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Constitutional Political Economy

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30.06.2018 | Original Paper

The constitution of patron–client relations and patronage appointments: a study of open and limited access

verfasst von: Louis Corriveau

Erschienen in: Constitutional Political Economy | Ausgabe 3/2018

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Abstract

I expound a game theoretical model of the constitution of patron–client relations and patronage appointments. For all parameter values, the game has open access equilibriums, where patronage does not occur. For some parameter values, it has also a limited access equilibrium, where patronage does occur. I prove open and limited access equilibriums are not Pareto-comparable to one another. Defining social welfare in utilitarian terms, I prove also that social welfare is maximised in a particular open access equilibrium, but that a limited access equilibrium can be a second-best solution, when it exists.

Vorheriger Artikel Political parties: insights from a tri-planar model of political economy

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Titel: The constitution of patron–client relations and patronage appointments: a study of open and limited access
verfasst von: Louis Corriveau
Publikationsdatum: 30.06.2018
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: Constitutional Political Economy / Ausgabe 3/2018
Print ISSN: 1043-4062
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-9966
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-018-9266-1

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