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2023 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

4. The DCT: The Fractious Origins of a Geopolitically Sensitive Port Ecosystem

verfasst von : Benjamin Barton

Erschienen in: The Doraleh Disputes

Verlag: Springer Nature Singapore

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Abstract

The Doraleh Container Terminal (DCT) ecosystem represents Djibouti’s first genuine “SSC 3.0” endeavour. Predominantly financed, built and operated by state-owned companies (led by Dubai Ports World (DPW)) from one of the Global South’s leading “providing parties” (the United Arab Emirates (UAE)), the DCT ecosystem—and its ultimate commercial success—was at first a source of “real pride” for Guelleh’s regime. After all, instead of being a mere “recipient,” the regime was a fully-fledged stakeholder to this partnership. However, after the culmination of a sequence of deleterious events (notably pertaining to the sense of sovereign injustice felt by the regime against the terms of the DCT’s 2006 Concession Agreement), Djibouti’s relationship with DPW turned sour. From a pioneering “third wave” SSC success story, the DCT ecosystem would ultimately become known for unending legal battles, media warfare and even character assassination pitting these two sides against one another. This Chapter investigates the causes and consequences of these legal disputes before turning to the geopolitical ramifications at stake, in relation to Djibouti’s bilateral relations with the UAE as well as to the disputes’ broader regional impact.

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Vorheriges Kapitel The Multilevel Politics of Djibouti’s Maritime Infrastructure

Nächstes Kapitel The Maritime Silk Road Effect in Djibouti

DPW, as of 2020, is under full state ownership (Cornwell, 2020).

Author’s creation (original map source: https://d-maps.com/pays.php?num_pay=20&lang=en). This map was was inspired by Image 2 (p. 10) from the study: Dutton Peter A., Kardon Isaac B. and Kennedy Conor M. (2020) ‘Djibouti: China’s first overseas strategic strongpoint’, CMSI China Maritime Reports, 6, retrieved at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=cmsi-maritime-reports, on 28/06/2022.

Boreh is the son of an eminent Issa notable and nephew to a modern martyr who lost his life fighting for Djibouti’s independence (Giorgis, 2013; Flaux, 2016: 222). Boreh, a very successful businessman, rose to prominence by allying himself with Aptidon (Giorgis, 2013). Boreh owes his fortune to numerous business ventures in tobacco, construction (etc.) which allowed him to accede to the position of Vice-President of the nation’s Chamber of Commerce in the 1990s (Ghorbal, 2006; Giorgis, 2013). Despite a keen interest in politics and his burgeoning relationship at the time with Guelleh, Boreh never formally held a position in government (Flaux, 2016: 4). This being said, he is credited with bringing DPW into the fold of many of the projects discussed in this Chapter thanks to his business interests in Dubai (including a warehouse in the Jebel Ali Free Zone (JAFZ)) having allowed him to cultivate relationships with leading figures in the UAE’s business and political community, notably bin Sulayem (Giorgis, 2015; Flaux, 2016: 29–30).

It could handle a maximum of 6.2 million tonnes per annum (0.35 Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit (TEU) capacity), with quay length of 3.2 kms and berth depth of 9–12.5 m. It consisted of 15 berths with three quays designed to receive bulk cargo (wheat, fertilizer, coal, etc.) (Xu, 2018: 30).

Originally Obock had served as the port for the early French settlers until a more suitable location was identified in the Gulf of Tadjourah where the French then built Djibouti City. In 1896, Tadjourah, Obock and Djibouti City were merged to form the Côte Français des Somalis (Shehim and Searing, 1980: 211).

PAID would reassume direct control over the management of the vieux port in July 2011 before being restructured as a private entity in January 2013 (Styan, 2020: 201).

DPW was also granted the power to set tariffs. In fact, as recounted in Chapter 3, DPW did just that in January 2001 when port dues witnessed a 30 percent hike (Xinhua News Agency, 2000b). Dubai Customs would go on to sign an agreement with Djibouti to manage Djibouti’s Customs thus assuming part of the latter’s administrative, financial and IT responsibilities (AMEinfo, 2005).

In hindsight, the irony here is that the feasibility studies in question were financed and undertaken by the US Trade and Development Agency (USTDA)—a situation which would be highly polemical contemporaneously in light of the unfolding US-China strategic rivalry (Flaux, 2016: 63).

The Ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Ahmed bin Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, donated and opened the said USD $21 million 16 km highway (named after him) linking the DCT to Djibouti City and the highway to Ethiopia (WAM, 2018).

As detailed in (Flaux, 2016: 158–159), of the USD $400 million, the shareholders invested about USD $130 million. PAID’s contribution came from the reserves of the vieux port. DPW also contributed its share of reserves from the vieux port, plus approximately USD $15 million of its own cash. The balance of USD $260 million originated from a “syndicated bank loan” arranged by DPW through Standard Chartered Bank and Dubai Islamic Bank. The financing was obtained on “non-recourse terms.”

Although Guelleh does refer to a meeting in/with Paris in 1999 where he first mentioned the need for a new oil jetty in Doraleh without specifying whether this meeting was held with potential investors or with government officials. In any case, Guelleh recalls how he was met with contempt as investors “laughed” in the face of his proposal (author’s translation) (cited in Soudan, 2008).

The result of a project carried out in three phases, the second phase involved relocating the terminal to Doraleh in order to increase storage capacity to 240,000 square metres (EIU, 2003). Come the final phase of the project, storage capacity was to expand to 360,000 square metres (Ghorbal, 2006).

A reception was held on board the USS Vicksburg to celebrate the opening of the terminal, where bin Sulayem was in attendance (AMEinfo, 2006a). The US Navy had in fact ordered the construction of its own refuelling dock at the terminal, which opened in 2005 (Ghorbal, 2006).

Which, ominously, would not end well following disagreements over DPW’s ineffectual approach to managing Djibouti’s congested airspace (Styan, 2013: 6–7).

Notably with the attacks on the USS Cole (2000) and on a French tanker (2002) (Styan, 2013: 5–6). DPW actually took over the management of the port of Aden in 2008 before relinquishing this role four years later, the same year former President Ali Abdullah Saleh was removed from office (Peel, 2013: 153).

DPW had already begun its expansion into the global port management business first in India and then, in 2004, when it defeated PSA to secure the international port assets of CSX Corp. of Jacksonville, Florida (WSJ, 2006). It then attempted six bids in 2006 to acquire port concessions in the US and has gone on, since, to acquire the rights over African ports in Algeria, Mozambique and Senegal (among others) (Dickinson, 2012).

Elizabeth Dickinson (2012) quotes a 2010 policy paper from the UAE’s Ministry of Trade which outlines the complementarity at stake between the continent’s needs and the UAE’s comparative advantages: “the very lack of development, especially in infrastructure, means that over the next several years there will be massive demand by African nations for precisely the types of development that the UAE is skilled at providing and is world famous for.”

Made possible thanks to turnover of USD $160 million per annum and net profits of USD $70 million (Flaux, 2016: 5–6).

Author’s translation.

For which there must have been an element of disinformation since DPW returned to full state-ownership in 2020 on the back of the company struggling to repay borrowings incurred during the 2009 debt crisis (Cornwell, 2020).

As a matter of fact, the ripple effects of the GFC ultimately led DPW to delay the DCT’s extension and put on hold promises to build the Tadjourah and Obock terminals (Ghorbal, 2015b). In any case, these promises fell flat once the regime mounted its legal challenge against DPW.

Boreh first fled to France where he filed complaints against his “10-min political trial” conviction in abstentia in Djibouti and against Guelleh (see Table4.3) (Giorgis, 2013). To add more fuel to the fire, Boreh hired the legal representative for the wife of the deceased French judge Borrel as his lawyer (see Chapter 3), who was striving herself to seek justice for her deceased husband (Ben Yahmed, 2010).

In 2013, the Dubai International Financial Centre Courts struck the landmark decision to approve Djibouti’s freezing request on USD $5 million of Boreh’s assets in JAFZ (UAE Government News, 2013).

The extradition attempt ended in failure (EIU, 2015).

Author’s translation.

PIL partnered with CMP in August 2017 to build new markets in Asia (Xinhua News Agency, 2018).

Sour grapes reflected in revisionist comments such as the current Chairman of the DPFZA Aboubaker Omar Hadi’s rhetorical questioning of DPW’s suggested arrogance during the initial negotiations. Hadi was quoted as asking with hindsight: “how can a private company dictate its terms on the very sovereignty of an independent nation?” (cited in Giorgis, 2018).

Ironically, the ‘Vision Djibouti 2035’ articulates the need to/for: “ensure the legal security of investors,” justice for the “protection of investors against expropriation risks and will guarantee the respect of contracts,” ensuring the state’s “non-interference in the creation of private companies” on top of the elimination of “barriers hampering the creation of foreign companies” (Republic of Djibouti, 2014: 61).

Tadjourah was conceived to handle the transit of trade in non-containerised goods such as coal, steel and potash to Ethiopia, especially to the latter’s Tigray and Afar regions via the North Tadjourah-Balho corridor (Addis Fortune, 2017; New Business Ethiopia, 2020). It owns a 435-m-long linear platform and a 190-m roll-on/roll-off platform with the expectation that it will, over time, handle 35 percent of goods to Ethiopia (Addis Fortune, 2017).

The port of Damerjog, which forms part of the DDID project, includes a multipurpose port, a Heavy Industry Free Zone, a desalination plant, a power station, a Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) terminal, a livestock terminal, dry docks, a ship repair area, a power plant, a cement mixing plant and a factory that will produce construction materials. The development of the complex will help Djibouti meet the region’s hydrocarbon needs (Darras, 2017; EIU, 2020a).

The port of Ghoubet, built by CMP, was opened in 2017 with the main aim of making it a key terminal for the exportation of salt drawn from Lake Assal, to the tune of five million tonnes (allAfrica.com, 2017; Darras, 2017).

All errors and inaccuracies in this table are mine.

The SGTD’s board would also comprise seven members, all of whom were to be nominated by the state. The board would be presided by the Chairman of the DPFZA. In so doing, the DCT had thus become a fully state-owned entreprise, far from its initial structure (Republic of Djibouti, 2018a). The HOT was nationalised as well with its physical and non-tangible assets transferred to the Société de Gestion de la Jetée du Terminal Pétrolier Doraleh (SGJTPD), who was tasked with managing the jetty (Republic of Djibouti, 2018b).

The first USD $100 million tranche of this total amount was reportedly designed to build 400 out of the 800-m-long quay as well as the Free Zone envisaged as per the master plan for Berbera (Darras, 2018).

First opened in 1968, the port had historically served as a naval and missile base for the government of Somalia after independence. It had changed hands during the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the US. Since the early 2000s, it had mainly been used to help with the import of food aid for countries in the region (Giorgis, 2018).

Bringing DPW’s share down to 51 percent and the Somaliland government’s stake to 30 percent. As per Kateřina Rudincová, this was not the first time a deal had been struck between Addis and Hargeisa. In the year 2000, Somaliland had already offered its Ethiopian counterpart usage of the port during Meles Zenawi’s state-visit (2016: 218). In 2006, Ethiopia signed an agreement with Somaliland regarding usage of the port (Ibid: 219). In November 2014, an Ethiopian delegation inspected the port as well as its storage facilities (Ibid).

Albeit thanks to funding provided by the UAE in conjunction to the Abu Dhabi Fund, a 250 km dual carriageway was to be built between the Berbera corridor and the Ethiopian border (Tadesse, 2019).

A piece in The Economist recalls how authorities in Mogadishu temporarily confiscated an Emirati plane reportedly carrying USD $9.6 million in cash intended for soldiers in the other semi-autonomous region of Puntland to pay for the salaries of the Puntland Maritime Police Force and Intelligence Agency—which Mogadishu interpreted as the subversive funding of a breakaway federal state (Okbandrias, 2017: 130; EIU, 2018; Marsai and Szalai, 2021: 14). The UAE had, since 2011, been financing the development of a maritime police force in Puntland to help combat piracy at sea and on shore in Somalia, as well as providing training and equipment in kind (Hansrod, 2016; Marsai and Szalai, 2021: 9). UAE-Somali ties took a further turn for the worse against the backdrop of the proxy battle of influence in the HoA pitting Abu Dhabi and Riyadh against Doha and Ankara, especially as Qatar had been acting as a fulcrum of support for Somalia’s federal government (Oxford Analytica, 2015; ICG, 2018).

A deal which apparently was dead in the water only a couple of years due to persistent logistical and political difficulties (Strategic Survey, 2020: 283).

In April 2015, the UAE temporarily closed its Consulate in Djibouti following an altercation between the UAE Vice-Consul and the Commander of the Djibouti Air Force (Oxford Analytica, 2015). The same day, Djibouti evicted Gulf troops (Saudi and Emirati), Afwerki met with Saudi King Salman bin Abdel Aziz to conclude a security and military partnership which included basing rights (Obkandrias, 2017: 2016). According to Guelleh, in 2016 and 2017, while appealing to his counterparts in the UAE regarding the regime’s legal contentions with DPW, he was met with a muted response from the Emirate’s Prime Minister, Foreign Minister as well as by Sheikh Mohamed Ibn Rached, Abdallah Ibn Zayed and by the Crown Prince Mohamed Ibn Zayed himself (Soudan, 2018).

Back in 2009, for instance, Guelleh had reportedly entertained former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on a state-visit to Djibouti where enhancing defence ties and signing an economic cooperation agreement formed part of the agenda (Boreh, 2010; Bishku, 2019: 11). Later down the line though, due to pressure coming from Saudi Arabia in particular, Guelleh was forced into repudiating his engagements with Riyadh’s Shia rivals, especially when Riyadh came across intelligence that Houthi rebels in Yemen were receiving military supplies from Iran through Djibouti (Bishku, 2019: 11). The regime eventually broke off diplomatic ties with Tehran following the Iranian attack on the Saudi embassy in Iran’s capital in retaliation for the Saudis executing Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr (Ibid: 14).

As a direct consequence of this decision, Qatar—whose troops had been stationed at the border between Djibouti and Eritrea since 2010 to keep the peace in the wake of a ceasefire brokered at the time by Doha—withdrew its peacekeeping contingent in retaliation (Barakat and Milton, 2017). Asmara then sent troops to occupy the border, thus reviving the bilateral flare-up over a situation which seemed to have become subdued (Donelli & Gonzalez-Levaggi, 2021: 53).

Abiy’s ascent to power constituted a game-changer for Abu Dhabi, in the opinion of Alex de Waal, due to the nature of Addis’ past ties with Iran and Qatar (cited in Oneko, 2018). Abiy had already signaled his desire to normalise ties with Eritrea, thus aligning himself with one of the pillars of the UAE’s regional strategy. Better yet, the UAE could offer both Ethiopia and Eritrea the financial stimulus (in the shape of a USD $3 billion aid and investment package) needed to strongly incentivise them to agree to this historic deal (Quinn and Akyol, 2021: 1098).

Abu Dhabi also announced plans to invest in an oil pipeline connecting Ethiopia and Eritrea (Oneko, 2018).

In 2017, Puntland signed a contract with the Emirati-owned P&O Ports for the management of Bossaso port (Marsai & Szalai, 2021: 13).

With both countries’ respective Foreign Ministers meeting during the summer of 2018 before Guelleh himself travelled to Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) for the Eritrea-Djibouti summit in the autumn of that year (Vilmer, 2021: 30),

In mid-2020, Eritrean authorities reportedly rejected medical aid shipments from the UAE (EIU, 2020b).

For instance, on the port of Berbera, Guelleh gave an interview where he downplayed its prospects due to the exorbitant costs involved in rebuilding the roads linking the port to the Ethiopian border which he claimed would cost almost as much, if not more, than the sum of the total investments in the port itself. Furthermore, he pointed to difficulties in the port’s ability to draw water sufficiently close to its docks to grant heavy-tonnage tankers entry to the port (cited in Soudan, 2017). As a result, Djibouti’s comprehensive lead would remain intact.

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Titel: The DCT: The Fractious Origins of a Geopolitically Sensitive Port Ecosystem
verfasst von: Benjamin Barton
Verlag: Springer Nature Singapore
Buch: The Doraleh Disputes
Print ISBN: 978-981-19-7438-0

Electronic ISBN: 978-981-19-7439-7

Copyright-Jahr: 2023
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7439-7_4

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