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2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

The European Union Competition Law Framework

verfasst von : David Gabathuler, Wouter Devroe

Erschienen in: Procedural Rights in Competition Law in the EU and China

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Abstract

It has been over 10 years since the European Union modernised its competition law regime and introduced a more decentralised system that granted the national competition authorities (NCA) and the national courts the power to apply Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (now Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) alongside national competition rules. In particular, NCAs and the national courts were empowered by the implementing procedural regulation (Regulation 1/2003) to determine whether agreements restrictive of competition met the conditions for exemption in Article 101(3).

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Vorheriges Kapitel Introduction

Nächstes Kapitel An Overview of the Administrative Enforcement of China’s Competition Law: Origin and Evolution

For a textbook on EU competition law written by current and former officials of the Commission (DG Competition), see Faull and Nikpay (2014). Other well-known textbooks are Rose and Bailey (2013) and Van Bael and Bellis (2010). Detailed information, including legislation, cases and speeches can be found on the Directorate General for Competition website of the Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html.

Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Arts. 81 and 82 of the Treaty, O.J. L 1, 4 January 2003, p. 1.

Previously, the Commission had the exclusive responsibility for applying Art. 101(3) and a cumbersome notification was required if the agreement did not fall within the terms of specific standard block exemptions (see Sect. 2.2 below).

Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, O.J. C 101, 27 April 2004, p. 43.

The Commission highlights a number of areas in which further progress should be made, namely guaranteeing the independence of NCAs in the exercise of their tasks and making sure that they have sufficient resources, in particular (i) by ensuring that NCAs have a complete set of effective investigative and decision-making tools and (ii) by ensuring that effective tools for imposing deterrent and proportionate fines and well-designed leniency programmes are in place in all Member States, and avoiding disincentives for corporate leniency applicants. See Communication from the Commission—Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives (COM(2014) 453, 9 July 2014). The Commission also published two Staff working papers: Commission Staff Working Document SWD (2014) 230—Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003 (SWD(2014) 230/2, 9 July 2014) and Commission Staff Working Document SWD (2014) 231—Enhancing competition enforcement by the Member States’ competition authorities: institutional and procedural issues (SWD(2014) 231/2, 9 July 2014).

Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives, COM (2014) 453, para 11.

See Case AT.39939—Samsung—Enforcement of UMTS standard essential patents, Commitments decision of 29 April 2014. See also Case AT—39985 Motorola—Enforcement of GPRS standard essential patents, Commission prohibition decision of 29 April 2014.

Fox (2014), p. 129.

See Best practices on cooperation in merger investigations, US-EU Merger Working Group, 14 October 2011. For a US perspective on international cooperation, including with the Commission, see International Cooperation at the Antitrust Division, Joseph F. Wayland, Acting Assistant Attorney General, US Department of Justice, Remarks as prepared for the IBA’s 16th Annual Competition Conference, Florence, September 14, 2012.

The ICN is a forum where antitrust agencies from developed and developing countries discuss practical antitrust enforcement and policy issues of common concern. The organisation has a number of working groups dealing with a range of topics, including cartels, mergers and unilateral conduct.

Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between Competition Directorate-General of the European Commission and the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Chinese State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC), 20 September 2012.

Practical Guidance for Cooperation on Reviewing Merger Cases between Directorate-General for Competition of European Commission and Ministry of Commerce of P.R. China, http://ec.europa.en/competition/international/bilateral/practical_guidance_mofcom_en.pdf.

Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, O.J. L 349, 5 December 2014, p. 1.

The term “undertaking” covers all legal or natural persons carrying on economic or commercial activities, including companies, partnerships, sole traders and the self-employed. The term “agreement” covers formal and informal agreements, whether or not in writing, including gentlemen’s agreements. The key requirement is that two or more undertakings reach a consensus and agree to conduct themselves in the market in a specific way. A series of individual agreements can be considered to form part of an overarching agreement. The term “concerted practice” covers looser forms of cooperation than agreements and is principally intended to catch secret, illicit arrangements between competitors. It has been defined as any coordination between undertakings, whether direct or indirect, that leads to an understanding whereby practical cooperation is knowingly substituted for the risks of competition (ICI v Commission (“Dyestuffs”) (Case 48/69), [1972] ECR 619).

Article 23(2) Regulation 1/2003 provides that the Commission can fine undertakings up to 10 % of the undertaking’s total turnover in the preceding business year.

See Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64, Consten and Grundig v Commission, [1966] ECR 299; Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands and Others v Raad van Bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, [2009] ECR 4529, para 29.

Guidelines on the applicability of Art. 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, O.J. C 11, 14 January 2011, p. 1. See para 27.

Case 5/69, Völk v Vervaecke, [1969] ECR 295, paras 5 and 7. The Commission has also adopted a Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Art. 101(1). The de minimis thresholds are a combined 10 % market share for agreements between competitors and 15 % individually for agreements between non-competitors. Hardcore restrictions cannot benefit from the de minimis Notice.

Case C-226/11, Expedia v Autorité de la concurrence and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2012:795.

Horizontal Guidelines, para 37.

In Commission Decision of 15 October 2008 relating to a proceeding under Art. 81 [now 101] (Case COMP/39.188—Bananas), the Commission fined importers of bananas for their participation in a cartel that coordinated the reference price (“quotation price”) of bananas. The Commission found that importers announced their quotation price in advance. They also had regular calls before setting their quotation price where they discussed how they saw the price evolving or whether they intended to maintain, increase or decrease the quotation price. In Case T-587/08, Del Monte v Commission and Case T-588/08, Dole v Commission, the General Court confirmed a finding of infringement by object through the exchange of pre-pricing information.

Horizontal Guidelines, para 74.

Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands and Others v Raad van Bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, [2009] ECR I-04529, para 43.

Genuinely public information is information that is generally equally accessible (in terms of cost of access) to all competitors and customers. The possibility to gather the information from customers does not necessarily make the information readily accessible. See Horizontal Guidelines, para 92.

Horizontal Guidelines state at para 63 that “[t]he possibility of finding a concerted practice cannot be excluded, for example in a situation where such an announcement was followed by public announcements by other competitors, not least because strategic responses of competitors to each other’s public announcements (which, to take one instance, might involve readjustments of their own earlier announcements to announcements made by competitors) could prove to be a strategy for reaching a common understanding about the terms of coordination”.

See Commission press release Commission opens proceedings against container liner shipping companies, IP/13/1144 of 22 November 2013.

Where an agreement is considered an agency agreement as defined by the Guidelines, the restrictions contained in the agreement that relate to the sale and purchase of the contract goods/services will fall outside the scope of Art. 101. This is because the principal assumes the commercial and financial risks that relate to the sale and purchase of the contract goods or services.

Commission Regulation 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Art. 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, O.J. L 102, 23 April 2010, p. 1. See Brenning-Louko et al. (2010).

Commission guidelines on vertical restraints, Brussels, 10 May 2010 SEC (2010) 411 final, O.J. C 130, 19 May 2010, p. 1.

The Verticals Guidelines indicate that the following factors are particularly relevant to establish whether a vertical agreement brings about an appreciable restriction of competition under Art. 101(1): (a) nature of the agreement, (b) market position of the parties, (c) market position of competitors, (d) market position of buyers of the contract products, (e) entry barriers, (f) maturity of the market, (g) level of trade, (h) nature of the product and (i) other factors. See paras 111–121. The guidelines also discuss the competition risk associated with specific forms of vertical restraints, including single branding, exclusive distribution and selective distribution.

Dobson et al. (2001), pp. 247–281.

See also Commission guidelines on the application of Art. 81(3) of the Treaty [now Art. 101(3) TFEU] (2004). Hereafter “Art. 101(3) TFEU guidelines”.

Article 101(3) TFEU guidelines, para 50.

Commission Regulation 1217/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the application of Art. 101(3) of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union to categories of research and development agreements, O.J. L 285, 29 December 1971, p. 46; Commission Regulation 1218/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the application of Art. 101(3) of the Treaty to categories of specialisation agreements, O.J. L 335, 18 December 2010, p. 43; Commission Regulation 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Art. 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, O.J. L 102, 23 April 2010, p. 1; and Commission Regulation (EU) 316/2014 of 21 March 2014 on the application of Art. 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of technology transfer agreements, O.J. L 93, 28 March 2014, p. 17.

In the area of vertical agreements, national courts and NCAs are more actively involved in assessing the legality of distribution agreements and there is a view that national jurisprudence is more rigid in its interpretation of the EU block exemption and verticals guidelines. See Vogel (2014), pp. 393–399.

See O’Donoghue and Padilla (2013).

Monti (2001), pp. 131–157.

The Commission’s Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings explain the application of the concept of “co-ordinated effects”, O.J. C 31, 5 February 2004, p. 5, section 4.

The collective dominance may arise from structural or commercial links between the undertakings or from the nature of the market and result in a relationship of interdependence leading to coordinated action on the market. See Joined Cases T-68/89, 77/89 and 78/89, Societa Italiana Vetro, Fabbrica Pisana and PPG Vernante Pennitalia v Commission (Italian Flat Glass), Joined Cases T-24-26/93 and T-28/93 Compagnie Maritime Belge v Commission, upheld in Joined Cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P, Compagnie Maritime Belge (No. 2), [2000] ECR I-1365.

Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v Commission, [1979] ECR 461, para 38.

Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Art. 82 of the EC Treaty [now Art. 102 TFEU] to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, O.J. C 45, 24 February 2009, p. 7. See para 11.

Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission, [1979] ECR 461.

For cases on excessive pricing, see Case 26/76, United Brands and United Brands Continentaal v Commission, [1978] ECR 207 and Case 26/75, General Motors Continental v Commission, [1975] ECR 1367. Case COMP/36.570 Sundbusserne v Port of Helsingborg, Commission decision of 23 July 2004. For the imposition of unfair trading term, see Case C-127-73, BRT v SABAM, [1974] ECR 51; Case IV/31.043 Tetra Pak II, O.J. L 72, p. 1.

Case C-41/90, Hofner and Elser v Macrotron, [1991] ECR I-1979; Case C-179/90, Port of Genoa v Gabrielli, [1991] ECR I-5889.

Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar, [1999] ECR II-2969; Case T-301/04, Clearstream Banking and Clearstream International v Commission, [2009] ECR II-3155.

Case T-30/89, Hilti v Commission, [1990] ECR II-1439; Case T-201/04, Microsoft v Commission (Microsoft I), [2007] ECR II-3601. See also Dolmans and Graf (2004) and Ahlborn et al. (2004).

Joined Cases 6/73 and 7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial Solvents v Commission (Commercial Solvents), [1974] ECR 223; Cases C-241/91 and C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v Commission (Magill), [1995] ECR I–743.

Case C-62/86, AKZO v Commission, [1991] ECR I-3359; Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak II, [1994] ECR II-755; Case C-202/07 P, France Télécom, [2009] ECR I-2369. Case C-209/10, Post Danmark v Konkurrenceradet, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172. See also Areeda and Turner (1975).

Case 322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v Commission, [1983] ECR 3461 (Michelin I); Case T-203/01, Manufacture Francaise des Pneumatiques Michelin v Commission, [2003] ECR II-4071 (Michelin II); Case C-95/04 P, British Airways, [2007] ECR I-2331; Case COMP/37.990 Intel, Commission decision of 13 May 2009.

Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche, [1979] 461; Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v Commission, appeal rejected in Case C-552/03 P, Unilever Bestfoods (Ireland) v Commission, [2006] ECR I-9091.

Cases C-241/91 and C-242/91 P, Magill, [1995] ECR I-743; Case C-418/01, IMS Health v NDC Health, [2004] ECR I-5039; Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner v Mediaprint, [1998] ECR I-7791.

See Case AT.39939—Samsung—Enforcement of UMTS standard essential patents, Commitments decision of 29 April 2014. See also Case AT.39985 Motorola—Enforcement of GPRS standard essential patents, Commission prohibition decision of 29 April 2014 ruling that Motorola Mobility’s (Motorola) seeking an enforcement of an injunction against Apple before a German court on the basis of a smartphone standard essential patent (SEP) constitutes an abuse of a dominant position prohibited by Art. 102 in view of the particular circumstances in which the injunction was used. See Commission Press release IP/14/489 of 29 April 2014. See also Lemley and Shapiro (2007), Shapiro (2010) and Jones (2014).

Guidance on applying Art. 102, para 28.

Source DG Competition, Cartel Statistics, available on Commission’s competition website.

For example, the Commission fined manufacturers of cathode-ray tubes (CRT) a total of 1.47 billion euros for participating in one or both of two cartels in the CRT sector. The Commission found that the companies fixed prices, shared markets, allocated customers and restricted their output worldwide and in the EEA between 1996 and 2006. Case 39437 TV and computer monitor tubes, decision of 5 December 2012.

The Commission has fined many companies for engaging in market-sharing agreements. For example, it fined Solvay and ICI, two major producers of soda ash, for operating a cartel agreement. The companies agreed to divide up the European market for soda ash, and Solvay agreed not to compete for customers on the UK market if ICI agreed not to challenge Solvay’s supremacy in continental markets. Soda-ash—Solvay, CFK, O.J. L 152 15 June 1991, p. 16.

Submitting joint bids in an open and transparent manner in order to increase the likelihood of winning the contract may not be restrictive of competition. This will depend, for example, on whether the companies could have met the tender specifications on their own or would not have been able to provide a comprehensive offer independently.

Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, O.J. C 298, 8 December 2006, p. 17.

An applicant should be in a position to provide the Commission with insider information on the cartel that will allow the Commission to better target its inspection with more precise information. For instance, information that would alert the Commission as to what sort of evidence to look for or where that evidence may be located would fall within the scope of information that would enable the Commission to better target its inspection.

An applicant will not necessarily be disqualified from immunity, provided there is no other immunity applicant, if the evidence of a cartel is adduced after the launch of an inquiry by the Commission. However, in order for an applicant to obtain immunity at a later stage of the Commission’s investigation the information supplied must enable the Commission to find an infringement under Art. 101. See Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, O.J. C 298, 8 December 2006, p. 17, point 11.

Commission Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures in view of the adoption of Decisions pursuant to Art. 7 and Art. 23 Regulation (EC) 1/2003 in cartel cases (2008/C 167/01) and a new Commission Regulation 662/2008 amending Regulation 773/2004. See Laina and Laurinen (2013).

Nonetheless, the settlement and leniency processes are distinct and any reduction in fines afforded under the leniency notice is separate from the reduction afforded under the terms of settlement.

Commission Regulation (EC) 622/2008 of 30 June 2008 amending Regulation (EC) 773/2004 as regards the conduct of settlement procedures in cartel cases, recital 2.

Case 38866—Animal Feed Phosphates of July 2010 and Case 39861 Yen derivatives and Case 39914 Euro derivatives of December 2013.

The Commission is more likely to consider settlement where, amongst other factors, there is a high proportion of leniency applicants, the parties do not have strongly conflicting positions and are not expected to strongly contest findings and there are no novel legal issues.

For the mandatory content of a settlement submission, see para 20 Settlement Notice.

A statement setting out the accusations of the Commission with regard to the participants’ involvement in the alleged cartel. Since there will be less dispute over the facts, the SOs in settlement cases are expected to be significantly shorter than those in normal cases.

The Commission will also (at the earlier stage of fine calculation) limit any multiplier imposed on a settlement party to a factor of 2.

Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), O.J. L 24, 29 January 2004, p. 1; Commission Regulation (EC) 802/2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (The “Implementing Regulation”) and its annexes (Form CO, Short Form CO and Form RS), O.J. L 133, 30 April 2004, p. 1 as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) 1033/2088 of 20 October 2008 (O.J. L 279, 22 October 2008, p. 3) and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 1269/2013 of 5 December 2013 (O.J. L 336, 14 December 2013, p. 1). For textbooks, see Levy (2013); Lindsay and Berridge (2012).

The Commission publishes the fact of the notification in the Official Journal of the EU and on the DG Competition website, if the notification is complete. Notification is complete if it is made in the form prescribed (Form CO) and contains all the information requested in the form, unless the Commission has granted a specific waiver on the prior application of the notifying parties. If the notification is not complete, the suspension period is extended by the time required for the provision of the missing information or the notifying party will withdraw and re-file. In practice, there are extensive and lengthy pre-notification contacts, especially in the most complex mergers.

See discussion paper submitted by the European Union to the OECD on Investigations of consummated and non-notifiable mergers, 25 February 2014 (Working Party No. 3 on Cooperation and Enforcement).

See Commission press release Mergers: Commission cuts red tape for businesses, IP/13/1214 of 5 December 2013.

Control is defined by the Merger Regulation as the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking, and the concept of decisive influence has been interpreted widely. The possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking can exist on the basis of rights, contracts or any other means, either separately or in combination, and having regard to the facts and law involved.

See Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, O.J. C 95, 16 April 2008, p. 1. The Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice provides guidance on the key Merger Regulation concepts of a “concentration” and of a “Community” dimension.

The Merger Regulation and turnover thresholds are also applicable to the three members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), namely Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein.

Article 4(4) Merger Regulation.

Article 4(5) Merger Regulation.

Voelcker (2004).

Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, O.J. C 31, 5 February 2004, p. 5.

Horizontal Merger Guidelines, para 22.

Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, O.J. C 265, 18 October 2008, p. 6.

Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004 and under Commission Regulation (EC) 802/2004, O.J. C 267, 22 October 2008, p. 1. The Commission has also issued best Practice Guidelines on the Commission’s Model Texts for Divestiture Commitments and the Trustee Mandate under the EU Merger Regulation (December 2013).

Antitrust: Commission proposal for Directive to facilitate damages claims by victims of antitrust violations—frequently asked questions, European Commission—MEMO/14/310 of 17 April 2014.

The Directive also makes it easier for indirect purchasers to prove that a passing on occurred.

The Directive provides that the following information should only be disclosed after a competition authority has closed its proceedings: (a) information that was prepared by a natural or legal person specifically for the proceedings of a competition authority, (b) information that the competition authority has drawn up and sent to the parties in the course of its proceedings and (c) settlement submissions that have been withdrawn.

Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of Art. 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, O.J. C 167, 13 June 2013, p. 19.

Commission Staff Working Document, Practical guide—Quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of Art. 101 or 102 TFEU. Accompanying the Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of Art. 101 or 102 TFEU. Strasbourg, 11 June 2013, SWD(2013) 205.

State aid procedure is governed by Art. 108 EC and Council Regulation (EC) 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Art. 93 of the EC Treaty (now Art. 108) [“Procedural Regulation”] which codified existing law and practice, as well as providing for greater Commission enforcement powers, O.J. L 83, 27 March 1999, p. 1.

National courts are not competent to rule on the compatibility of aid measures. However, they may have an important role if a Member State has breached the standstill obligation (that is, the obligation to notify aid measures to the Commission and to refrain from their implementation until clearance has been obtained).

For example, Commission Regulation (EC) 800/2008 of 6 August 2008 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the common market in application of Arts. 87 and 88 of the Treaty (General Block Exemption Regulation), O.J. L 214, 9 August 2008, p. 3. The General block exemption authorises aid in favour of, amongst others, SMEs, research, innovation, regional development, training, employment and risk capital as well as environmental protection. A revised General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) was adopted on 21 May 2014 which has considerably extended the scope of exemptions from prior notification of State aid granted to companies. Under the revised GBER, Member States are able to grant more aid measures and higher amounts without having to notify them to the Commission for prior authorisation, because they are less likely to lead to undue distortions of competition in the Single Market. The GBER entered into force on 1 July 2014. See Commission press release State aid: Commission exempts more aid measures from prior notification, IP/14/587 of 21 May 2014.

Communication from the Commission on EU State Aid Modernisation (SAM), COM/2012/0209 final.

Ahlborn C, Evans DS, Padilla JA (2004) The antitrust economics of tying: a farewell to per se illegality. Antitrust Bull 49:287–341

Areeda P, Turner DF (1975) Predatory pricing and related practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Harv Law Rev 88:697–733CrossRef

Brenning-Louko M, Gurin A, Peeperkorn L et al (2010) Vertical agreements: new competition rules for the next decade. Competition Policy Newsletter, vol 2

Dobson PW, Clarke R, Davies S et al (2001) Buyer power and its impact on competition in the food distribution sector of the European Union. J Ind Competition Trade 1(3):247–281CrossRef

Dolmans M, Graf T (2004) Analysis of tying under Article 82 EC. Eur Commission’s Microsoft Decis Perspect World COMP 27(2):225–244

Faull J, Nikpay A (eds) (2014) The EU law of competition, 3rd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Fox E (2014) Monopolization and abuse of dominance: why Europe is different. Antitrust Bull 59(1):129–152CrossRef

Jones A (2014) Standard-essential patents: FRAND commitments, injunctions and the smartphone wars. Eur Competition J 10(1):1–36CrossRef

Laina F, Laurinen E (2013) The EU cartel settlement procedure: current status and challenges. J Eur Competition Law Pract 4(4):302–311CrossRef

Lemley M, Shapiro C (2007) Patent holdup and royalty stacking. Tex Law Rev 85(7):1991–2049

Levy N (2013) (Loose-leaf) European merger control law: a guide to the merger regulation. LexisNexis

Lindsay A, Berridge A (2012) The EU merger regulation: substantive issues, 4th edn. Sweet & Maxwell, London

Monti G (2001) The scope of collective dominance under Articles 82 EC. Common Mark Law Rev 38(1):131–157CrossRef

O’Donoghue R, Padilla J (2013) The law and economics of Article 102 TFEU, 2nd edn. Hart, Oxford

Rose V, Bailey D (eds) (2013) Bellamy and Child, European Community competition law, 7th edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Shapiro C (2010) Injunctions, hold-up, and patent royalties. Am Law Econ Rev 12(2):280–318CrossRef

Van Bael I, Bellis J-F (eds) (2010) Competition law of the European Community, 5th edn. Kluwer Law International, The Hague

Voelcker S (2004) Mind the gap: unilateral effects analysis arrives in EC merger control. Eur Competition Law Rev 25(7):395–409

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Titel: The European Union Competition Law Framework
verfasst von: David Gabathuler
Wouter Devroe
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Buch: Procedural Rights in Competition Law in the EU and China
Print ISBN: 978-3-662-48733-4

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-662-48735-8

Copyright-Jahr: 2016
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48735-8_2

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