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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

38. Rules Versus Discretion in Criminal Sentencing

verfasst von : Daniel J. D’Amico

Erschienen in: James M. Buchanan

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Does a system of fixed punitive rules or an adaptive system of discretionary authority better assure proportionate punishment and incarceration outcomes? Do fixed rules or discretionary interventions better avoid the social consequences of mass incarceration? This chapter leverages theoretical insights from the Public Choice tradition regarding monetary policy to inform and progress applied debates surrounding mass incarceration.

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Titel: Rules Versus Discretion in Criminal Sentencing
verfasst von: Daniel J. D’Amico
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: James M. Buchanan
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-03079-7

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-03080-3

Copyright-Jahr: 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03080-3_38