The Changing Global Order

International relations theories attempt to explain and extrapolate possible outcomes with regard to policy issues, foreign policy decisions, war propensity and animosity between states as well as the structure of the international system. The relevance of the major international relations theories has been a matter of much debate throughout the last 25 years, with the discourse having been divided mainly between (neo)liberal and (neo)realist thought. Identifying the main attributes of these theories as well as the key thinkers in this milieu will be the primary aim of this chapter. The preeminent inference of realist theory is that violent conflict is inevitable as states seek to maximize their power and minimize the risks associated with the international environment. Liberal scholars emphasize the importance of reason, liberty, and progress, and see these attributes as mutually beneficial concerning all states. They maintain that individual freedom leads to rational choices, that rational decisions preserve freedom, and that, ultimately, this cycle is a contributing factor to the achievement of progress in international relations. The concept of structural realism postulates that state behavior is determined by the structure of the international system and that the anarchic structure of this system makes countries more prone to seek relative gains to ensure their survival. Constructivism is predicated on the assumption that all social underpinnings are constructed rather than preordained concomitants of human nature or international politics. Constructivists draw attention to the salience of norms and ideas in international relations.

This chapter outlines a few post-positivist theories of international relations and compares them with positivist theories. At its core, the chapter aims to demonstrate that these two camps are not to be viewed as in constant turmoil, but in terms of complementarity and their objective contribution to the advancement of social science and IR. Thus, rather than critically comparing these two schools of thought, or focusing solely on their contradictions or strengths and weaknesses, it elucidates the complementary strengths of both these camps of thought. In addition, it outlines the relative advantages and disadvantages of both camps. In essence, in light of the standards used during that era, positivist theories seek to organise the early social scientific theories by using similar methods to those used to study the natural sciences. Post-positivist theories are a consortium of theories that are not particularly complimentary or unified in perspective with one another, but allied in their rejection, and critiques of core positivist rationales. Positivism was influenced by the wider political and social context of the time, just like post-positivism was, and still is influenced by contemporary social and international contexts. Both of these theoretical schools were conceived in lieu of (contrasting) social and international contexts. Positivism was devised with the advent of the Enlightenment and Renaissance movements. Post-positivism was devised later, after the World Wars and the Cold War, with the advent of new actors, opinions, values, and in sum a much larger variety of variables impacting the global order. In doing so, it has advanced the debate pertaining to theory and method in social science. With the advent of change in the international system and the global order, both schools have undergone revisions. Despite their differences, this chapter essentially strives to portray that both these schools are to be seen not from a perspective of opposing camps, but as genuine attempts to study the social and international systems as driven by the nuances and structural changes of the social and international systems and the resultant changes in global order.

This chapter explores the consequences of power shifts. The world order will change if the West becomes less powerful relative to other countries. And if hegemonic power is so important for global stability, then a decline in American power must lead to less stability. There is much evidence to support these hypotheses. Global power transitions are accompanied by friction and even by conflicts. Countries that see their position worsening will want to counter this, whereas countries that are rising will not allow their ascent to be thwarted. Moreover, there is a much greater chance of misinterpreting each other’s intentions if not one, or two, but a number of countries are dominant. Misinterpretation of other states’ intentions is a major cause of conflict in international relations. Leaders tend to underestimate the effects of their actions on the leaders of other countries, to endow their convictions with the status of truth and to judge their opponents on moral and ethical grounds.

When it comes to the changing global order, China’s rise attracts worldwide attention. In particular, the nature of its ascent and its potential impact on world order have been in the spotlight for decades. A variety of epithets have been employed to describe China to capture the nature of China as an increasingly influential power. Meanwhile, prior scholarship has also contributed much from various perspectives of IR theory. However, there exists a wide gap in perception regarding China, within and outside the country. This chasm can only be straddled with a better understanding of China’s strategic panorama. Mindful of this potentiality in bridging the chasms, but without assuming a position on China’s peaceful rise, this chapter throws light on China’s resurgence by considering its related strategies: its vision of a world order, its focus on external partners, and its intention of national rejuvenation. The conclusion demonstrates that China is envisaging a twenty-first-century world order where emerging powers play important roles, prioritizing its relations with well-targeted partners, and implementing its foreign policies under the guidance of historical experiences, national interests, strategic needs and the capricious climate of international relations.

With a reference to Russia’s size and location, its unique history and culture, and its massive economic and military resources Russia claims a prominent role in the current world order. The foreign policy strategy which Russia’s post-communist leadership developed from this worldview, has generally been pragmatic and re-active. More recently, partly due to developments beyond Russia’s influence and partially as a result of political and economic changes in Russia itself, the country’s foreign policies have become more self-confident, more assertive and more offensive, initially especially in its own environment but later also beyond its sphere of influence. Russia is a revisionist power, but with a strongly conservative streak. Multipolarity is Russia’s major foreign policy ambition, one that is based on competition and cooperation among sovereign great powers. Russia demands the right to be included, but it also wants to stand apart. Russia is strongly in favour of multilateralism, but preferably a multilateralism for the few, Russia included.

This Chapter explores the conception of India as a rising power. In the last two decades, India is said to be a growing economic power which is interested in pursuing political and strategic gains. It is indeed listed as a large economy, comparable to other BRIC economies, such as Brazil, Russia, and China. However, these understandings about rising India can be questioned. Taking a social constructivist starting point, this Chapter argues how social phenomena, such as India’s rise, are shaped by human interaction through dialogue between individuals and groups. Exploring India’s so-called emergence in terms of economic growth, military potential, and foreign policy outlook, it demonstrates that these “social facts” can be further interrogated. One interpretation can gain more prominence than the other. The understandings of India are embedded within a larger debate about global transformation which presupposes a particular view of the international order and India’s position within it.

The multipolarisation of the international system and the rise of nations from the global South opened new avenues for Africa and increased its role in global politics. Power dynamics in a multipolar world put forward the concept of agency in the international relations discourse, yet, bounded in the African context. This chapter analyses Africa’s position in contemporary geopolitical and economic affairs, focusing on African agency and its role played in multilateral negotiations. It demonstrates an emergence of African agency in the multilateral fora in the domains of peace, security, climate change, and in shaping the global normative framework. The chapter examines the questions on how African agency interacts, cooperates and competes with superpowers in the multipolar global system from an intergovernmental and individual state level. It delves into the cases of the African Union and South Africa, as two main continental actors on exercising agency regionally and globally. In the examined cases, the agency is evaluated as the ability to act in order to change the outcomes or rules. The chapter concludes that African agency is an incontrovertible fact and its significance is increasing gradually. It has begun to assert its voice at different levels, from individual states to intergovernmental organizations but the structural organization of the relevant institutions is crucial to the process of exercising agency.

In this chapter it is argued that the rise in regionalism since the end of the Cold War does not constitute a new phenomenon. In fact, regionalist movements can at least be traced back to the nineteenth century, and we are currently experiencing its fifth wave. However, what is certainly distinct about regionalism in the twenty-first century is the extent to which it draws on existing forms and the importance it has in structuring the global politico-economic order. Therefore, as shown in this chapter, today’s world (map) is characterized by a complex landscape of hundreds of regional groupings which are all connected in one way or the other. This chapter also conceptualizes overlapping and cognate terms for conceptual clarity, such as regionalism, regional cooperation, regional integration and regional sub-systems. Finally, the chapter lists various conceptual and empirical challenges related to the study of regionalism and regional integration efforts around the world.

An important aspect of the EU’s external affairs is ‘interregionalism’. As this chapter demonstrates, the EU’s interregional approach has gradually achieved an important position in European integration and in EU foreign policy. It serves to enhance peaceful and cooperative relations of the EU with other world regions, while strengthening support for its core values, norms and economic interests. The chapter provides an overview of the scholarly research on interregionalism and its relation to foreign policy analysis and studies of global affairs. The chapter also provides an overview of main rationales for EU-driven interregionalism, its current forms and outreach and its strategic significance within current EU foreign policy aims as incorporated in the 2016 Global Strategy.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is an intergovernmental organization founded in Shanghai on 15 June 2001 by six countries: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Established to ensure the security of the Central Asian region in the post-Soviet era, in its early years it was interpreted in many studies as little more than an extension of Russian foreign policy interests, but recently it is clear that the initiative has shifted to Beijing. In 2015 its membership was expanded for the first time with the addition of India and Pakistan, and this was formalised at its 2016 summit. Including the two new members means the SCO represents 45% of the world’s population and 19% of world GDP. As Russia and China further develop their cooperation, the SCO is now “increasingly viewed by governments across the world as an organization reflecting the political and economic ascendancy of the Eurasian region” (Savic 2016). This chapter outlines the origins and purposes of the SCO, and its position in relation to other post-Soviet regional entities that have been formed since 1991 under the heading of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), such as the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The question is to what extent these formations are beginning to represent an inter-connected, multi-layered regional governance structure for Eurasia that could have consequences within a changing global order.

Intrastate conflict is the most common conflict trend in the world since the middle of the twentieth century. As the series of conflicts in Southeast Asia account for nearly half of all intrastate conflicts in the Asian region, the question of how they have been resolved arises. Responding to this, mediation has been considered as the most efficient method to bring the conflicting parties to a mutually acceptable agreement. As Southeast Asia has ASEAN as the closest regional entity who has the framework to act as a third party mediator, this paper analyses ASEAN’s role by asking what are the factors that explain the dynamic of ASEAN involvement in intrastate conflicts as mediator? Through analysing three different cases – the Cambodia conflict, the Aceh conflict, and the East Timor conflict – this chapter suggests that the factors have a variety of levels of influence towards the dynamic of ASEAN mediation. It is hoped that this paper can be a fruitful contribution to previous studies about ASEAN as a regional conflict manager and also the basis of future research in the context of the potential of ASEAN as an effective mediator.

Regionalism in Latin America is a complex phenomenon. This chapter will argue that after a sequence of various waves of regionalization efforts, Latin-American regionalism has become multi-layered, multi-faceted and eclectic. It is characterized by a large set of different arrangements, both formal and informal in nature and structure, and various regimes and regional institutions currently coexist. It is the result of a large variety of different drivers and influential factors, both endogenous as well as exogenous which has resulted in what can best be labelled “the alphabet soup of Latin American regionalism”.

This chapter analyses the concept of regional integration in light of South Asia, which is one of the least integrated regions globally. It starts by examining regional integration in South Asia, and outlines why there has been no integration, and cooperation thus far. Subsequently, it posits that integration of the South-Asian region, or any other region for that matter, requires the collaboration, and good will of the key regional players. All regions which are integrated economically, or militarily, or both, require the cooperation between key regional players. This chapter sheds light on the prerequisites of regional integration in South Asia, if it were to materialise in the near or distant future. Furthermore, it scrutinises the regional organisation SAARC, and makes comparisons with other regional processes across the globe such as Europe, North America, and South East Asia with South-Asia. It highlights certain dynamics between India and Pakistan and assesses the role of regional powers in a regional integration process. The chapter postulates that outright hostility, or lack of cooperation and trust between key regional players severely impedes regional integration. It also briefly addresses the Kashmir conflict, which is a root cause of hostilities between India and Pakistan. As evidence indicates, for regional integration of South Asia to materialise, the resolution of this conflict is vital. This chapter concludes by assessing in light of the past and present dynamics in Kashmir, as well as the overall nature of bilateral relations between the regional powers, South Asia as a region is highly unlikely to witness integration, at least in the near future. Consequently, it sheds light on sub-regional organisations such as SASEC and BIMSTEC. It postulates that for South Asia to become a developed, industrialised and a positively peaceful society, the conflict between India and Pakistan needs resolution as a prerequisite, the odds for which are not too favourable.

Globalisation and global governance are frequently employed buzzwords when discussing the characteristics of the current global order. This chapter seeks to both define and illustrate the interaction between these two concepts, along with their accompanying ramifications for state sovereignty. In doing so, it identifies the primary actors involved, including states, intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), regional entities, multinational corporations (MNCs), and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). This chapter also outlines key IR theoretical approaches to global governance, a relevant discussion as global governance is often addressed as an analytical concept or tool, which provides a certain perspective on global politics that differs from mainstream IR theories. The second half of the chapter proceeds on a brief analysis of the ways in which globalization and the diversification of governance play out on the global stage, comparing their differing effects within democratic and authoritarian state systems. In doing so it highlights some adverse effects and critical views on global governance. The chapter concludes that globalisation may exacerbate existing challenges to democratic structures of governance, and that it is therefore necessary to carefully evaluate the organisation and efficacy of global governance schemes.

The chapter explores how the Security Council has reacted to the changing global order in terms of institutional reform and its working methods. First, we look at how the Security Council’s setup looks increasingly anachronistic against the tremendous shifts in global power. Yet, established and rising powers are not disengaging. In contrast, they are turning to the Council to address growing challenges posed by the changing nature of armed conflict, the surge of terrorism and foreign fighters, nuclear proliferation and persistent intra-state conflicts. Then, we explore institutional and political hurdles for Council reform. While various reform models have been suggested, none of them gained the necessary global support. Instead, we demonstrate how the Council has increased the representation of emerging powers in informal ways. Potential candidates for permanent seats and their regional counterparts are committed as elected members, peacekeeping contributors or within the Peacebuilding Commission. Finally, we analyze how innovatively the Council has reacted to global security challenges. This includes working methods reform, expansion of sanctions regimes and involvement of non-state actors. We conclude that even though the Council’s membership has not yet been altered, it has reacted to the changing global order in ways previously unaccounted for.

This paper addresses the evolving purpose of NATO in the post-Cold War World. This Western defensive alliance has faced strong pressure to change and embrace an array of new tasks to justify its continued existence. This famously led it to engage in a protracted ‘out of area’ campaign in Afghanistan. Russia’s invasion of Crimea in early 2014 and the ongoing civil war in Eastern Ukraine enabled NATO to re-focus its attention on combatting its original enemy in the East. In the modern-day East-West rivalry cyberspace has become an increasingly strategic military domain. Adopting both quantitative and qualitative techniques, this chapter seeks to demonstrate how NATO has influenced the conceptualisation of cyber-attacks. The paper is structured as follows. Section 16.1 provides an overview of NATO’s structure and evolution over time. Section 16.2 draws on existing scholarship to analyse how shifting role conceptions have shaped this military organisations’ ability to adapt to new challenges. Section 16.3 illustrates how cyber threats have been conceptualised in NATO doctrine and strategic communication. Section 16.4 analyses the findings of the content analysis, showing that NATO’s organisational culture(s) have played a key role in shaping the Alliance’s framing of and response to cyber threats. Finally, an outline of the theoretical and policy implications of the study is made. Broader insights are also given as to how international security organisations adapt to technological, geostrategic, and societal changes.

This chapter describes the evolution of the G20, which was heavily marked by crisis events. It zooms into how the G20 has recently evolved from an abrupt global response to the global financial crisis to a forum for international cooperation in multiple policy areas, in other words from a “crisis committee” to a “steering committee”. This has implications for the G20’s objectives. Although initially preoccupied with financial regulation reforms and balanced economic growth, the G20 has experienced a noticeable expansion of its objectives to issues such as corruption, climate change, aid and development. Against this background, this chapter describes the institutional design and effectiveness of the G20 with the goal being to position the G20 as an essential part of the changing global order. This chapter provides a detailed account of the institutions’ main strengths and weaknesses, as well as threats and opportunities as one of the world’s most important diplomatic mechanisms for international economic governance.

There are many conflicts around the world that involve violations of international law (e.g. the civil war in Syria). However, unlike in the national systems, there is no centralized world enforcer. Therefore, a question arises whether in the current state of affairs international law can be enforced. This chapter uses key theories of international relations (IR) to explain the problem of enforcement in the context of international law. In particular, the chapter focuses on three international institutions that play a role in the maintenance of global order: United Nations Security Council, International Court of Justice, and International Criminal Court. These institutions are analyzed from the perspective of IR theories to explain their emergence and functionality. Having different levels of impact on international law, all three institutions derive their authority from the States that delegate to them decision powers. Finally, the chapter offers some thoughts on the implications emerging powers have on the changing global order.

Progressing from institutionalization to practice less than 6 years after its endorsement at the 2005 World Summit, the responsibility to protect (R2P) is a rising norm in international relations. This chapter uses the constructivist theoretical framework of Finnemore and Sikkink (International Organization 52(4):887–917, 1998) to determine which stage R2P has reached on the scale of international norm dynamics. The research is driven by an analysis of the political discourse held by the permanent members of the Security Council (P5) on R2P. This analysis results in a classification of the support brought to R2P by the P5 according to three distinct categories: strong supporters, cautious supporters, and rejectionists. While strong supporters advocate R2P in principle and practice, cautious supporters and rejectionists do not consider R2P as the standard procedure to protect civilians from crimes against humanity. This chapter argues that Russia and China are cautious supporters of R2P, as they oppose the norm’s implementation for conceptual reasons. Russian and Chinese concerns about R2P undermining core principles of the UN Charter result in the absence of consensus on the norm’s implementation within the Security Council. Acknowledging that this situation reduces the prospects of R2P implementation, analysis reveals that the norm has not reached the stage of internalization and is confined to the stage of norm cascade.

International negotiations as an instrument in conflict resolution are difficult to to grasp, both in theory and practice. Yet it is important to get to grips with this process, as negotiations between states and in international organizations are the lifeblood of the international body politic. The Charter of the United Nations, for obvious reasons, ranks negotiation as the foremost instrument in the peaceful settlement of inter-state conflicts. Scholars of international relations are still searching for methodologies and theories to explain outcomes of negotiations by the processes that produce them.

This chapter approaches the process of international negotiations from different angles, while applying a multi-faceted qualitiative analysis of case studies from the past and the present. It is hoped that a better understanding of negotiation as one of the main tools of conflict resolution will help to enhance the effectiveness of this process as an alternative to warfare. Words, after all, are cheaper than weapons. Still, negotiation is basically a struggle in the promotion and defence of state interests. It is war by peaceful means.

The central proposition of this chapter is that negotiations between states can only be a viable replacement of the use of violence if they are conducted within the framework of international regimes that set the rules and procedures for negotiation behaviour and mitigate lack of trust. International regimes may take the shape of international organizations, which can force countries to live up to their agreements. International negotiation processes may be taken as a ceaseless series of attempts to bring more order to the international system. If this system is eroded, negotiation will be a less effective alternative to the use of force in international relations.

Reflecting on four of the most significant peacemaking processes in the twentieth century – the 1978 Camp David Accords, the 1993 Oslo Accords, the 1995 Dayton Agreement, and 1988 Tripartite Accord on Namibia – the present chapter aims to explore the reasons that explain why and how specific outcomes have been achieved. As these cases shows, peacemaking processes are often characterized by a decision to leave out from discussion a major item of contention. While the decision might have been out of fear that discussing these issues might derail the other items on which agreement was in sight, it is still not clear how this decision is actually made. Reflecting back at these examples, a common puzzle comes to light: was the exclusion of a major issue the price of eventual success in reaching an agreement? Since the presence of mediators was crucial in shaping outcomes in all four cases, in order to answer what prompted the decision to leave some of the major issues out and move to agreement on other points, the present study will focus on the role of third parties on three tactical dimensions: strategic issue sequencing (i.e. decision which issue should be addressed first), party arithmetic (i.e. who should they engage with in the peace talks and which spoilers should be excluded), and the feasibility assessment of a potential solution (i.e. what kind of a deal is sustainable and achievable at the same time). All three dimensions will be further scrutinized as the building blocks of a specific type of bias that third-parties bring to the peacemaking process: bias of outcome.