nach oben

Erschienen in:

2019 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

8. Summary

verfasst von : Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi

Erschienen in: Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

This chapter concludes the analysis of the 20 voting procedures in terms of 5 voting paradoxes in restricted domains characterized by the existence of a Condorcet winner which at the same time is elected by the procedure under investigation. The restricted domain provides a perspective to how much difference various profile types make in terms of the possibility of encountering a voting paradox. In this analysis we contrast the general (unrestricted) domain with one where the initial outcome is stable. We illustrate the problems involved in the choice of an appropriate procedure by discussing the recent proposal for electoral reform suggested by Maskin and Sen.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Vorheriges Kapitel The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Preference Inversion Paradox in a Restricted Domain

These 5 paradoxes are: various types of Monotonicity failure, the Inconsistency (or Reinforcement) paradox, the No-Show paradox, the violation of the Subset Choice Condition (SCC) and the Preference Inversion paradox—analyzed in this booklet in Chaps. 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, respectively.

There are various estimates as to the relative frequency of finding cyclical majorities in the social preference ordering as a function of the number of voters and competing alternatives. These estimates are based on various theoretical assumptions and computer simulations, as well as on some laboratory experiments and limited actual election results conducted under some voting procedures. These estimates, in general, seem to be quite low.

This article can be viewed in the following website: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/01/opinion/sunday/how-majority-rule-might-have-stopped-donald-trump.html.

In contrast, note that the Plurality with Runoff procedure is invulnerable to two of the five paradoxes analyzed in this booklet, i.e., to the No-Show and to the Preference Inversion paradoxes.

The only Condorcet-consistent procedure in Table 8.1 which seems to have an advantage over the Plurality Voting procedure is Minimax, which is vulnerable to only the Preference Inversion paradox.

The Condorcet loser is a candidate that would be defeated by all the others if pairwise majority comparisons were conducted and the voters voted according to their preferences.

Felsenthal, D. S., & Nurmi, H. (2018). Voting procedures for electing a single candidate: Proving their (in)vulnerability to various voting paradoxes. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.CrossRef

Titel: Summary
verfasst von: Dan S. Felsenthal
Hannu Nurmi
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-12626-1

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-12627-8

Copyright-Jahr: 2019
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12627-8_8