1 Introduction
ARGUMENT SCHEME
as a primarily logical concept.5 Moreover, Lumer seems to downplay the influence of the Aristotelian Topics (ibid., 2), whereas our own attempt seeks to incorporate them by enriching a logical with a substantive approach.2 Why a Logical Account of Argument Schemes?
2.1 Levels
(1a) | Argument scheme ‘from a position to know’; theoretical level, instance 1 |
a is in a position to know whether A is true. | |
a asserts that A is true. | |
A is true. |
(1b) | Argument scheme ‘from a position to know’; theoretical level, instance 2 |
a is in a position to know whether A is true. | |
a asserts that A is true. | |
If a is in a position to know whether A is true, and a asserts that A is true, then A is true. | |
A is true. |
(1c) | Argument scheme ‘from a position to know’; theoretical level, instance 3 |
a is in a position to know whether A is true. | |
a asserts that A is true. | |
a is an honest (trustworthy, reliable) source. | |
A is true. |
(1a′) | Argument scheme ‘from a position to know’; applied level, instance 1 |
Harry is in a position to know whether ‘Mary is the murderer’ is true. | |
Harry asserts, “‘Mary is the murderer’ is true.”7 | |
‘Mary is the murderer’ is true. |
(1b′) | Argument scheme ‘from a position to know’; applied level, instance 2 |
Harry is in a position to know whether ‘Mary is the murderer’ is true. | |
Harry asserts, “‘Mary is the murderer’ is true.” | |
If Harry is in a position to know whether ‘Mary is the murderer’ is true, and Harry asserts ‘Mary is the murderer’, then ‘Mary is the murderer’ is true. | |
‘Mary is the murderer’ is true. |
(1c′) | Argument scheme ‘from a position to know’; applied level, instance 3 |
Harry is in a position to know whether ‘Mary is the murderer’ is true. | |
Harry asserts “‘Mary is the murderer’ is true.” | |
Harry is an honest (trustworthy, reliable) source. | |
‘Mary is the murderer’ is true. |
(1a″) | Argument scheme ‘from a position to know’; meta-level, instance 1 |
Premise(s) | |
Conclusion |
(1b″) | Argument scheme ‘from a position to know’; meta-level, instance 2 |
Premise(s) | |
If premise(s), then conclusion | |
Conclusion |
(1c″) | Argument scheme ‘from a position to know’; meta-level, instance 3 |
Premise(s) | |
Absence of exception(s) | |
Conclusion |
2.2 A Logical Account of Argument Schemes
(2) | Defeasible modus ponens rule |
P | |
If P then usually Q | |
Therefore (presumably), Q |
(3) | Argument scheme ‘from a position to know’; defeasible inference rule |
a is in a position to know whether A is true. | |
a asserts that A is true. | |
A is true. |
(4) | Argument scheme ‘from a position to know’; generalised conditional premise |
a is in a position to know whether A is true. | |
a asserts that A is true. | |
If a is in a position to know if A is true, and a asserts that A is true, then A is true. | |
A is true. |
(5) | Argument scheme ‘from a position to know’; inference-rule account with exception-premise(s) |
a is in a position to know whether A is true. | |
a asserts that A is true. | |
a is an honest (trustworthy, reliable) source. | |
A is true. |
(6) | Meta-level logical structure for any argument scheme |
Premise(s) | |
If premise(s), then conclusion | |
Therefore, conclusion |
3 A Substantive Account of Argument Schemes
3.1 The Pragma-Dialectical Theory
3.2 A Substantive Account’s Benefits
(7) | Combined argument scheme at the meta-level |
Premise(s). | |
The relation R holds between the referents of premise(s) and conclusion. | |
Therefore, conclusion. |
(8a) | Example, similarity relation, applied level |
“The method I propose worked last year (and this problem is similar to last year’s), so the method will work again.” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, 97) |
(8b) | Example, similarity relation, theoretical level |
“For [problem] X, [method] Y is valid because [, f]or [problem] Z, [method] Y is valid and X is comparable [because it is relevantly similar] to Z.” (van Eemeren and Kruiger 1987, 73f.) |
(8c) | Example, similarity relation, meta-level |
For X, Y is valid because, for Z, Y is valid; and the relation R connects X and Z. |
(9a) | Example, similarity relation, applied level |
The method I propose worked last year (and the method’s proven problem-solving ability for last year’s problem is similar to the method’s problem-solving validity for this year’s problem, because the problems are similar), so the method will work again. |
(9b) | Example, similarity relation, theoretical level |
Premise(s). | |
Therefore, conclusion. |
(9c) | General relation, meta-level |
Premise(s). | |
Therefore, conclusion. |
3.3 Defining Argument Scheme
ARGUMENT SCHEME
, yet the scheme itself remains distinct from the concept.12Second, argument schemes do not merely cite substantive information that a logical account abstracts “away,” they also cite such information at structural positions that a logical account helps identify. A logical and a substantive account are therefore complementary. Third, if one were to define an argument scheme at the meta-level in terms of the substantive relation alone, then one would capture merely the ‘if–then’ premise. However, one could obviously not saturate this scheme any further to (re-)construct an argument at the applied-level. We therefore define as follows:Definition of ‘argument scheme’: S is an argument scheme if, and only if, S is a meta-level argument with at least one premise and a conclusion, where the transfer of the premise(s)’s acceptability to the conclusion grounds in a substantive—as opposed to a logical—relation, R, that holds between the scheme’s sentences, their parts, or their referents.
4 Argument Evaluation on the Toulmin Model
4.1 The Toulmin Model
4.2 Evaluation Criteria
4.3 Making Toulmin’s Model More Precise
4.4 Warrant, Backing, and Qualifier
(10) | D–W–C version |
(D) Petersen is a Swede. | |
(W) A Swede can be taken almost certainly not to be a Roman Catholic. | |
So, (C) Petersen is almost certainly not a Roman Catholic. |
(11) | D–B–C version |
(D) Petersen is a Swede. | |
(B) The proportion of Roman Catholics Swedes is minute. | |
So, (C) Petersen is almost certainly not a Roman Catholic. |
5 CQs as Argument Attacks or Rebuttals
5.1 Three Attack Types
5.2 Five Rebuttal Types
(11) | Five elements one may argue against |
1. The data, D | |
2. The claim, C | |
3. The warrant, W | |
4. The associated conditional ‘if D, then C’ expressing the bridge from D to C | |
5. The associated conditional ‘if W, then if D, then C’ expressing the bridge between W and ‘if D, then C’ |
5.3 From Five Types to Three
6 A Complete CQ-List
6.1 Premise, Inference, and Conclusion Attacks
6.2 Towards a Complete Meta-Level CQ-List
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CQ-1. Are the data correct?
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CQ-2. Is ‘If D, then C’ correct?
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CQ-3. Is the claim correct?
6.3 Full Meta-Level CQ-List
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CQ-1 Is D correct?
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If not, or if no clear answer is forthcoming, then the evaluation process stops, resulting in a negative evaluation.
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If yes, then the evaluation process continues.
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CQ-2.1 What is the intended category of D’s subject?
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If no clear answer comes forth, the process stops with a negative evaluation.
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Otherwise, the evaluation continues.
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CQ-2.2 What is the content of the ‘D therefore C’-relation?
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If no clear answer comes forth, the process stops with a negative evaluation.
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Otherwise, the evaluation process continues.
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CQ-2.3 Does the relation between D’s intended category and C’s predicate hold necessarily?
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If yes, then the process stops with a positive evaluation.
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If not, or if no clear answer comes forth, then the evaluation continues.
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CQ-2.4 Does D’s subject belong to an exception-class of its intended category (as per CQ-2.1)?
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If yes, then the process stops with a negative evaluation.
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If not, then the process stops with a positive evaluation.
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If no clear answer comes forth, then the evaluation continues.
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CQ-3.1 Can one offer additional relevant data (D*) besides D?
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If no clear answer comes forth, the process stops with a negative evaluation.
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If yes, then add these data, and return to CQ-1.
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If no, then the evaluation continues.
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CQ-3.2 Are there other arguments against the claim?20
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If yes, then evaluate these arguments (pros versus cons).
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If no, then the process stops with a positive evaluation.
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6.4 Applying the CQs
6.5 Standardization
(1) | D, so C |
(2) | W, so C |
(3) | B, so C |
(4) | D, W, so C |
(5) | D, B, so C |
(6) | W, B, so C |
(7) | D, W, B, so C |
7 Conclusion
ARGUMENT SCHEME
as a logical concept, we have sought to capitalize on the distinction between an argument scheme’s levels, separating an applied level, from a theoretical, and a meta-level. If this approach to evaluating natural language arguments completely does succeed, then this would be so because we proceeded from the outset at the meta-level. This showed that one can abstract all elements that a complete evaluation must address. Although this result is fully consistent with a logical account, we also saw why a substantive account must complement it, and how a specification of Toulmin’s model can ground this hybrid account. Having applied our complete CQ-list so far only exemplarily, future research should relate our meta-level CQs to the applied level in order to obtain specific criteria for a given scheme. This should advance the construction of an exhaustive list of applied CQs.