Weitere Kapitel dieses Buchs durch Wischen aufrufen
This chapter presents a model in which the party that loses the general elections can still try to capture the majority in Parliament by convincing members of the majority faction to switch sides. These attempts are not successful in equilibrium. Nonetheless, the results of the general elections are partly determined by this additional stage of political conflict. Larger majorities are shown to lead to lower rent payments and some voters therefore face a trade-off between lowering rent payments by supporting the party that wins the elections or supporting their preferred party. Multiple equilibria in the general elections with either party winning are possible. Moreover, the size of the equilibrium majority is larger than when no bribes after the elections are possible.
Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu diesem Inhalt zu erhalten
Sie möchten Zugang zu diesem Inhalt erhalten? Dann informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:
Alesina, A. (1988). Credibility and policy convergence in a two-party system with rational voters. The American Economic Review, 78, 796–805.
Brennan, G, & Hamlin, A. (1998). Expressive voting and electoral equilibrium. Public Choice, 95, 149–175. CrossRef
Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper & Row.
Groseclose, T. & Snyder, J. M. (1996). Buying supermajorities. American Political Science Review, 90, 303–315. CrossRef
Hillman, A. L. (2010). Expressive behavior in economics and politics. European Journal of Political Economy, 26, 403–418. CrossRef
Persson, T. & Tabellini, G. (2002). Political economics - explaining economic policy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Riker, W. H. (1962). The theory of political coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Rent Seeking and the Size of Parliamentary Majorities
Neuer Inhalt/© Stellmach, Neuer Inhalt/© Maturus, Pluta Logo/© Pluta, digitale Transformation/© Maksym Yemelyanov | Fotolia