Public Choice

Political science and public choice: 1950–70

William C. Mitchell

A general equilibrium model of two group conflict with endogenous intra-group sharing rules

Suk Jae Noh

Opposition backlash and platform convergence in a spatial voting model with campaign contributions

Richard Ball

Capital structure and performance: Evidence from a transition economy on an aspect of corporate governance

Sumit K. Majumdar, Pradeep Chhibber

Cost disease versus Leviathan explanations of rising government cost: An empirical investigation

J. Stephen Ferris, Edwin G. West

Colonial legacies and economic growth

Robin M. Grier

The hazard rate of political regimes

Ricardo Sanhueza

Nash equilibrium strategies in directional models of two- candidate spatial competition

Samuel Merrill, Bernard Grofman, Scott L. Feld

A political economic analysis of congressional voting patterns on NAFTA

In-Bong Kang, Kenneth Greene

Central bank independence and inflation: Corporatism, partisanship, and alternative indices of central bank independence

Thomas Oatley

Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations

Kofi O. Nti

Voter turnout: How much can we explain?

John G. Matsusaka, Filip Palda

The feasibility of a desirable minimal state

Roger Nils Folsom, Rodolfo Alejo Gonzalez

Fighting pollution when decisions are strategic: A reply

Manfred J. Holler

Karen I. Vaughn, Austrian economics in America: The migration of a tradition. Cambridge University Press, 1994. xiv + 198 pages. $54.95 (cloth).

Mark Thornton

Werner Troesken, Why regulate utilities?: The new institutional economics and the Chicago gas industry, 1849-1924. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997. 132 pages. $37.50 (cloth).

James F. Dewey

Michael A. Crew (Ed.), Pricing and regulatory innovations under increasing competition. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996. x + 205 pages. $75.00 (cloth).

Edward E. Zajac

Volume contents

Author index