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Erschienen in:
2019 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
11. Social Coordination and Network Formation with Heterogeneous Constraints
verfasst von : Qingchao Zeng
Erschienen in: Game Theory for Networking Applications
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Abstract
In this paper, we consider a co-evolutionary model of social coordination and network formation, where heterogeneous agents of two groups make a decision on action in a 2 × 2 coordination game as well as the population with whom they costly interact. Agents of two groups support different constraints of active links. We find that in the situation of low linking cost, the co-existence of payoff dominate and risk dominate absorbing sets is determined by the population size of each group and the number of agents choosing the efficient action, not the size of overall population. If the number of agents with larger constraints is relatively larger than the size of another group’s population, and if the smaller constraint is larger than the number of efficient players, co-existence of both absorbing sets is able to be observed.