’ as an integrative and transdisciplinary concept indicating those critical moments where the combination of events, individual actions, or policy interventions lead at a given moment to structural qualitative effects in coupled social-ecological systems (SES) (Tàbara et al., 2022, p. 566).

Scholars have increasingly explored the idea of positive tipping points that could shift societies on to a more sustainable path, asking how they come about and how they may be enacted for transformative change (Tàbara, 2021; Tàbara et al., 2018). Social tipping processes present a form of social change whereby a small change can shift a sensitive social system into a qualitatively different state due to strongly self-amplifying (mathematically positive) feedback mechanisms. Social tipping processes with respect to technological and energy systems, political mobilization, financial markets and sociocultural norms and behaviors have been suggested as potential key drivers towards climate action” (Winkelmann et al., 2022).

Tipping points emerge from the building blocks of previous conditions for transformative change—some deliberate, others not, and these often derived from the interlinked/intertwined incremental but synergistic effects of multiple tipping events. At one point the system tips to a different development trajectory and that the effects are not/cannot be necessarily or fully guided or anticipated by actors but are also co-managed as the new system conditions emerge, and that such conditions can be conducive to just arrangement and distribute effects (Tàbara, 2021; Tàbara et al., 2018). Social tipping processes are thus recognized as potentially key pathways for generating the necessary shifts towards climate action. (Winkelmann et al., 2022). In our analysis, we particularly emphasize tipping events—a key aspect of understanding of tipping processes—and consider how these events may have triggered specific trajectories in the Lofoten oil dispute, and more broadly in Norwegian petroleum policy, politics, and in the country’s historically pro-oil resource regime.

In 2006, the first Integrated Management Plan for the Barents Sea and Lofoten was published by the Ministry of Environment (now the Ministry of Climate and Environment). The purpose of the Norwegian marine management plans is to facilitate value creation while also maintaining natural diversity⁴ along the country’s vast coastal and ocean areas. The management plan for the Barents Sea and Lofoten introduced a framework for petroleum activities, which included the mention of the areas outside of Lofoten. The plan outlined that petroleum activities outside of Lofoten would be considered during the following parliamentary cycle and in the updated Integrated Management Plan to be published in 2010. The management plan further noted that there was a need to strengthen the knowledge base in these areas and that mapping and research should be carried out. Most significantly, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate was to carry out geological mapping in the area, which included the sampling of seismic data (Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 2006). While an impact assessment was NOT to be carried out during the 2006 parliamentary cycle, the geological mapping and the collection of seismic data was seen as putting Lofoten on the petroleum agenda (Kristoffersen & Dale, 2014: 211–212, Interview #1).

In response to the increasing national interest to put the LoVeSe regions on the petroleum map, two separate people’s movements were founded in 2006: one in Lofoten and another in Vesterålen. These two movements joined forces in 2007 with the hiring of a joint manager, and formally merged in 2009. The coalition, The People’s Action for an Oil-free Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja, soon became not only a regional but also a national force, recruiting members and establishing branches in both cities, towns, and rural areas in other parts of the country as well. In 2021, the coalition had over 7000 members,⁵ making it one of the most successful protest movements in Norway’s history. Their broad-based mobilization of members was the very foundation upon which they sought influence politics and public debate, and they soon allied with both environmental organizations, political opposition parties (and importantly their youth organizations), local businesses opposed to petroleum and the fishery organizations, the latter admittingly being the strange bedfellow in this consortium, as they in the past more often than not had been in conflict with environmentalist sentiments (as for instance concerning fishing quotas and whaling). The success of the movement has been commented on by several of our interviewees, and the coalition is highlighted as a crucial actor in the events that followed their initiation (Interviews #1, #4, #6).

In 2010, Norway and Russia resolved their 40-year long delimitation dispute in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean and established a maritime delimitation line between the two countries in the disputed areas⁶ (See Fig. 2).

A map depicts a location around the Arctic Circle, with the Barents Sea and Norwegian Sea marked. It displays a delimitation line between Norway and Russia.

The treaty brought an end to a moratorium on all forms of exploration in the disputed areas and included detailed provisions regarding potential transboundary hydrocarbon deposits. The Norwegian government wasted no time and already in 2011 included concession areas from the newly opened waters in the 22nd licensing round for the Norwegian Continental Shelf. Then in the 23rd licensing round, where “… a potential new petroleum province”⁷ was introduced with 54 blocks in the Barents Sea, 31 of which were in the new area.

The implications of these events for Lofoten’s petroleum future are twofold. While the signing of the delimitation treaty accelerated the oil industry’s push to the north, it also meant that some pressure was taken off Lofoten when a potential new oil province was now opening to the oil and gas industry and providing companies with areas to explore other than the increasingly controversial LoVeSe areas.

The concern over knowledge needs on the consequences of increased activities on the Norwegian shelf meant that a revision of the management plan was needed. During this process, it became apparent to many that the combined efforts of the scientific community and the increasingly influential industrial actors interested in access to Barents Sea and Lofoten de facto sidelined a lot of other issues and concerns from a broad range of other actors and stakeholders (von Quillfeldt, 2010; Dale, 2016; Andersen, 2017). It was felt that other potential development pathways were not included, and that the consequences of the revision of the management plan could be that rather than to protect against harmful activities, the plan would be used to define where and how it would be acceptable to initiate activities such as petroleum exploration. Decision makers in the north—and in parliament—needed another, more inclusive process of knowledge production.

Faced with this criticism, the government initiated a process aiming at filling knowledge gaps and ensuring stakeholder and actor participation. One investigation—on the positive and negative effects of an expansion of the petroleum industry—was lead by the Ministry of oil and energy, whilst five other investigations (on the potential for tourism, marine industries, cultural heritage, minerals, and renewable energy) (Regjeringen, 2013). The results covered the whole of Northern Norway but indicated also strongly that other future possibilities existed also for the Lofoten region, where opposition was the strongest against the reigning oil narrative for the north.

Just as these reports were finalized and introduced into the political debate over the future of Norwegian oil, parliamentary elections seemed at first to have provided a push in the direction of opening for more oil and gas in the north. The sitting prime minister Jens Stoltenberg lost his parliamentary support, and a right-wing Cabinet led by Erna Solberg took over. At first, proponents of oil rejoiced; however, the cabinet needed support from two center-leaning parties—Venstre (Liberals) and KrF (Christian democrats)—who both had declared Lofoten as a no- go zone for oil and gas companies. As a consequence, the strategy of postponement introduced by the Stoltenberg cabinet in 2005 and repeated in 2009 was again the result of negotiations for a parliamentary majority. This again meant four more years where ‘nothing happened’ for the oil industry in Lofoten, and as they had just been provided potentially interesting prospects further north in the Barents Sea, interest from the industry dwindled.

Another reminder of the growing sense of oil dependency in Norway came with the sudden fall in oil prices in 2014/15. As described elsewhere (ref), geopolitical petroleum powerplay between Russia and Saudi Arabia in particular led to a spike in production globally which again led to a crash in oil prices. The repercussions were seemingly managed over some time, as the Norwegian oil industry indeed has bounced back; however, the event fueled discussions about the dependency of an oil revenue that, eventually, will have to dry out, and how the Norwegian society can ensure a softer transition from a carbon to a green energy-based economy. The event had a negative effect on the overall sentiment about political decisions that could lead to an extension of the oil age, which then influenced attitudes towards opening Lofoten for oil and gas. In other words, the event further spurred initiatives for alternative future pathways.

Setting new standards for goals and strategies for a post-carbon world, the Paris agreement was yet another event that influenced the sentiments on the Lofoten case. Its influence on Norwegian political discourse was almost immediate, with both critics and sceptics chipping in, as well as all those involved in government and beyond thrilled by the prospects of a truly global movement towards decarbonization. In Norway, the signing of the agreement was yet another incident that moved the debate and development strategies towards greening the economy.

As the results from the 2017 parliamentary elections came in, it was clear that The Solberg Cabinet would continue, and once again, the LoVeSe oil issue was up for debate. However, proponents were once again left disappointed, as the necessary support from parties skeptical to petroleum development was needed; thus, the postponement strategy remained.

A mayor turning point in parliament came when the Labor party decided in 2019 to stop working to initiate an impact assessment, formally the first step in an opening process for oil extraction. The decision at the party’s annual national convention came as a result of a proposal and the significant lobbying from representatives from the youth party, AUF, who had for many years held what up to now had been the oppositional position in the party on this matter.

In 2019, a new regional development plan and private–public partnership for a low-emission island society by 2030 was established between the regional council, a regional energy company and the regional DMO. In February 2022 all six municipalities in Lofoten passed the strategic plan for green growth and prosperity in the region. Strategic areas include environmental requirements in public budgeting and procurements; zero-emissions transport zones; renewable and low-emission destination; low emission coastal fishing; low-emission agriculture and aquaculture; and low-emission aviation and electric aircrafts (Interview #7).

As a sign of these new times, the highly effective and influential people’s action movement for an oil free Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja decided to dismantle, and to go out celebrating their victory with a summer festival in Kabelvåg, Lofoten, in August 2023. The decision was made after discussions about how to maintain the necessary momentum in a movement heavily dependent on people’s acceptance of working for the organization for free, and as a possible oil future seem at present to be highly unlikely, the annual meeting decided to dissolve the organization.

The debate about oil in Lofoten took place within and across multiple scales (local, regional, national, and international), included a broad variety of diverse actors and centred around multi-faceted and cross-cutting concerns about the future of energy sources, the climate crisis, ecosystem degradation, environmental risk, biodiversity loss, economic prosperity, the welfare state, livelihoods, cultural heritage, and notions of the good life. The events we identified all influenced the decision to deviate from oil exploration in the LoVeSe region. However, the extent to which these can be labelled as tipping points is debatable. We do, however, find that there is a pattern of connections—both over time and across scales—that seem to intertwine and interact in ways that makes identification of a single event or decision as a tipping point in and of itself. In the following section we look at how alternative visions of a future beyond oil took shape.

By the late 2000s, the Norwegian oil and gas industry saw itself as at a crossroads. Oil production had dropped by 30 percent since 2000, and forecasts predicted that production could drop by another 50 per cent by 2013, with overall output expected to begin falling within the next decade (KonKraft, 2009:3). The industry argued that to slow the decline in output and maintain the substantial oil revenues so vital to the Norwegian economy, oil companies needed access to “new and attractive exploration acreage.” The solution, the industry argued, was to open further areas of the Norwegian Continental Shelf to petroleum activities and expand activities into northernmost parts of the country. The unopened areas along the north-Norwegian coast and north-eastwards to the Russian border were regarded by the petroleum industry as the most promising regions for big discoveries, and which could slow the production decline (KonKraft, 2009:3).

The Arctic and the seas outside of northern Norway were thus increasingly seen as the new frontier for Norwegian oil and gas development, and by the 2000s, there was a dominant narrative that the north ought to be opened to petroleum activities, which would kickstart a “new” Norwegian oil adventure. At the regional level, a new oil adventure in the North was seen as a prosperous pathway for economic development. Those in favor of oil argued that oil and gas would bring vitally needed economic prosperity to a region experiencing rapid out-migration, rural decline, and economic challenges. However, this dominant oil-narrative became increasingly challenged and several counter-narratives, which all centered on future development trajectories without petroleum, began to emerge and take shape over the years.

One of the earliest and strongest counternarratives to emerge saw fisheries as a vital cultural heritage and long-standing economic activity in the region. This counter-narrative centered around the concern that traditional coastal fisheries and marine-based livelihoods could not coexist with offshore oil and gas development, and that the opening to petroleum activities was a seen as an unacceptable risk to traditional fishing in the area (Interview #6). Opponents were particularly concerned about risks to the North Atlantic cod, which spawns in the Lofoten area during the winter months and has been an integral component of the region’s livelihood and cultural heritage for centuries (Kristoffersen & Dale, 2014).

The second counter-narrative to emerge saw tourism—particularly nature-based tourism—as important to the future of the region and argued that oil and gas activities conflicted with the goals of regional tourism development. In recent decades, tourism has played an increasingly important social and economic role in the Lofoten region. The local tourism industry is heavily dominated by nature- and marine-based tourism, and as such, relies on a broad set of interconnected ecosystem-based products and services, as well as a coastal cultural heritage, which are seen as at odds with oil and gas activities (Antonsen et al., 2022; Kaltenborn et al., 2017; Karlsson & Dale, 2019).

A third counter-narrative started to emerge in the early 2010s, wherein climate concerns became increasingly seen as urgent, and as time goes by references the Paris Agreement which institutionalizes these concerns. Indeed, notions of carbon risk became ever more present in public debates about new licenses throughout the 2013–2018 period. Environmental NGOs such as Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, WWF and the Bellona Foundation had mobilized against oil and gas activity in the Arctic for many years, but starting from the 23rd licensing round, opposition was much more explicitly tied to carbon risk. Similar to environmental NGOs in North America and elsewhere (Cheon & Urpelainen, 2018), they built on the Paris Agreement’s 2 °C target and the limited global carbon budget it implies to argue that Norwegian oil and gas resources should be left in the ground. Their advocacy shifted from demanding geographical limitations on oil and gas extraction to calling for a ‘managed decline’ of the industry as a whole—echoing and sometimes collaborating with international NGOs making similar claims (Bang & Lahn, 2020, p. 1002).

Finally—and to a large extent a result of a combination of the above counter-narratives—a new alternative narrative focusing on a future without oil and gas emerges as the new mainstream narrative. In particular, the idea of “The Green Islands” sets into motion a new regional development trajectory that centers on decarbonization, electrification and circularity.