8. Swedish Trade Unions and Migration: Challenges and Responses

Migration has become an increasingly contested issue in Sweden. The single most important catalyst for the restrictive sentiments that dominate Swedish migration politics today was the so-called refugee crisis of 2015. In that year, the nation received almost 160,000 asylum seekers, mostly from Syria and Afghanistan (Eurostat, 2016), among the highest numbers of refugees in the EU relative to recipient country population. This quickly led to pivots among almost all parties, especially Socialdemokraterna (S—Social Democrats) and the conservative Moderaterna (M—Moderate Party), both of which had previously been more welcoming toward migrants (Neergaard & Woolfson, 2017). Initially, this new consensus on migration skepticism in the parliament mainly concerned refugees; however, more recently, the broad political consensus to reduce immigration also includes labor migration. For instance, almost all residence permits now granted for refugees in Sweden are temporary (whereas before 2016 they were generally permanent), more stringent rules apply for family reunions, and stricter requirements for financial support (i.e., salaried work) have been introduced (and, as of 2022, even higher levels are being considered by the government).

The political trauma of the refugee crisis still looms large, as indicated by the initial response from Sweden’s Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson when asked about Sweden’s preparedness for Ukrainian refugees from the war with Russia in February 2022: “We can never come back to the situation of 2015” (DN, 2022). This hawkish reaction to a severe humanitarian crisis in a neighboring country sharply departs from the modern Swedish (especially Social Democratic) tradition, dating back to Prime Minister Olof Palme in the 1970s and 1980s, when the country viewed itself as a “humanitarian superpower.”⁵ What does the trauma consist of and why is it so entrenched? To understand this we must return to 2010, when the Sweden Democrats managed to pass the threshold (four percent of the votes) required to gain seats in the Swedish Parliament. A radical right-wing party formed by neo-Nazis and anti-immigration activists in the 1980s, the party almost quadrupled its support between 2010 and 2022, attracting large numbers of voters from the two largest political parties (the Social Democrats and the Moderate Party). The refugee crisis of 2015 was a significant boost to the party, which has occasionally polled as the second most popular in the country (as of 2022 it ranks third). The political establishment’s pivot to a more restrictive stance on migration (framed as a “breathing room” by the government; Statsrådsberedningen, 2015) should be seen in this light and is likely driven by at least three factors. First, there is a widespread fear of losing votes to parties with more restrictive migration policies, as voters prioritize immigration-related issues far higher than before (Valforskningsprogrammet, 2020). Secondly, there is concern among center-left parties that the Sweden Democrats’ increased political influence will be detrimental to liberal democracy and minorities. Thirdly, there is a more openly expressed view among politicians and the general population (reflected in media statements by politicians, opinion polls, and in voter preferences and priorities) that migration can have negative social consequences, for instance in the labor market, the school system, criminality, and the welfare state (for an extended analysis of the latter, see Jerneck, 2023, Chap. 4 of this volume).

A development related to the Social Democrat’s loss of votes to the Sweden Democrats, concerns Landsorganisationen i Sverige (LO—the Swedish Trade Union Confederation), a meta-organization for Sweden’s 14 blue-collar unions. Traditionally, the Social Democrats are the most popular among members of blue-collar unions, but the balance is shifting in favor of the Sweden Democrats, in tandem with growing migration, and declines in both union membership and union density.⁶ As we will see, these developments pose serious challenges for both Swedish industrial relations and, especially, blue-collar unions.

In the aftermath of the 2015 refugee crisis, labor migration has also become increasingly contested in Sweden. The debate centers around a 2008 agreement between the then liberal-conservative government and the Green Party, which turned Swedish labor migration policy into one of the most liberal in the OECD (OECD, 2011). Previous regulation required that Arbetsförmedlingen (the Swedish Public Employment Service) evaluate the need for labor migration to fill a specific position (i.e., establish if there was labor shortage) and allowed unions to verify that wages and other conditions conformed with collective agreements (Riksdagen, 2008; Riksrevisionen, 2016). The new Labor Migration Act of 2008 shifted the power balance to employers in allowing working permits for persons offered employment (under certain conditions). In 2020, about 35 percent of labor migrants had jobs that require tertiary education (e.g., programming, engineering, or research), and 36 percent did low-skilled work (e.g., agriculture, hospitality, construction, or transportation work) (Migrationsverket, 2021). As shown in Fig. 8.1, the number of refugees has gone down substantially since 2016, while the number of labor migrants has remained at about 20,000 per year, except during the height of the Covid-19 pandemic.

A stacked bar graph depicting data on refugee and labor migrants from 2005 to 2021. The vertical axis has a scale of 0 to 1,000,000. In 2016, the highest bar reads at 100,000, followed by 71,000 in 2017. Refugee migrants are the majority in all of the bars.

As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the Swedish labor market is seeing increased segmentation between foreign-born and native workers (an interesting analysis of job segmentation and segregation is provided by Kazlou & Wennberg, 2023, in Chap. 10 of this volume). While labor force participation is high and unemployment low among native Swedish workers, foreign-born workers from outside the EU/EEA area and North America (especially from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East) are quite marginalized in terms of, for instance, lower labor force participation, higher unemployment rates, lower income, fixed-term work, and precarious working conditions (Fig. 8.2; Neergaard & Woolfson, 2017; Svalund & Berglund, 2018; Wingborg, 2019; Calmfors et al., 2021). Further, the Covid-19 pandemic resulted in an increase of approximately 29 percent in long-term unemployment (more than 12 months), which, as of June 2022, amounts to almost 180,000 people, roughly 60 percent of whom are foreign-born (Arbetsförmedlingen, 2021, 2022). Overall unemployment is 7–8 percent (January 2022), almost half of which is long-term. In addition to refugees (who by far make up the largest share of the foreign-born workforce in Sweden), labor migrants are also included in most statistics discussed in this chapter (unless noted). However, they constitute a relatively small share of the foreign-born workforce and do not make up as large a part of the unemployment as refugee migrants (although some of them may count as unemployed, due to, e.g., terminated or false contracts).

A line and bar graph denotes unemployment from January 2005 to January 2022. The line follows an increase in trend starts at 12% and ending at 46%. The bars represent the unemployment percentage based on countries. Africa ranges highest at 33.1%, followed by Asia ranges at 27.6%.

In parallel with this dualization, which has increased over time, there has been a bifurcation in union affiliation. Union membership has declined significantly since 2006, but more so among foreign-born workers, especially in blue-collar professions (unless explicitly noted, all numbers in this section come from Kjellberg, 2022a). In 2006, union density was the same for Swedish and foreign-born blue-collar workers alike: 77 percent. Fifteen years later, in 2021, it had dropped to 65 percent for Swedish-born and 54 percent for foreign-born. In other words, union affiliation among foreign-born blue-collar workers had dropped more than twice as much as that of their Swedish-born colleagues (Fig. 8.3). The trend is similar among white-collar workers, but not as pronounced. In 2006, union density among foreign-born white-collar workers was 70 percent, and among the Swedish-born, 77 percent. In 2021 the foreign-born union density for white-collar workers was 66 percent, and among the Swedish-born, 76 percent.

From 2006 to 2021, a line graph depicts the data for foreign-born, Swedish-born, and all workers. The vertical axis ranges from 0 to 90. Three lines begin at 77 and end at 54 for foreign-born, 62 for all workers, and 65 for Swedish-born.

The number of foreign-born union members is determined by two principal factors: first, the share of foreign-born workers in the professions or sectors organized by a particular union and, secondly, the degree to which that union is able to recruit foreign-born members. The decline in union density reflects declines in union membership and it is especially evident among non-EU workers. Between 2005 and 2020 the share of non-EU workers in the 14 labor unions of the blue-collar confederation LO doubled from 10 to 20 percent. If foreign-born workers from all other countries are included, the share is 26 percent, considerably higher than the 15 percent share of foreign-born workers among white-collar unions.

Another notable trend is that, although foreign-born workers have increased significantly both among blue-collar union members and in the workforce, they have not done so in parallel. While the share of foreign-born blue-collar workers in 2005 was the same among union members as in the workforce (16 percent), it was lower in 2020 (26 percent in unions and 29 percent in the workforce).⁷ This reflects most unions’ problems with attracting foreign-born workers, problems that are especially noticeable among blue-collar unions. Of course, large variations exist between unions and between sectors. For instance, in 2020, the share of foreign-born members in Hotell-och resturangfacket (HRF—the Hotel and Restaurant Workers’ Union), Fastighetsanställdas Förbund (Fastighets—the Real Estate Employees’ Union), and Livsmedelsarbetareförbundet (Livs—the Food Workers’ Union) was more than 40 percent. The blue-collar Svenska Kommunalarbetareförbundet (Kommunal—Municipal Workers’ Union) and Svenska Transportarbetareförbundet (Transport—the Transportation Workers’ Union) doubled their share of foreign-born members between 2005 and 2020 (to 32 and 21 percent respectively, see Fig. 8.4).

A grouped bar graph plots the share of migrants in different sectors in 2005, 2010, 2015, and 2020. When compared to 2005, the share increased in 2020. The share in hotels and restaurants increases from 34 to 42, in real estate the share, rises from 35 to 42, and in food, the number increases from 22 to 42.

While unions have not been able to recruit foreign-born members at the same pace, as these have increased in the workforce in the past decades, overall union density (white- and blue-collar, domestic and foreign-born) has gone up slightly during the Covid-19 pandemic. The reasons for this have not been studied, but a likely explanation is that fear of being laid off during the pandemic caused an uptick in union membership among the employed. There may also be composition effects caused by the fact that unemployment during the pandemic predominantly affected employees in sectors with low union density and those with fixed-term contracts, who also have lower union membership rates. If these are no longer counted in union membership statistics, union density among the employed increases.⁸ Foreign-born workers are overrepresented in both of these categories.

The decline of union affiliation among foreign-born workers is even more negative for overall union density than it may first appear. As illustrated in Fig. 8.5, this trend has occurred in parallel with a sharp increase in the number of foreign-born workers, who now make up a considerable share of the workforce.

From 2006 to 2021, a line graph indicates the share of foreign-born workers in union density, private sector, and public sector. The line signifies union density decreases from 77 to 54, and the lines represent the private sector and public sector share begin at 16 and end at 28 and 37, respectively.

Future prospects are worrisome for the Swedish labor market model. The Swedish Public Employment Service has previously estimated that eight out of ten job vacancies must be filled with foreign-born workers (due to the low unemployment level and high labor force participation among the Swedish-born), making them essential for job growth in Sweden (Arbetsförmedlingen, 2018). This entails a structural problem for union density that will be exacerbated as the share of foreign-born in the workforce continues to grow, unless the negative unionization trend in this group (and other weakly organized groups see, e.g., Palm, 2017) is reversed. The problem is particularly challenging for blue-collar unions, as foreign-born workers are overrepresented in sectors with lower rates of collective bargaining coverage, like retail, restaurants and hospitality, and transportation.

Most studies investigating the rapidly declining union density among migrants in Sweden are descriptive in nature, with some of this research accounted for in this chapter (e.g., Wingborg, 2019; Kjellberg, 2022b). However, there are attempts to explain the trend. Kjellberg (2019a, 2022a) argues that some factors may be (1) the overrepresentation of migrant workers in sectors, occupations, and employment forms (fixed-term and part-time) with low union density (which, in turn, has many explanations, including lower wages, weaker unions, workers with weaker bargaining position, smaller workplaces, more union-hostile employers, etc.); (2) low income among migrants, making union fees burdensome; (3) the large share of refugees from countries with weak union traditions and skepticism toward unions; (4) problems related to language barriers, lack of knowledge about the Swedish labor market model, and other cultural differences that unions have been late and unsuccessful in addressing; and (5) institutional changes in 2007⁹ that led to a sharp decline in union density, especially among blue-collar workers.

In a literature review of factors affecting union density and union membership, Palm (2017) discusses research that is relevant to several of these explanations. It should be noted that there are surprisingly few studies on factors driving unionization in Sweden, and she notes that “many factors have been observed to demonstrate mixed results between both countries and studies” (Palm, 2017, p. 36). That said, she finds little support for large effects of structural changes on union density, like an increasing share of foreign-born in the workforce, although she also does not find support for the opposite. Some structural factors seem to matter more than others, for example, size of employer establishment, worker age/cohort, and atypical employment. It should be noted, however, that foreign-born workers tend to populate smaller establishments, holding atypical employment; thus, there is a correlation between these factors and the unionization of foreign-born workers.

Concerning the propensity to join a union, Palm finds strong support for the effect of instrumentality, for instance the perceived benefits of membership. This may be seen as support for explanations (2), (3), and (4) suggested by Kjellberg above. It also lends support to explanation (5), institutional factors, which can affect both overall union density and an individual person’s decision about whether to join a union. The literature review also indicates that social pressures and pro/anti-union attitudes can affect the propensity to unionize and that these factors vary considerably depending on workplace, sector, and union. Palm further finds support in the literature for the effect of “charismatic leaders that arise from within a group” on participation and involvement in unions (Palm, 2017, p. 44).¹⁰ Granted, this does not necessarily apply to the propensity to join a union, but it does suggest that who represents unions and how the problems that workers face are framed may at least be a part of the complex explanation of declining unionization among the foreign-born. This is also raised by Neergaard (2018), who maintains that unions have not sufficiently addressed the specific problems of foreign-born members in the way they have regarding, for instance, women’s rights. For example, there is a striking lack of union representatives with non-European background (especially in leadership positions), especially given the large share of members with this background in many blue-collar unions, while there is no such discrepancy when it comes to women. Further, Neergaard argues that the Swedish union movement’s engagement in women’s issues is often framed as “feminist unionism” (e.g., equal pay), while migrant workers’ concerns are addressed as socioeconomic and class-related, rather than in terms of race and ethnicity.

An interesting study on the drivers of union membership in Sweden is Calmfors et al. (2021). Based on a questionnaire answered by 3000 union members and non-members, the authors find that few structural factors predict union affiliation. The only clear effects relate to age (old more than young) and sector (public more than private). As for foreign background,¹¹ it does not explain differences in unionization after controlling for other structural factors. In other words, workers who are comparable in terms of age, gender, sector, class (blue- or white-collar occupation), place of residence, and form of employment, have roughly the same likelihood of being union members whether they are foreign-born or not. It should be noted, of course, that these results only control for observable and included factors, but the overall conclusions are supported by other research discussed in this chapter (Palm, 2017; Cools et al., 2021). The study also finds that social norms (if one has colleagues, friends, and relatives who are union members, and if one’s employer has a positive attitude toward unions) matter, especially for employees with foreign background. The same is true for instrumental factors (e.g., if one thinks that union membership can offer benefits in or outside of the workplace), which are associated with higher unionization for workers with a foreign background. Further, the study finds that accessibility and contact (e.g., not having been asked to join, not having received information) are more important explanations for the low unionization of young workers and those with foreign background than for others, which at least partly seems to support Neergard’s (2018) view that unions should pay more specific attention to foreign-born workers.

For the purposes of this chapter, a key question is whether a worker’s origin in and of itself determines the likelihood of union affiliation. In light of the evidence discussed so far, we can conclude that it might, to some extent, but considerably less than other correlated factors, for instance income, sector, form of employment, age, or level of education. This conclusion is also supported by a study using Norwegian data (Cools et al., 2021). Using a population-wide administrative dataset spanning 1997 through 2013, the study examines why immigrants are less likely to unionize than natives in Norway. The authors find that the gap in unionization between natives and immigrants is reduced significantly over time, as the latter become more unionized, although it never closes completely. This is true regardless of the reason for immigration (asylum, family ties, or work). Moreover, half of the gap is accounted for by variables describing labor market sorting, that is, the fact that foreign-born workers populate less unionized firms and sectors. Controlling for other variables (e.g., education, job experience, age) reduces the gap to one third of its original size (and almost the entire gap for second-generation immigrants). The most important factor, by far, is a firm’s unionization rate, which accounts for between half and two-thirds of the unionization gap between immigrants and natives in the study. Second most important is seniority, which affects unionization considerably over time. In other words, migrants are much more likely to unionize (as are natives) if they work in highly unionized firms or sectors, and the longer they have been employed. Similar controls account for the differences between migrants from different countries and the authors find almost no evidence that immigrants from more unionized countries are more likely to join a union, when controlling for the aforementioned factors. The authors conclude that the difference in unionization does not have cultural explanations to any sizeable extent but is rather explained by labor market sorting. In addition, another study using Norwegian data shows that the increasing share of migrant workers has had no effect on native workers’ willingness to unionize (Finseraas et al., 2020). Arguably, these findings can at least partly be assumed to hold for Sweden as well, since Norway is a country with relatively similar institutional and cultural features. Although Sweden has considerably higher union density and there are other differences related to the workforce, the economy, and labor market institutions, Norway is certainly a relevant country to compare with.

The Swedish labor market model has moved from its strong corporatist roots to what is known in the industrial relations literature as an “organized decentralized” collective bargaining system (Traxler, 1995; OECD, 2019). While it still exhibits corporatist traits (e.g., tripartite concentration in labor legislation and training policies), the model is now less centralized than it was up to the mid-1980s, when bargaining was carried out by organizations at the central level. Today, unions and employers or employer associations at the local and sectoral levels have more scope to bargain for wages and other conditions in collective bargaining agreements. Further, the so-called Swedish Model rests on voluntarism and limited state intervention. It presumes that strong labor and employer organizations can represent workers and firms, self-regulating issues pertaining to the labor market and working life through collective agreements rather than legislation (Finansdepartementet, 2017; Kjellberg, 2019b). For instance, Sweden does not have a statutory minimum wage¹² and wide-ranging deviations from labor law (e.g., on working time or employment protection) can be made if unions and employers agree to do so through collective agreements. Therefore, high collective bargaining coverage is fundamental for the system to work as intended, otherwise increased state intervention through legislation would become necessary. State intervention is generally seen as anathema to the Swedish labor market model, which is widely supported by all key stakeholders, namely unions, employer associations, and the state.

Importantly, while union density has fallen, the same is not true for collective bargaining coverage. In Sweden, all employees at firms bound by collective agreements are covered, whether they are union members or not. Firms can either sign a collective agreement on their own or (more commonly) through membership in an employer association that negotiates agreements with its union counterparts at the sectoral level. Collective bargaining coverage in the private sector is approximately 85 percent; in the public sector it is 100 percent. This amounts to an average collective bargaining coverage rate of 90 percent, which has been more or less stable since 2006, while the overall union density has fallen from 77 to 70 percent. Hence, collective bargaining is, to some degree, upheld by the high level of organization among employers, who still seem to favor signing agreements (Calmfors et al., 2019; Kjellberg, 2022b). Thus, an obvious concern is that the ongoing decline in union density will threaten collective bargaining coverage in the long run, as employers have fewer union counterparts to bargain with and as they also become less fearful of industrial action from weakened unions. As mentioned, there are large variations between sectors both in terms of collective bargaining coverage and union density. Foreign-born workers are overrepresented in sectors with lower levels of both. In other words, the parallel trends of declining union affiliation and growing share of the foreign-born workforce constitute a potential threat to the Swedish labor market model in the long run. If organized labor is weakened enough such that collective bargaining coverage drops significantly, legislation may have to be extended to more areas, thus reducing derogation and shifting power from the social partners (employers and unions) to the state, for example politicians. Another risk is that, even if the state would abstain from involvement and allow social partners to self-regulate, collective agreements would become increasingly weaker and devoid of material content, as union strength is reduced by declining membership numbers.

The long-term threat to the labor market model posed by declining union density among migrants (as well as other groups) is of great concern to all stakeholders, especially trade unions. If union density drops significantly in certain sectors, for instance those where migrants are overrepresented, workers’ bargaining power can suffer, especially if collective bargaining coverage declines as a consequence. This can undercut wages and other conditions for workers in those sectors, thus threatening the capacity of unions to safeguard and advance the interests of their members. If unions become less effective and influential, union affiliation may become less attractive, especially as membership fees are relatively more burdensome for workers in low-pay professions with fixed-term and/or part-time contracts (because, in general, blue-collar unions have higher fees and their members earn less). This type of vicious circle is already proving difficult to break in certain sectors, like transportation, restaurants, and hospitality (Kjellberg, 2019a). White-collar unions are also affected by migration, although the unionization gap between migrants and natives is not as large in white-collar unions and the share of migrant workers is smaller. As for labor migration, white-collar unions were largely in favor of the liberalized legislation ushered in 2008, whereas the blue-collar unions were ambivalent and critical, as they believed it would lead to the undercutting of wages, occupational safety, and employment conditions in their sectors (Marino et al., 2017; Neergaard & Woolfson, 2017; Afonso et al., 2020).

In summary, changes in union density can have significant institutional effects for industrial relations systems. Although unionization in Sweden is among the highest in the world, it has declined almost 20 percent since the early 1990s, and almost 10 percent between 2006 and 2021. As yet, the institutional framework underpinning the Swedish labor market model has not been affected to the same effect. Not only has there been some organizational consolidation on both the labor and employer sides but also labor law has gone through some non-trivial changes with regard to labor migration and the aforementioned relaxation of employment protection. However, most relevant legislation, as well as the main public and legal authorities and industrial relation structures, remain largely the same.¹³ Collective bargaining coverage remains unchanged at about 90 percent, partly upheld by the high levels of affiliation to employer associations (affiliated employers are automatically bound to collective agreements). Finally, wage formation, one of the most important functions of an industrial relations system, has been coordinated in much the same way since the turn of the millennium (Kjellberg, 2019b; Bender, 2021).

Nevertheless, the importance of union density should not be underestimated and there are warnings about the possible effects that the negative trend may have on Sweden’s political economy, as power relations tilt to the employers (Calmfors et al., 2019; Kjellberg, 2019a). As the labor market is a central element in Sweden’s broader social model, institutional changes in the industrial relations system can have economy-wide effects in areas such as social policy, macroeconomic policy, education policy, and migration policy. Of course, unions are aware of this, as their high membership numbers and union density give them not only bargaining power but also political influence.

Another development impossible to ignore in the context of migration is the rise of the Sweden Democrats, a populist radical right-wing party that managed to get its first parliament seats in 2010 on an anti-immigration agenda. The party has grown rapidly since, especially among blue-collar workers, while union density in the same group has declined substantially (Fig. 8.6).

A dual-axis line graph denotes a union density in blue-collar unions, votes for Sweden democrats, and votes for Sweden democrats among L O members from 1998 through 2018. The line that represents union density starts decreasing from 86 and reaches 64, and the lines that represent votes of L O members and votes for Sweden democrats start decreasing from 24 and 17.5 and reach 0.4.

These parallel developments are a major concern for the blue-collar confederation LO and its member unions, for at least four reasons. First, internal tensions will likely arise when a large minority of the members (mostly Swedish-born men) support a radical right-wing party that opposes the interests of another large minority (migrant workers) (Neergaard, 2018). Second, LO is affiliated with the Social Democrats in numerous ways, including financially and with seats in the party leadership, as are some of its member unions. This is difficult to accept for some workers who sympathize with other political parties (Calmfors et al., 2021) and may explain at least part of the decline in both union density and membership numbers.¹⁴ Third, there have been (so far unsuccessful) attempts by representatives of the Sweden Democrats to gain elected positions in blue-collar unions, thus influencing these organizations’ political priorities. Given that the Sweden Democrats usually side with the conservative parties in parliament (and also pledged their support to a conservative government after the 2022 election), whose policies are generally not favorable to the labor movement, this can be seen as a form of infiltration to undermine organized labor from within. Fourth, a considerable share of the Sweden Democrats’ growth since 2010 comes from previously Social Democratic voters, which has caused a major structural shift in Swedish politics and undermined any prospects of a Social Democratic majority, or even a dominant center-left coalition. This is a blow to blue-collar unions, both because their political influence largely rests on their connection to the Social Democrats (whose political dominance has been weakened considerably, perhaps permanently) and because they strongly oppose any government that does not include the Social Democrats.

Of course, these consequences can also be detrimental to refugees and labor migrants. Weakened unions can affect working conditions in blue-collar and precarious jobs, where migrant workers are overrepresented. The loss of LO members and Social Democratic voters who sympathize with the Sweden Democrats might cause blue-collar unions and the Social Democrats to adopt anti-immigrant policies that appeal to the members and voters they risk losing. If the Sweden Democrats succeed in getting elected to union positions, this may also spur anti-immigrant policies in the union movement (in the past few years, the party has been calling for negative net migration).

The challenges facing trade unions due to increased immigration are not uniform across unions in the same country, even less so across countries with different levels and types of immigration, different job structures, and varieties of institutional settings (e.g., industrial relations systems and welfare regimes). Based on the research discussed in this chapter, the following broad challenges for trade unions, particularly in Sweden, can be identified.

Broadly, then, the main challenges migration poses for unions stem from the low employment rate, the low union density among migrants, and from political developments (e.g., the opposed examples of liberalized labor migration and anti-immigrant sentiment among voters and political parties). Therefore, policies that promote economic growth, job growth, and improve employment conditions are essential to address these challenges, as are, of course, inclusion and anti-discrimination measures. Further, since research indicates that foreign-born workers exhibit unionization patterns similar to those of natives (when controlling for relevant factors), policies that promote union density in aggregate, but also for specific groups, are important and are typically preferred by Swedish unions.

At this point, it is pertinent to ponder the potential effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on the challenges listed above. Firstly, we can observe that an immediate effect of the pandemic has been a slight increase in union density, both for natives and foreign-born workers. Although the increase so far has been modest both at the aggregate level and for subgroups,¹⁵ it marks a change from the negative trend of the past three decades. Of course, it is difficult to say if this is the beginning of a positive trend, a new equilibrium, or if the long-term negative trend will continue. As mentioned, the pandemic also resulted in an increase of approximately 29 percent in long-term unemployment (more than 12 months), amounting to almost 180,000 people, of which about 60 percent are foreign-born (Arbetsförmedlingen, 2021, 2022). In the current high inflationary environment, which has been met by tightening monetary policies, some employment forecasts point to rising unemployment during 2023 and 2024.

These conditions may make it more difficult to increase union density, but that is contingent on other factors like unemployment insurance and social benefits, and the duration of the downturn in the labor market. During the pandemic and the financial crisis of the early 1990s, union density in Sweden increased partly due to fear of rising unemployment among workers, and partly to generous changes in unemployment insurance. In contrast, the financial crisis of 2008 had the opposite effect of drastically decreasing union membership numbers, due to political reforms that reduced unemployment benefits and other forms of social protection, while rising the unemployment insurance fees. A critical challenge for policy makers in post-pandemic Sweden will be to reduce the gap between native and foreign-born blue-collar workers, especially regarding long-term unemployment, but also regarding overall unemployment and precarious employment conditions. For unions, the challenge will be to find (perhaps new) ways of reaching and organizing foreign-born workers.

Given the serious problems that declining union density among foreign-born workers entails for the Swedish industrial relations system and, in particular, for unions, it is surprising how little the issue has been addressed by trade unions, both rhetorically and in actual measures. It would not be possible to offer a detailed overview of union responses to migration in this chapter. However, drawing on previous research, we can attempt to categorize various types of responses by Swedish unions to the challenges posed by migration. The logics behind these responses are then discussed, employing a theoretical model proposed by Connolly et al. (2014). The following responses can be summarized as the most common found among Swedish (and many other) trade union organizations.

In summary, Swedish unions have largely opted for what Connolly et al. (2019, p. 84) label “default-inclusion strategies,” as illustrated by the introductory quote to this chapter. These strategies are neither separatist nor specifically tailored for migrant groups but aim to organize foreign-born workers as members of the broader worker collective. Similarly, drawing on Penninx and Roosblad’s (2000) typology of union responses to migration, Bengtsson (2013) finds that organizing migrant workers as members is the main strategy among Swedish unions (three blue-collar unions were studied), instead of opposing migration, demanding quotas, or including them into union ranks as elected officials or employees. Other scholars present similar findings on Swedish unions’ main response to migration; for instance, Afonso et al. (2020) and Boräng et al. (2020) refer to an “equalization strategy,” and Marino et al. (2017) describe it as “inclusion” and “equal treatment.” Hence, Swedish unions promote the interests of foreign-born workers as they do for all other workers, namely through organizing, class- or profession-based policy development and advocacy, as well as collective bargaining on issues pertaining to economic and work-related issues. This is preferred to strategies that focus on culture or ethnicity, for instance setting up separate institutional structures or regulation.

It should be mentioned that some scholars are critical of this strategy. Neergaard and Woolfson (2017, p. 216) call it “subordinated inclusion,” in which “the central dynamic is to organise, but without particular practices of representation or giving voice.” According to Marino et al. (2017, pp. 361–362), this practice “indicates a formal inclusive approach that does not address the disadvantages of migrant workers in the labour market,” and “implies that representation is provided if the interests of migrant members coincide with the interests of native workers, but on the latter’s terms.” In other words, to the extent that migrant workers are categorized as workers, they are included in the Swedish trade union movement’s striving for equal treatment and decent working conditions that comply with labor law and collective agreements, according to these authors. However, those specific aspects pertaining to migrant workers as ethnically or culturally different from the majority population are generally not taken into account in union strategies, resulting in a “‘colour-blind’ approach” (Marino et al., 2017, p. 378).

The “default-inclusion strategy” proposed by Connolly et al. (2019) can be placed into a theoretical model for categorizing union logics and modes of action, developed by the same authors in an earlier paper (Connolly et al., 2014). The model is represented by a triangle (Fig. 8.7), which illustrates three overarching logics that inform trade union activities. The authors argue that unions in the three countries they study prioritize certain logics over others. Specifically, they place the UK on the left-hand side, Spain on the right-hand side and the Netherlands at the base of the triangle (for further analyses of France, Italy, and Spain, see Chap. 7 in this volume, by the same authors).

An illustration of a triangle. The top, right bottom, and left bottom of the triangle are labeled class, social rights, and race or ethnicity. The countries U K, E S, and N L are labeled on the left, right, and bottom sides of the triangle. The arrows from U K, E S, and N L point to social rights, race or ethnicity, and class, respectively.

My overall assessment is that the Swedish union movement should be placed on the right-hand side of the triangle: it is motivated by class and social rights, with its actions revolving around organizing and institutional regulation. This is the main strategy favored by Swedish unions, albeit not very successfully, as shown in the first sections of this chapter.

The authors further suggest that the model can be used analytically, not only descriptively, in the sense that the missing logic (the opposite corner in the triangle) can be seen as a particular union movement’s (or a specific union’s) “weak point,” that is, “the union’s position along one of the dimension of the triangle implies that the opposite pole is the challenge (the gap) that the union have to face” (Connolly et al., 2014, p. 16) with regard to migration. So, for instance, the authors argue, the Spanish trade union movement is characterized by the two logics of class and social rights, and thus lacking in the opposite dimension, namely issues related to race and ethnicity. However, the research reviewed in this chapter does not necessarily support this claim. While it is true that Swedish unions are not generally motivated by race or ethnicity, and that community building (based on these traits) is not a priority for their actions, it is not clear that it is a weakness in terms of achieving their aims and addressing migration-related challenges. As discussed, most studies indicate that organizing and institutional regulation seem to be more effective ways of increasing unionization among migrant workers. In other words, the default-inclusion strategy employed by Swedish unions seems to be in line with the research reviewed in this chapter (Palm, 2017; Calmfors et al., 2021; Cools et al., 2021; Kjellberg, 2022a), which indicates that, if unions wish to reduce the unionization gap between migrant and native workers, they (and policy makers) should focus on addressing institutional (e.g., labor law, unionization rates, social policy) and structural (e.g., age, job experience, firm size) factors instead of cultural differences.

Nevertheless, there is certainly scope for improvement along the “weaker” dimension and the ethnicity/community logic does present an untapped opportunity that Swedish unions could explore. We should also note that studies have not assessed counterfactual scenarios; for instance, what would have happened if unions had abstained from some specific measure or how strategies that unions did not employ would have affected unionization. Moreover, we know very little about how unionization in Sweden is affected by measures that take cultural factors into account, for instance better representation among union staff and elected officials, anti-racist messaging, communication in different languages, or suborganizations (like immigrant sections). In other words, measures specially tailored to foreign-born workers should certainly not be written off, but extant research does indicate that unions and policy makers should perhaps focus more on measures that contribute to better employment conditions and wages and, thusly, to higher unionization overall, as well as on instrumental factors (e.g., membership fees and benefits) that improve the cost-benefit calculation for low-wage and precarious workers.