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2015 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Research and Teaching Awards as Elements of Incentive Systems in Academia

verfasst von : René Krempkow

Erschienen in: Incentives and Performance

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Research and teaching awards are non-monetary incentives. This contribution asks which role awards may play in order to acknowledge performance in teaching and research (This contribution is a revised version of the lecture given at the conference “Innovation, achievement performance measurement and incentive systems in academia and business—Governance of knowledge-intensive organizations” at the Technische Universität München (Munich University of Technology) on January 14th and 15th 2014. For helpful comments to my presentation and for this book chapter I like to thank some participants and the organizers of this conference. For the translation of this article I like to thank Dorit Rowedder and Susan Harris-Hümmert). It is based on surveys conducted in the context of the project “GOMED” (The project “GOMED—Governance of university medicine: Intended and non-intended effects of decentralised incentive systems using the example of the performance-based funding within the respective faculty in medicine” was funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research). The chapter is divided into three parts: The first part discusses the potential of teaching and research awards in incentive systems in academia. This discussion is based on the available literature and on our own findings. The second part presents investigations on the number as well as the prize money of awards in Germany. This includes teaching and research awards that are relevant for researchers at medical faculties in Germany as well as those that are open to other subjects. The third part summarizes and discusses possibilities of further developments for teaching and research awards, e.g., a higher prize money or a higher number of team awards.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Imaginary Contradictions of University Governance

Nächstes Kapitel Myths, Challenges, Risks and Opportunities in Evaluating and Supporting Scientific Research

On founded presumptions on non-intended incentive effects for the research area see also German Council of Science and Humanities (2011). For the teaching area, e.g., Dohmen and Henke (2012) show that intended effects are accompanied by unintended effects.

Furthermore the goal attainment of the performance-based funding is very positively related to the justice perception of performance-based funding and the discussion of the findings of performance-based funding (this applies to all target dimensions: transparency of the research achievements, efficiency and quality). It is negatively related to the reward of “mainstream research” (cf. Krempkow et al. 2013). Additionally, there was an effect of the justice perception of the performance-based funding in publication analyses, i.e.: Those faculties where the justice of the performance-based funding is perceived to be greater are the same that show greater publication performance (cf. Krempkow et al. 2013).

According to Ziegele and Handel (2004) recognition and reputation along with freedom (in the sense of autonomy), time allocation (e.g., research sabbaticals of one semester) and transparency (for all those involved with a view to triggering cost-conscious dealings) are among the non-monetary incentives. However, performance-based funding may also create space and as a result additional autonomy as well as transparency with regard to the achievements if designed correspondingly (cf. Krempkow et al. 2013). This may be the case by creating research possibilities that may otherwise not be available (cf. in greater detail Krempkow 2007). As awards usually aim at reputation and recognition, above all else, they appear to be a particularly interesting example of non-monetary incentives in this context.

The economy, too, provides examples that some companies prefer to reward quality work with personal recognition instead of money “because personal recognition has proved to be an extremely effective motivational tool” (cf. Hochschild 1998; Oelkers and Strittmatter 2004).

Also Witte et al. (2001) call for reductions of the teaching load and sabbaticals to be used as non-monetary incentives to avoid “that monetary incentives replace or even destroy the existing intrinsic motivation” (cf. Minssen and Wilkesmann 2003; Hellemacher et al. 2005; Krempkow 2007). As far as incentives in the context of university teaching are concerned, it is uncertain though whether reductions of the teaching load and similar releases from lecture can point the way to the desired direction in order to strengthen the significance of teaching compared to research as sought by politics.

The theory of awards has not had any major developments in the last 30 years (Frey and Gallus 2014).

Frey and Gallus (2014) used the principal-agent framework to describe the relationship between the award giver and the award winner and (potential) recipients.

By bestowing awards, the principal emits signals about his or her quality that monetary rewards cannot transmit: First, the principal signals a high degree of interpersonal skills (e.g., attentiveness); second, the award can serve as a signal of the principal's authority within the organizational hierarchy.

Crowding out means (in short terms): External interventions reduce intrinsic motivation and replace by extrinsic motivation if the individuals affected perceive them to be controlling (and not supporting) (cf. Frey 1997).

Until now, there is little evidence on the effect of awards on performance in German academia [which is also observed in the non-academic sector (cf. Neckermann et al. 2012)]. A noteworthy study on research awards is by Chan et al. (2013), which shows that the scientific performance of the award winner is significant higher than in a synthetic control group. For teaching awards Wilkesmann and Schmid (2012) show in a regression analysis a significant higher intrinsic teaching motivation for teaching award winners at universities.

From 2010 to 2013 the author headed the GOMED project organized as part of the iFQ Berlin, Germany.

N in each of the surveys was more than 600 respondents. The scientific staff survey includes post-docs, PhDs and senior researchers. Detailed reports on the findings of the surveys including methodological explanations are available on the project website: www.forschungsinfo.de/Projekte/GOMED/projekte_gomed.asp.

Furthermore, we asked questions such as which performance indicators were used in the faculties of medicine, and which indicators should be used from the view of academics (cf. Krempkow et al. 2013).

In our survey only those respondents who had previously indicated that they were aware of further mechanisms of incentive were asked this question. Semi-structured interviews (conducted as a part of the GOMED project) permitted us to deduce that those further incentive mechanisms include objective agreements, innovation funds and non-monetary incentives such as awards and sabbatical semesters.

Here we have to take into account that in such survey data the respondents answer not independently from social desirability. For the analysis of the effects of awards it is therefore recommended to include other methods, e.g., publication and citation analyses [for an example of awards for economists see Chan et al. (2013); for bibliometric analyses of publication and citation data in medicine see Krempkow et al. (2013)].

For the latter aspect the amount of the income is nevertheless considered to be an important so-called hygiene factor (Herzberg 1966) whose existence alone does not lead to greater achievements on a permanent level, but whose drop below a certain level perceived as appropriate, may have an adverse effect.

For the group of professors the amount of raised external funding is ranked in third position.

There might also be other reasons. Some scientists might care more for publications in order to advance their career and/or gain power.

The “should-be state” of performance indicators was assessed in a survey of young academics in the field of economics in Germany. Therefore the number of research awards was also revealed as an indicator which should be used to measure research performance (cf. Wollersheim et al. 2014).

According to a nationwide survey, 9 % of the teaching staff has already received teaching awards. It can be assumed that many of these are faculty- or subject-level awards. In the overview of Jorzik (2010) presumably the letter are not included. In comparison—according to Wilkesmann and Schmid (2010)—only 5 % of the professors received achievement-related income bonuses and 42 % a performance-based funding on chair level.

The Stifterverband is the business community’s innovation agency for the German academic system.

The survey was conducted in 2010/2011 and the prize money of individual awards may have changed in the meantime. It can be assumed, however, that the charted fundamental dimensions have not been very liable to change. Furthermore it can be assumed that our survey is still the most recent and most complete survey that is available, at least in this area. Frey and Gallus (2014) also stated that reliable data on award bestowals is not yet available and will require much work in the future.

‘Medicine/healthcare’ was entered as the special field in the drop-down menu of the database on academics.de: We gathered all scientific awards that were found. In the database on forschen.foerdern.de ‘human medicine’, ‘diagnoses’ were entered as special fields and ‘scientists’, ‘university lecturers’ as target groups.

All findings that were not yet available in the database of academics.de were gathered (comparing the titles using the search function). As there were hardly any details available on awards in the database of forschen-foerdern.org, we used google.de to search for the name of the award to receive information on prize money. As a rule, the first two result pages were searched, as this turned out to be sufficient in most cases. When there was no prize money, this was marked in our database in addition to when no information was found. Any variations in prize money that was indicated in the database were noted. When there were additional awards (medals, certificates) this was also documented. ‘Scholarships’ were specified separately. Any items that did not fall in the categories ‘research awards’ or ‘scholarships’ were included in ‘Miscellaneous’. I thank our former assistant Verena Walter for this work.

According to Frey and Gallus (2014) two types of awards can be assumed, while most research and/or teaching awards are confirmatory awards. Unfortunately in the databases it is not possible to allocate it exactly.

In a specific search run for medicine alone, approximately 300 of those awards could be found and thus display the majority.

This is the arithmetic mean. The distributions are skew. The median for research awards is 10,000 €.

Some federal states (such as Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Rhineland-Palatinate) and some German universities have been awarding teaching awards for some time; not all of these are included in our analysis (e.g., the Universität Münster, the Technische Universität Dresden, the Technische Universität Bergakademie Freiberg as early as in the 1990s). Many of these awards have been bestowed only recently. This may be the reason why teaching awards are not completely recorded, despite the intensive efforts undertaken by Jorzik (2010). The nine percent of teaching staff that according to Wilkesmann and Schmid (2010) have received an award may also be incompletely recorded because of this reason. However, teaching awards usually attract public attention so that the estimated number of unreported cases might be low.

cf. Hornbostel (2002) on the relation of frequency and value of awards in the former German Democratic Republic (East Germany between 1949 and 1990).

This is the arithmetic mean. The distributions are skew. The median for teaching awards is 5,000 €.

Multivariate analyses (that we have not introduced here) show, furthermore, that the goal attainment of incentive systems is positively related to the reputation relevance (cf. Krempkow et al. 2013).

In an unpublishes analysis of case studies of the implemetation of incentives in German universities was found, that the background of the implementation of teaching awards often was to find a balance with the existing research incentives (cf. Dohmen et al. [in preparation] and to other project results cf. Dohmen and Henke 2012).

The total amount could be divided into 10 awards of 2,500 € each.

This can be divided in up to 10 awards; it is awarded for outstanding lectures, long-standing teaching on a high level of content and didactics (proven by evaluation), and innovative teaching concepts.

This state award “for particularly good achievements in teaching” was already established in the middle of the 1990s. According to the Ministry of Science, Research and Arts Baden-Württemberg (MWK Baden-Württemberg) it “not only led to a fundamental discussion of the subject of teaching and the criteria of good teaching, but also encouraged a competition of ideas and implementations of good teaching both within and across universities and thus contributed to an increase in quality altogether”. It allows individuals, or working groups of up to five members or entire organizational units in charge of teaching, e.g., faculties, institutions, and seminars, to be put forward (MWK BaWü 2009, the same as MWK BaWü 2012).

In comparison the prize money for the “lecturer of the year” was 5,000 €.

“New Australian Awards for University Teaching”: $ 50,000 (Prime Ministers Award “Teacher of the year”), $ 25,000 (40 awards, corresponds to the approx. number of universities) up to $ 10,000 (210 awards: approx. number of faculties).

By bestowing awards on only selected agents, the principal runs the risk of affronting those who are not awarded. The danger of negative effects is particularly high in small and homogenous groups (Frey and Gallus 2014). Another reason might it be that research (and partly teaching) is in some fields (nowadays) conducted in groups and thus group performance should be honored as such.

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Titel: Research and Teaching Awards as Elements of Incentive Systems in Academia
verfasst von: René Krempkow
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Incentives and Performance
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-09784-8

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-09785-5

Copyright-Jahr: 2015
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-09785-5_13

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