Swedish Security Policy in a New Security Environment

However, Sweden has never been, nor is it now isolated, or solely relied on its own capability. Defence cooperation with other countries has been and remains essential to strengthening Sweden’s military capabilities to respond to armed attacks and to raise the conflict deterrence threshold. Today, Sweden takes part in approximately twenty defence cooperation initiatives, which have created the conditions for, and contributed to, a high level of interoperability with strategic partners. It has enhanced the ability to act together in a crisis and ultimately in war.

Over the last decade, the Nordic countries have further intensified their foreign, security and defence cooperation. Within the framework of the Nordic Defence Cooperation, NORDEFCO, defence cooperation in the region has been enhanced through extensive training activities, exchange of air surveillance information, easier access to each other’s territories, a crisis consultation mechanism and secure communication systems. Defence ministers of Nordic countries hold regular crisis consultations.

Sweden’s defence cooperation with Finland is of particular significance. In a deteriorating security environment, the importance of Finnish-Swedish cooperation has become increasingly clear. Specific areas of cooperation include joint operation planning, exercises, combined military units, the establishment of secure communication systems, air and maritime surveillance, defence material, mutual use of military infrastructure as well as personnel exchanges. In 2020, the Swedish parliament granted the Government extended rights to provide and receive operational military support within the framework of defence cooperation between our two countries.

At the same time, Sweden maintains close defence cooperation with our other neighbours Norway and Denmark on a bilateral basis. Bilateral cooperation also extends to the Baltic countries in the defence and security policy arena.

In addition, Sweden maintains defence and security cooperation with other countries in Europe, within the European Union, and with the United States. Sweden has a shared interest with the United States in improving the ability to act together in a crisis. Following the signing of a bilateral Statement of Intent, SoI, in 2016, cooperation between the United States and Sweden has developed and been solidified.

Sweden also has a long-standing tradition of supporting the UN and has reason to continue to be active in all areas of the UN’s work, such as peace and security, development cooperation and human rights.

Sweden has since 1948 contributed with more than 80,000 Swedes to UN peacekeeping operations: from the very first group of military observers in 1948 in the Golan heights, to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) on the Korean Peninsula, ONUC in the Congo, UNIFIL in Lebanon, UNPROFOR in Bosnia and MINUSMA in Mali, to only mention a few examples. Swedish participation has been greatly appreciated, especially in light of the high quality of our personnel and skill. Sweden has unique capabilities in a number of areas that are crucial to UN peacekeeping, especially as conflicts have become increasingly complex and require specialised capabilities.

However, within the current cooperation framework, there is no guarantee that Sweden would be helped if it were target of a threat or attack. If I had been asked one and a half years ago if Sweden had any intention of joining NATO in the near or intermediate future, my answer would have been that I could not foresee it. Russia’s large-scale aggression¹ against Ukraine, launched a year ago, on February 24, 2022, was of a nature and scope that Europe has not experienced since the Second World War. The fabric of European Security was torn apart and was an order that was based on the fundamental principles of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris and the other commitments of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE, and includes territorial integrity, every state’s right to independently determine its security policy and the right to self-defence. Through its actions, Russia failed to adhere to the rules-based international order despite its commitments to do so.

It was a watershed moment because Russia’s actions immediately gave rise to a structural, long-term and significant deterioration of the security environment in the region around Sweden, in the rest of Europe and globally. It raised questions about how Sweden could best guarantee its national security. The Government concluded that Russian provocation and retaliatory measures against Sweden could not be ruled out.

Global developments require an active, broad-based and responsible foreign and security policy. It is Sweden’s view that challenges and threats should, as far as possible, be met in cooperation with other countries and organisations. Political, diplomatic and international dialogue contributes to Sweden’s security and national interests.

The United Nations plays a central role in the multilateral, rules-based international order. The principles and rules of intergovernmental cooperation set out in the UN Charter form the basis of the global collective security system. However, the UN’s ability to act to resolve crisis affecting permanent members of the Security Council is limited by the right of veto.

The significant deterioration of the security environment has highlighted the importance of continuing to deepen Sweden’s defence and security cooperation frameworks. Cooperation with the Nordic countries and other partner countries with engagement in the Baltic Sea region is especially important. While Sweden welcomes the development of the EU’s civil and military crisis management capacity, as well as the cooperation to strengthen the resilience and capability development in the Member States, in line with the objectives of the Strategic Compass adopted in 2022, the necessary conditions are not in place to able defence obligations to be provided within the EU. Such arrangements were not comparable to NATO membership.

In this rapidly deteriorating security environment, the Swedish government took the decision to apply for NATO membership on 18 May 2022. This decision enjoys broad support in the Swedish parliament. NATO membership is in line with the solidarity-based security policy that has been the basis of Sweden’s security policy for a long time.

NATO membership will not affect Sweden’s ability to continue to promote the basic values of Swedish foreign and security policy. Membership would be complementary to Sweden’s engagement in the EU, the UN and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE. Several European countries have driven the development of multilateral formats with increased intensity in recent years. For NATO allies, these cooperation formats are complementary to NATO membership. In these, Sweden will continue to be able to push for security-related issues based on its own decisions and respect for democracy, human rights, the rule of law, women’s political and economic participation, and the fight against climate change. Sweden will remain a driving force in international efforts for gender equality and the women, peace and security agenda.

As this article is written, Sweden’s NATO membership is still awaiting ratification by all NATO members. The Swedish Government’s report to the parliament,² which preceded the decision to join NATO wrote that for Sweden, the primary effect of NATO membership would be that Sweden would become part of NATO’s collective security and be covered by the security guarantees enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The report also stated that Russia (or the Soviet Union) had never attacked a NATO Ally, but it has recently attacked non-NATO countries. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the measures NATO has highlighted the distinction between the countries that are covered by NATO’s defence guarantees and those that are not. The importance of being covered by guarantees increased as Russia showed its readiness to carry out a large-scale military attack on a neighbouring country.

As a NATO member, Sweden would be obliged to consider an armed attack on an Ally as an attack on Sweden and to assist that Ally by taking such action as it deems necessary, including military, should a situation in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter arise.

NATO takes decisions by consensus and, if Article 5 is invoked, each individual member country reserves the right to determine the form of assistance to provide to other allies.

Sweden would be expected to contribute to NATO’s deterrence and defence posture. Like all allies, Sweden would be expected to contribute in a spirit of solidarity to operations to defend individual NATO countries.

Given its strategic geographical location, Sweden would primarily contribute to NATO through defence of Swedish territory and its neighbourhood. Swedish NATO membership would raise the threshold for military conflicts and thus have a deterrent effect in northern Europe.

With both Sweden and Finland as NATO members, all Nordic and Baltic countries would be covered by collective defence guarantees. The current uncertainty as to what form collective action would take if a security crisis or armed attack occurred would decrease. From a security perspective, the Baltic Sea region and the Cap of the North constitute a single area, and, as members, Sweden and Finland would be fully involved in NATO defence planning for that area. Through NATO membership, Sweden would not only strengthen its own security, but also contribute to the security of like-minded countries.

As already being a partner, Sweden has had long-standing cooperation with NATO within the framework of NATO’s operational planning. Membership would however substantially improve the conditions for integrated defence planning. NATO has a command structure with a unique capability to lead large-scale and demanding military operations. The integrated command structure enables the allies to operate together more effectively and swiftly than what would otherwise be possible. NATO also provides an infrastructure that incorporates air surveillance and defence and advanced logistics cooperation.

The United States is the most important factor for security in Europe. The United States has made clear that European countries outside NATO do not receive bilateral defence guarantees. Regardless of administration, the United States has pushed for European countries to assume greater responsibility for their own security. Even if Sweden does not receive formal guarantees or become a NATO member, the United States is important for Sweden’s defence.

Swedish NATO membership would make Sweden—as a member of a multilateral organisation with formal collective commitments—less dependent on its bilateral, and in this context, non-formalised relationship with the United States. NATO membership would mean that Sweden would receive collective defence guarantees from NATO’s member countries under the North Atlantic Treaty.

NATO membership also entails committing to the organisation’s nuclear doctrine and strategic deterrence policy. At the same time, NATO decisions are taken by consensus, and every member has the right to take a position on decisions concerning the deployment or use of nuclear weapons on its own territory as, for example, Denmark, Lithuania, Norway and Spain have done. NATO has stated that the Alliance will work to reduce strategic risk as long as nuclear weapons exist.

A number of NATO countries are committed to disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and this will remain a foreign and security policy priority for the Swedish government. The work will be carried out not least within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty for nuclear weapons (NPT) as well as through the Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament, with a view to strengthening the implementation of the NPT, reducing polarisation between countries and achieving concrete steps on the way towards the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Due to military-strategic and military-geographical factors, Sweden would inevitably be involved if a military conflict arose in northern Europe. NATO would expect support and collaboration, based on Sweden’s partnership and Modalities for Strengthened Interaction, MSI, that were activated in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Similarly, Russia’s defence and security structures essentially already include Sweden in NATO’s sphere. Sweden had the status of an Enhanced Opportunities Partner of NATO, which is a framework for an individually designed partnership that focuses on political dialogue, training and exercises, and information exchange. Cooperation with NATO has been key to developing the capabilities of the Swedish Armed Forces, both for national defence and for operations in our neighbourhood and beyond. Following Russia’s illegal aggression against Ukraine in 2014, NATO’s cooperation with Sweden and Finland deepened. Following the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Sweden and Finland activated Modalities for Strengthened Interaction, MSI, which intensified information exchange and coordination of activities and strategic communication linked to the crisis.

The UN and NATO cooperate on peacekeeping operations, training, mine clearance, the fight against terrorism and in the area of women, peace and security. In a Joint Declaration in 2018, the two organisation set out plans for their joint efforts in these and other areas. The UN Security Council has given a mandate for NATO crisis management operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya, as well as NATO Training Mission in Iraq. As a partner country, Sweden has also participated in a number of NATO-led operations, including the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya and Kosovo (KFOR).

Russia assumes that Sweden will cooperate with NATO on a deep and broad basis if a crisis or war involving both Sweden and NATO countries arises (or only NATO countries in Sweden’s neighbourhood). On the other hand, Sweden would lack the defence guarantees that NATO membership provides, which would potentially be associated with a low risk for Russia if it took unilateral action against Swedish territory early in a conflict, for example, by attempting to take control of the Swedish island Gotland in the Baltic Sea. Sweden would therefore need to have greater military capability to defend itself and assert its territorial integrity without NATO support. This would require major investments and, in addition to the announced two percent of GDP, an increased defence budget for years to come.

The report also noted that if both Sweden and Finland became NATO members, their bilateral cooperation would also develop within the framework of NATO, where bilateral operational planning for certain situations or specific geographical areas could complement or become part of NATO defence planning. Interoperability with NATO member countries would increase further if Sweden were fully integrated into different NATO structures. Ongoing cooperation would continue, including air surveillance information exchange, territorial surveillance and the assertion of territorial integrity, but it would need to be adapted—to varying degrees—to new circumstances.

NORDEFCO could be deepened within NATO. This applies to joint planning, capability development and logistics solutions within both NORDEFCO and Nordic trilateral and bilateral cooperation.

Nordic-Baltic cooperation could also be deepened and include a greater focus on practical collaboration and joint planning. Sweden would be able to maintain the same bilateral security cooperation arrangements under the military leadership of Western countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and France. Sweden’s bilateral cooperation with the United States would benefit through greater scope for advancing bilateral defence cooperation. This is especially important, as Sweden has ambitions to, and is interested in, furthering its cooperation with the United States.

Bilateral defence cooperation with leading European countries, such as the United Kingdom, France and Germany could deepen. If Sweden and Finland joined NATO, regional defence cooperation initiatives such as the JEF and EI2 would only comprise NATO countries, which could facilitate coordination and complement NATO’s other operations in times of conflict.

All in all, the report concluded, it can be said that Sweden’s existing bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation could be enhanced if Sweden joined NATO. Cooperation with countries in Sweden’s neighbourhood could serve as a platform for shared responsibility within NATO for the Baltic Sea region and the Cap of the North. Sweden’s extensive defence and security policy dialogue and high level of interoperability with other countries in the neighbourhood would contribute to this.

Hence, through the membership Sweden’s national security will be significantly strengthened. At the same time the entire responsibility of NATO will be Sweden's responsibility—an attack on one member is an attack on all. Or, as recently expressed by the Swedish Prime Minister, through an equally well-known phrase: one for all, all for one.