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2024 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

The Basic Models of Criminal Liability of AI Systems and Outer Circles

verfasst von : Gabriel Hallevy

Erschienen in: Legal Aspects of Autonomous Systems

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

The way humans cope with breaches of legal order is through criminal law operated by the criminal justice system. Accordingly, human societies define criminal offenses and operate social mechanisms to apply them. This is how criminal law works. Originally, this way has been designed by humans and for humans. However, as technology has developed, criminal offenses are committed not only by humans. The major development in this issue has occurred in the seventeenth century. In the twenty-first century criminal law is required to supply adequate solutions for commission of criminal offenses through artificial intelligent (AI) systems. Basically, there are three basic models to cope with this phenomenon within the current definitions of criminal law. These models are:

(1)

The Perpetration-by-Another Liability Model;

(2)

The Natural Probable Consequence Liability Model; and

(3)

The Direct Liability Model.

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Vorheriges Kapitel European AI Regulation Perspectives and Trends

Nächstes Kapitel Punishing Artificial Intelligence: Legal Fiction or Science Fiction

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Titel: The Basic Models of Criminal Liability of AI Systems and Outer Circles
verfasst von: Gabriel Hallevy
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Legal Aspects of Autonomous Systems
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-47945-8

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-031-47946-5

Copyright-Jahr: 2024
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47946-5_5

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