2. The Establishment of the European System of Central Banks and the Eurosystem

OJ C 191, 29.7.1992, pp. 1–112; on this Treaty, see, by way of mere indication, Hahn (1993a), Cloos et al. (1994), individual contributions in O’Keeffe and Twomey (1994) (in particular, Dunnett (1994)) and Pipkorn (1994).

On the concept of monetary sovereignty, see Mann (1986), pp. 465 ff.

It is reasonable to defend the argument that, if a common currency would have been adopted, circulating in parallel with the euro, the integrity of the euro area would have been even more negatively affected by the 2010 fiscal crisis (on this crisis, see Sect. 2.4.4).

Irrespective, however, of this remark, the European monetary union is not an ‘optimum currency area’ (‘OCA’), that is a geographical region in which the introduction of a single currency would maximise economic efficiency, according to the theory developed by Mundell (1961); see on this, by way of mere indication, Mongelli (2002) and in more detail De Grauwe (2004), pp. 24–59.

On this fund, see Louis (1973) and Smits (1997), pp. 17–18 (the latter also identifying its problems).

On the legal basis, operation, problems and contribution of the EMS to safeguarding a (relevant) monetary stability in the Community, see Smits (1997), pp. 20–26 and Padoa-Schioppa (1994), pp. 68–85.

This category includes 15 international organisations linked to the United Nations by special agreements; their activity covers a wide range of issues (such as monetary relations, economic development, agricultural policy, education, health, telecommunications and meteorology).

Articles of Agreement (1945), Article IV.

Articles of Agreement (1990), Article V (“Operations and Transactions of the Fund”); on these tasks, see Lowenfeld (2009), pp. 613–617 and 622–624, and Lastra (2015), pp. 415–422.

For a review of this system and the conditions for its abolishment, see, by way of mere indication, Hooke (1981), Eichengreen (1994), pp. 50–54, Lowenfeld (2009), pp. 622–633 and Lastra (2015), pp. 412–426.

The text of this Convention is available at: https://​www.​bis.​org/​about/​convention-en.​pdf. The initial Statutes of the BIS are available at: https://​www.​bis.​org/​about/​charter-en.​pdf.

BIS Statutes (2016), Article 1; these Statutes, as in force, are available at: https://​www.​bis.​org/​about/​statutes-en.​pdf.

The operation of the BIS in Switzerland is governed by the provisions of the “Headquarters Agreement” of 1987 (as currently in force). This agreement is available at: https://​www.​bis.​org/​about/​headquart-en.​pdf.

BIS Statutes (2016), Article 3, as further specified in Articles 19–25. For an analytical study on the work of the BIS during the period 1930–1973, see Toniolo (2005). On the more recent tasks of the BIS, see Nobel (2019), pp. 300–305.

OJ L 169, 29.6.1987, pp. 1–19.

On the synergies between microeconomic integration and monetary unification, see Chap. 1, Sect. 1.​2.​3.

A “Werner Committee Report” had been produced before, in 1971; however, the circumstances at the time were not appropriate for the implementation of the idea of European monetary integration. On this report, see, by way of mere indication, Smits (1997), pp. 15–17.

For an assessment of the Delors Committee proposals, see Smits (1997), pp. 38–40 and Padoa-Schioppa (1994), pp. 137–149.

However, the UK and Denmark were exempted from their participation in the monetary union by virtue of Protocols containing opt-out clauses; see Sect. 2.2.1.

Consolidated version, OJ C 321, 29.12.2006, pp. 37–186.

See Sect. 2.2.

On the establishment of the EMU, see Louis (1989a, b, (1992, 2009), pp. 39–47, Hahn (1990) and (1996) and Häde (1992).

TEC, Articles 108–109 and 121(1) (Articles 130–131 and 140(1) TFEU).

Ibid., Article 122(1); on the conditions for joining the EMU and the position of the Members States with a derogation, see Steindorff (1996), Kerse (1997), Smits (1997), pp. 134–139 and Louis (2009), pp. 51–70 and 80–83.

On this approach, see Chap. 1, Sect. 1.​2.​2.

By way of mere indication, see Ukrow (1999).

By way of mere indication, see Häde (1999), pp. 293–305.

The monetary policy of the Member States was delimited during that period by their participation in the mechanism of exchange rates of the European monetary system.

For a detailed presentation of the road towards the EMU, see Bini-Smaghi et al. (1994), Steinherr (1995), Vanthoor (1996), Smits (1997), pp. 10–35, Eijffinger and de Haan (2000), pp. 3–30, De Grauwe (2004), pp. 129–147, Issing (2008), Louis (2009), pp. 9–37, Proctor (2012), pp. 681–700, and Lastra (2015), pp. 219–245.

See Chap. 1, Sect. 1.​2.​2.

From an EU legal point of view, the principle of subsidiarity does not apply to the exclusive competencies of the EU, such as the monetary policy; see also Sect. 2.3.3. On this principle (currently governed by Article 5(3) TEU), see Lienbacher (2019), pp. 103–120, Craig and de Búrca (2015), pp. 95–102 and Fabbrini (2018).

TEC, Articles 4(2) and 105(1). The ECB is structured (albeit with significant differences) on the example of the central bank of Germany (Deutsche Bundesbank) and (to a lesser extent) the federal system of USA central banks (Federal Reserve System). For a detailed comparative presentation of these central banks, see Central Bank Governance Group (2009); on the relation between the ECB and the Bundesbans, see de Haan (2000).

Council Decision of 29 October 1993, taken at the level of Member States’ Heads of State or Government.

TEC, Article 117; on the EMI, see Louis (1993, 2009), pp. 49–51.

On the important contribution of Lamfalussy also in the field of EU financial law, see Chap. 3, Sect. 3.​2.​3.

On the role of NCBs in the ESCB under the TEC, see Potacs (1993); this aspect is discussed in more detail, under the TFEU, in Chap. 5, Sect. 5.​1.​2.

TEC, Article 8; by way of mere indication, see Häde (1999), pp. 362–363. On the legal aspects of the EMU and the ECB (with the exception of its specific tasks with regard to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, which are discussed in Chaps. 4, 5 and 8), see Hahn (1991, 1993b), Sarcinelli (1992), Mestmäcker (1994), Roth (1994), Slot (1994), Hahn and Häde (1995), Mehnert-Meland (1995), Stadler (1996), Smits (1997), Louis (1998), (2009), Zilioli and Selmayr (2000), (2001), Issing et al. (2001), various contributions in European Central Bank (2005) (including Smits 2005), Hadjiemmanuil (2006), Scheller (2006) and Lastra and Louis (2013).

See Sect. 2.3.

The establishment of an internal market, particularly in the field of financial services, forms a fundamental constitutive element of the monetary unification project. For an overview of this aspect, see Smits (1997), pp. 37–57, who assesses the internal market as the third constitutive element of EMU.

TEC, Articles 99 (on economic policy coordination), 101–104 (on fiscal discipline) and 100 (on economic solidarity). On these provisions, see Italiener (1997), Taylor (1997) (dealing, in particular, with the separation of monetary and fiscal policy in Stage Three of EMU), Hahn (1998) and Buti and Sapir (1998).

On the no-bail-out clause, the provisions governing economic solidarity and the lack of sovereign debt crisis management mechanisms, see also Sect. 2.4.4, when discussing the ongoing fiscal crisis in the euro area.

TEC, Article 104(11), first sub-paragraph.

See Chap. 1, Sect. 1.​2.​2.

On the sources of EU banking law, see Chaps. 3 and 4.

See Chap. 1, Sect. 1.​2.​4.

Consolidated version, OJ C 321, 29.12.2006, pp. 1–35.

Available at: https://​eur-lex.​europa.​eu/​legal-content/​EN/​TXT/​?​uri=​LEGISSUM%3Aai0033; for details on the text and a commentary of this Treaty, see Fischer (2008).

OJ C 202 (Consolidated version), 7.6.2016, pp. 1–45 and 47–200, respectively.

According to Article 51 TEU (Article 311 TEC), the Protocols annexed to the Treaties form an integral part thereof and, consequently, their provisions fall within primary EU law.

According to the author’s opinion, the last part of this provision (“whose currency is the euro”) is not absolutely precise, given that the euro is the currency of specific Member States (viz. those defined as the Member States whose currency is the euro) and not of the EU or the EMU.

TEU, Article 13(1), second sub-paragraph, point (6) (Treaty of Lisbon, Article 1(14)); see, on this, Snyder (2011), pp. 702–703.

Ibid., Articles 14–17 and 19, respectively; on this, see Snyder (2011), p. 702.

See Sect. 2.3.3.

OJ L 91, 6.4.2011, pp. 1–2.

Treaty of Lisbon, Article 2(1).

Ιbid., Article 2(2), point (i).

TFEU, Article 3(1), point (c). On Article 3 TFEU, see Pelka (2019).

The same provision is found in Article 2(3) TFEU; on this, see Snyder (2011), p. 701.

For an analysis of this Article, see Hatje (2019); on Article 3 TEU, see Becker (2019).

For an analysis of these Articles, see, by way of mere indication, Hattenberger (2019).

Treaty of Lisbon, Article 2(91)–(97), and Annex, Correspondence Table Β. It is noted, however, that the individual paragraphs of Article 111 TEC were placed in the TFEU as follows: paragraph 4 in Chap. 4, as Article 138 TFEU, and paragraphs 1–3 and 5 in the (new) Part Five of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“The Union’s external action”), in Title V (“International Agreements”) as Article 219.

On this Article, see further in Sect. 2.4.3.

The first indent of Article 127(2) TFEU refers to the “monetary policy of the Union”. Since, however, this paragraph applies only to the Member States whose currency is the euro (ibid., Article 139(2), point (c)), the phrase ‘monetary policy of the euro area’ is obviously more accurate.

Ibid., Article 127(2); on all these tasks, which are analysed in Chap. 7, Sects. 7.​1 and 7.​2, see indicatively Smits (1997), pp. 193–202, Papathanassiou (2001), pp. 15–28, Louis (2009), pp. 152–162, and Lastra and Louis (2013), pp. 79–81.

These tasks are analysed in Chaps. 8 and 7.3, respectively.

Lastra and Louis (2013), p. 79. The main legal consequence is that any reference in a legal act to the ECB’s basic tasks pertains to those listed in Article 127(2) TFEU.

It is noted that resort to Article 135 has never been made until now.

This Article is also discussed in Sect. 2.4.3.

On the related Protocol annexed to the Treaties, see further in Sect. 2.3.4. In the author’s opinion, even though the Eurogroup does not belong to the EU institutions, it does not lack any institutional character under EU law.

In particular, repealed were: Articles 116 with respect to the three Stages of EMU, 117(1), 117(2), point (6) and 117(3)–(9) on the EMI, 118 on the European Currency Unit (the ‘ECU’), 121(2)–(4) on the alternative initiation procedures of the third EMU stage, 122(1), 122(2), first sub-paragraph and 122(3)–(6) with respect to the Member States with a derogation, 123(1)–(2) and (4) with respect to the actions that should be undertaken immediately after the decision on the date of initiation of the third EMU stage, and 124(2) with respect to the exchange-rate policy of Member States with a derogation. For details, see Snyder (2011), pp. 702–703.

For updates on participation in this mechanism, see at: https://​www.​ecb.​europa.​eu/​ecb/​legal/​107663/​1350/​html/​index.​en.​html.

This Article, which currently includes all the main institutional provisions of the ESCB and the ECB, incorporated some paragraphs of Articles 105 and 107 TEC.

For a systematic summary of all these TFEU Articles, see the correlation Table 2.1.

TFEU, Articles 263, 265–267 and 277 (corresponding to Articles 230, 232–234 and 241 TEC), 271 (corresponding to Article 237 TEC), 340, third sub-paragraph (corresponding to Article 288, third sub-paragraph TEC) and 343, second sub-paragraph (corresponding to Article 291, second sub-paragraph TEC); several of these aspects are discussed in more detail in Chap. 6; on Articles 266–277, 271 and 277 (not further discussed), see Borchardt (2010), Schwarze and Voet van Vormizeele (2019) and Schwarze and Wunderlich (2019).

Ibid., Article 66 (corresponding to Article 59 TEC).

Ibid., Article 15(3), first–fourth (new) sub-paragraphs; see Zerdick (2010), pp. 353–356 and, in more detail, Görlitz and Schoo (2019), pp. 496–517. The right to access documents of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission was also established in Article 255 TEC, without reference to the ECB (see Görlitz and Schoo (2019), pp. 494–496).

TEC, Article 107(4).

See Smits (1997), p. 91, explaining the reason why certain TEC Articles are repeated verbatim in the Statute.

In this respect, it is noted that Articles 37, 50 and 51, which contained provisions that ceased to apply after the beginning of Stage Three of EMU (a fact that led to a necessary renumbering), were repealed, while Article 10.6 was incorporated as Article 40(2).

OJ C 202 (Consolidated version), 7.6.2016, pp. 230–250.

Treaty of Lisbon, Protocols, B. Protocols annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, Protocol No 1: Article 1, Α. Horizontal amendments, par. 1–6 and 8, Article 1, B. Special amendments, par. 11 and Annex, Correspondence Table A.

The Articles contained in the Chapters of this Protocol, which are also of primary importance to European central banking law and their majority will be presented in detail below, are presented in summary in Table 2.2.

TEU (1992), Article 48; see, on this, Cremer (1999), pp. 242–246.

This Article was added with the Treaty of Nice (OJ C 80, 10.3.2001, pp. 1–87).

These Articles are 5.1–5.3 (on the collection of statistical information), 17–18, 19.1, 22, 23 and 24 (on the monetary functions and operations of the Eurosystem, with the exception of Article 21 on operations with public entities), 26 (on the financial accounts of the ECB and the NCBs), 32.2–32.3, 32.4 and 32.6 (on the majority of the aspects relating to the allocation of NCBs’monetary income), 33.1, point (a) [on the variable amount (determined by the GC) of the ECB’snet profit to be transferred to the general reserve fund] and 36 (on the ECB’s staff). On this procedure, see Smits (1997), p. 115 (under I).

OJ L 83, 1.4.2003, pp. 66–68.

On this Article, see Boss (2010) and Herrnfeld (2019).

Treaty of Lisbon, Protocols, B. Protocols which are annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon. Protocol No 1, Article 1, B. Special amendments, par. 11, point (ka), sub-point (ii). In the TFEU, this aspect is governed by Article 129(3); see on this Wutscher (2019), pp. 2067–2068.

Article 41 was renumbered to Article 40.1 and Article 10.6 to Article 40.2 (which from a systemic standpoint was reasonable).

More specifically, the Decision on amendment is taken unanimously, albeit by the European Council and not by the Council of the Heads of State or Government, which was repealed by the Lisbon Treaty; the amendments come into force following their approval by Member States according to their respective national constitutional rules (as is also the case upon application of Article 48 TEU); decision-making requires as a necessary preceding condition either an ECB Recommendation (the relevant decision taken unanimously by its GC (ESCB/ECB Statute, Article 40.3) and consultation with the Commission or a Commission proposal and consultation with the ECB; the European Parliament must also be consulted.

Treaty of Lisbon, Protocols, B. Protocols annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, Protocol No 1, Article 1: Α. Horizontal amendments, par. 1–8, and B. Special amendments, on a case by case basis in the respective points.

OJ C 202 (Consolidated version), 7.6.2016, pp. 265, 266–272, 279–280, 281–282, 284–286, 287, 288 and 289, respectively.

On these aspects, see Chap. 6, Sect. 6.​1.​2.

On this Protocol, see also Sect. 2.4.3.

OJ C 202 (Consolidated version), 7.6.2016, p. 283.

For a summary of all these Protocols, see Table 2.3.

Treaty of Lisbon, Protocols, B. Protocols annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, Protocol No 1, Article 1, B. Special amendments, par. 9, points (c)–(e).

These legal instruments are discussed in Chap. 6, Sect. 6.​3.​1.

TEC, Article 123(1), first sub-paragraph, first point and Statute, Article 42. Article 107 was not included in the list of Articles of Article 122(3) TEC, which were not applicable to Member States with a derogation; it was also applicable to the UK (Protocol (No 25), paragraphs 5 and 7).

Treaty of Lisbon, Article 2(93)(c) (for Article 107(6) TEC) and Protocols Β. Protocols, annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, Protocol No 1, Article 1, B. Special amendments, par. 11, point (kb) (for Article 42 ESCB/ECB Statute).

ESCB/ECB Statute, Articles 4, point (a), second case, 5.4, 19.2, 20 (second sub-paragraph), 28.1 (second sub-paragraph), 29.2, 30.4 and 34.3, respectively; the majority of the legal acts adopted by the Council are discussed in the following chapters of this book, as appropriate (mainly, in Chap. 6).

For a comparative presentation of the simplified procedures for the amendment of provisions of the ESCB/ECB Statute (under its Articles 40.1 and 40.2; see Sect. 2.3.4) and the procedure for the adoption of the complementary legislation by the Council (under Articles 129(4) TFEU and 41 ESCB/ECB Statute) and on a summary of the legal acts adopted by the Council under the complementary legislation, see Tables 2.4 and 2.5.

Regulations (EC) 3603/93 and 3604/93 (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, pp. 1–3 and 4–6, respectively) and Regulations (EC) 1466/97 and 1467/97 (OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, pp. 1–5 and 6–11, respectively); the first two legal acts were adopted on the basis of Article 103(2) TEC, the third on the basis of Article 99(5) and the fourth on the basis of Article 104(14). In the first three cases, the Council was required to decide on the basis of the cooperation procedure of Article 252 TEC; in the latter, it was required to decide by a qualified majority, upon proposal of the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament.

The Resolution is available at: https://​publications.​europa.​eu/​en/​publication-detail/​-/​publication/​1409c2d7-2549-4e85-99a0-b262887b3a7b. An often repeated error is that the Pact sets the reference limits which are not to be exceeded within the framework of the excessive budgetary deficit procedure. However, the procedure was established in the TEC (and currently in the TFEU), the provisions of which were specified by Regulation 1467/97 included within the Pact, while the reference limits were provided for in Protocol (No 20), which formed an integral part thereof (i.e. primary law). As a result, any amendment of such limits requires a TFEU amendment. In addition, the amendment of the reference limits included (anymore) in Protocol (No 12) requires a unanimous Council Decision (TFEU, Article 126(14), second sub-paragraph). The same applies for the amendment of the provisions of Regulation 1467/97. It is also noted that the establishment of this prerequisite of a unanimous Council decision on the amendment (of the convergence criteria and) of the reference limits with respect to budgetary discipline was the main argument of the German Federal Constitutional Court, when it confirmed the constitutionality of the Treaty of Maastricht provisions (Cases 2 BvR 2134/92, 2 BvR 2159/92, Judgment of October 12, 1993, available at: https://​iow.​eui.​eu/​wp-content/​uploads/​sites/​18/​2013/​04/​06-Von-Bogdandy-German-Federal-Constitutional-Court.​pdf); see on this, Meessen (1993), Wegen and Kuner (1994) and Wiegandt (1995). On the content of the Pact, see, by way of mere indication, Lastra and Louis (2013), pp. 55–71.

Council Decisions 98/743/EC of 21 December 1998 and 1999/8/EC of 31 December 1998 (OJ L 358, 31.12.1998, pp. 109–110 and OJ L 5, 9.1.1999, p. 71, respectively), adopted on the basis of Article 114(3) (first sentence) TEC (currently Article 134 TFEU) and Article 209 TEC (Article 242 TFEU). The Statute is currently in force as amended by Council Decisions 2003/476/EC of 18 June 2003 (OJ L 158, 27.6.2003, pp. 58–60) and 2012/245/EU of 26 April 2012 (OJ L 121, 8.5.2012, pp. 22–24).

The legal acts governing the introduction of the euro were Council Regulations (EC) 1103/97 of 17 June 1997 and 974/98 of 3 May 1998 (OJ L 162, 19.6.1997, pp. 1–3 and OJ L 139, 11.5.1999, pp. 1–5, respectively); the former was adopted on the basis of Article 308 TEC and the latter on the basis of Article 123(4). On these two legal acts, see Gortsos (1998), Wiegand (1998), Louis (2000) and Wahlig (2000); on the particular issue concerning the continuity of contracts in the transition to Stage Three, see also Wölker (1996). On the changeover to the euro, see also Yeowart (1995), Bamford (1997), Dunnett (1996), (1997), Goodhart (1997) and Wittelsberger (1997).

Council Decisions 1999/96/EC, 1999/97/EC and 1999/98/EC, OJ L 30, 4.2.1999, pp. 31–32, 33–34 and 35–36, respectively; on the basis of these Decisions, France and Italy concluded in 2001 the necessary agreements with the countries in question.

Council Decision 1999/95/EC, OJ L 30, 4.2.1999, pp. 29–30. The same does not hold for other French overseas territories, such as New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna (see also the above-mentioned Protocol (No 18) on France), in relation to Italy for its exclave in Switzerland Campione d’Italia (which uses the Swiss franc, while in the case of the German exclave in Switzerland Büssingen am Hochrhein use is made of the euro), as well as for some overseas territories of the Netherlands. It is also noted that, by virtue of Council Decision 98/683/EC of 23 November 1998 concerning exchange-rate matters relating to the CFA Franc and the Comorian Franc (OJ L 320, 28.11.1998, pp. 58–59), France was allowed to continue (and did so) the implementation of its monetary agreements with the West African Economic and Monetary Union (well-known with the French acronym ‘UEMOA’), the Economic and Monetary Union of Central Africa (‘CEMAC’) and Comores, which guarantee the convertibility of the CFA and Comorian francs into the French franc at a fixed parity. Similar arrangements were made in relation to the Cape Verde escudo by virtue of Council Decision 98/744/EC of 21 December 1998 (OJ L 358, 31.12.1998, pp. 111–112).

On the basis of the above-mentioned, the euro is the national currency not only of the Member States which have met the convergence criteria (currently 19), but also of the above-mentioned European countries and the French territorial communities.

On this, see the Appendix to Chap. 6.

By mere indication, this Article (in conjunction with Article 121(6)), formed the legal basis of Regulations (EU) No 1174/2011 of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances (OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, pp. 8–11), 472/2013 of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, and 473/2013 of the same date on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area (OL L140, 27.5.2013, pp. 1–10 and 11–23, respectively).

These legal acts, which are of significant importance in the context of this book, are discussed in detail in Chaps. 3, 4 and 5.

See Sect. 2.2.2.

For an evaluation of this crisis and the related policy responses, see, by way of mere indication, Belke (2010), Eichengreen et al. (2011), pp. 47–64, Athanassiou (2011), Aizenman (2012), Caminal (2012), Stephanou (2013), de Grauwe (2013), Hadjiemmanuil (2015), pp. 6–10, d’Arvisenet (2015), Zimmermann (2015), Hadjiemmanuil (2019) and Honohan (2019), pp. 73–96. On the institutional aspects and implications of the crisis and the “New Economic Constitutionalism in Europe”, see Gerapetritis (2019).

During the first, emergency period of the Greek crisis and in order to deal with the spillover effects to other Member States (and, in particular, its credit institutions, since many of them were holding in their banking and trading books significant amounts of Greek government bonds) from a (highly potential at that time) haircut of Greek debt and given (as just mentioned) the absence of any sovereign debt crisis management mechanisms, the Eurogroup, the European Council and the Commission’s President announced on 11 April an initial financial support package, jointly with the IMF, of 30 billion euros (see at: https://​consilium.​europa.​eu/​uedocs/​cms_​data/​docs/​pressdata/​en/​ec/​113686.​pdf, which on 10 May was extended to 110 billion (see at: https://​consilium.​europa.​eu/​uedocs/​cmsUpload/​100502-%20​Eurogroup_​statement.​pdf).

OJ L 118, 12.5.2010, pp. 1–4.

Council Regulation 407/2010, recitals (3)–(5).

The EFSF was a special purpose vehicle established under the laws of Luxembourg; its statutory objective was to issue bonds and other debt securities in capital markets in order to raise the funds necessary for the provision of loans to Member States, which were facing fiscal problems and could not refinance their debt in capital markets. Its work is presented on its website at: https://​www.​efsf.​europa.​eu.

OJ L 91, 6.4.2011, pp. 1–2.

The consolidated version of the ESM Treaty is available at: https://​www.​esm.​europa.​eu/​legal-documents/​esm-treaty; on the pending proposals for the enhancement of the ESM’s role, see Chap. 4, Sect. 4.​3.​3.

Available at: https://​www.​consilium.​europa.​eu/​media/​20383/​st00tscg26-el-12.​pdf. On this Treaty, see Craig (2012) and de Streel (2014).

Only the provisions of Article 14 are applicable to Member States with a derogation.

On several institutional developments relating to improving the economic union, see, by way of mere indication, the Van Rompuy Report (2012) (discussed in more detail in Chap. 4, Sect. 4.​1.​1) and Stephanou (2013); on the current economic governance in the euro area and proposals for its enhancement, see, by way of mere indication, Fabbrini (2016).