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Social Choice and Welfare

Erschienen in:

03.04.2017 | Original Paper

Free riding on successors, delay, and extremism

verfasst von: Amihai Glazer, Stef Proost

Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare | Ausgabe 4/2017

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Abstract

An incumbent who can shift the cost of action to a successor may choose to avoid incurring the cost of an action the incumbent favors, resulting in delay. The delay will be longer the closer the preferences of officials to each other, the higher the fixed cost of action, and the higher the discount rate. Incumbents with moderate preferences have a greater incentive to postpone action than do extremists.

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See Arrow and Fisher (1974), Pindyck (1991), and Dixit (1992).

See Glazer et al. (1998).

See Bendor et al. (2001) for a survey regarding reasons to delegate.

Though we discuss mixed strategies, similar results can appear with correlated equilibria. For example, s could be the probability that the successor will be a Democrat, and the equilibrium could have a Democrat take action, whereas a Republican would not.

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Titel: Free riding on successors, delay, and extremism
verfasst von: Amihai Glazer
Stef Proost
Publikationsdatum: 03.04.2017
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare / Ausgabe 4/2017
Print ISSN: 0176-1714
Elektronische ISSN: 1432-217X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1043-y

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