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2019 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

SysML Model Transformation for Safety and Security Analysis

verfasst von : Rabéa Ameur-Boulifa, Florian Lugou, Ludovic Apvrille

Erschienen in: Security and Safety Interplay of Intelligent Software Systems

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

While the awareness toward the security and safety of embedded systems has recently improved due to various significant attacks, the issue of building a practical but accurate methodology for designing such safe and secure systems still remains unsolved. Where test coverage is dissatisfying, formal analysis grants much higher potential to discover security vulnerabilities during the design phase of a system. Yet, formal verification methods often require a strong technical background that limits their usage. In this paper, we formally describe a verification process that enables us to prove security-oriented properties such as confidentiality on block and state machine diagrams of SysML. The mathematical description of the translation of these formally defined diagrams into a ProVerif specification enables us to prove the correctness of the verification method.

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Fußnoten
2
The term call here is abusive. Indeed, the attacker has no control over the execution flow of each process. It is however able to pass a token to a particular process which is blocked waiting for it.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
SysML Model Transformation for Safety and Security Analysis
verfasst von
Rabéa Ameur-Boulifa
Florian Lugou
Ludovic Apvrille
Copyright-Jahr
2019
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16874-2_3

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