The Future of Europe

In recent years, European policy initiatives from Vienna were rather unusual. Austria regularly emphasized its anti-nuclear policy stance, made the case for a stronger social dimension of the Union by championing efforts to tackle youth unemployment and questioning distortions related to the free movement of people and services, cooperated with its neighbours to fight illegal migration, and was resistant to economic and free trade agreements such as CETA and TTIP. Similar to other countries, discourse regarding the EU in Austria has always been very much determined by public sentiment at home. While defending a proactive European standpoint is still perceived to be risky business, a reality-check on national sovereignty is regularly declined. Yet, Austria has participated in practically all steps of European integration. The country rightly considers itself to be part of Europe’s core and shows increasing approval rates for EU membership despite years of scepticism. However, ambition does not always match reality. The gaps between self-perception, action, and inertia provide for a “peculiar melange”.

Despite the multiple crises Europe currently faces, the salience of EU affairs in Belgium remains low and popular support for the EU above average. However, since the main party in the governing coalition, the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA), decided to exit the long-standing Belgian pro-EU consensus by labelling itself Eurorealist, Belgium’s voice in EU affairs seems to be fading. The latent tensions between the governing parties lead to a crucial lack of ambition and impact on the debates on Brexit and on the future of European integration.

If the EU disintegrates or withdraws into a smaller western European core, Bulgaria and the Balkans will become a contested region between Turkey, Russia, and possibly even China. This will lead to instability and potential conflicts. Democracy in the Balkan countries would hardly survive, but it most probably would degenerate further into some form of semi- or open authoritarianism.

Accession to the European Union has been a long-standing goal of Croatia’s foreign policy ever since it proclaimed independence from the former Yugoslavia in 1991. This goal had finally been achieved in July 2013, much later than initially expected. Croatia has passed the longest and the most demanding accession negotiations of all new member states from Central and Eastern Europe, and one would expect that it is rather prepared to compete in the single market. However, as the economic crisis of 2008 has revealed, Croatia still faces many structural difficulties that have made its economic recovery the longest among member states, with the exception of Greece. Positive economic trends in the last couple of years were insufficient to counter the effects of prolonged economic crisis and increased job opportunities in Germany, Ireland, and other member states with much higher wages. Consequently, the long-standing problem of a diminishing domestic demographic situation has been further exacerbated after the accession, as emigration has reached record levels in the last two years. In short, Croatia’s European dream that was nominally fulfilled by the accession to the EU is still far from materialisation in the sense of achieving lasting clear economic and social benefits. On the contrary, Croatia’s position has slipped from one of the most developed transition economies in 1990 to the bottom of the Central and Eastern European economies. While the bloody dissolution of the former Yugoslavia should be acknowledged as a great contributing factor to such an outcome, the sustained deficiencies in the Croatian economic governance system and other related factors are still slowing down its economic recovery and have kept the country from catching up with the rest of the EU.

Ever since the debate on the future of the EU was launched on 1 March 2017, not much discussion was discerned in Cyprus. There were some occasional opportunities for citizens to contemplate on the future of the Union, such as a Citizens’ Dialogue on the European Commission’s White Paper that was held in Nicosia in May 2017 in the presence of the Commission Vice-President J. Katainen and held by the European Commission Representation. Very few articles appeared in local newspapers while even fewer TV or radio talk shows tackled the issue. It is also very hard to detect any substantial discussion on social media on the subject matter.

The Czech Republic is a peculiar case of a persistently Eurosceptic country. Despite the fact that the country´s economy has been growing very fast in recent years and its unemployment rate is the lowest in the EU, recent Eurobarometer opinion polls suggest that Czechs express more wariness regarding European integration than the notoriously Eurosceptic Brits. Czech Euroscepticism consists of a mixture of the dashed hopes of a fast catching up process with the richer EU member states, the traditional Czech suspicion towards great powers, and a pinch of the general Czech dislike of grand visions of any kind.

Everybody seems to love Denmark. Or do they? Well, if one managed to take a stroll in the center of Paris at Christmas time last year, the traditional stylish shopping mall Le BHV just across the old town hall celebrated a true Noel Danois. The French may have a special crush on Denmark as the country is going through a period of intense ‘Denmark-hype’ led by the dynamic young President Macron. He loves Danish TV-series, flexicurity, our social-liberal model – and not least the Danish Commissioner Margrethe Vestager who he sees as an obvious candidate to lead the next European Commission.

Modern digital technologies have fundamentally reshaped the ways of how our society functions today. We are able to communicate over large distances at an unprecedented speed, share our views with thousands of people at the same time, analyse big data sets, and easily manage large administrative systems.

The years of several severe European crises have shifted the debate and policy on the EU in Finland into a more reserved and hesitant direction. Finland joined the EU in 1995 largely due to economic and security reasons. It wholeheartedly embraced the opportunities of European integration, and it built a distinctly pro-EU profile in comparison to its closest reference countries, the other Nordic states. Iceland and Norway have decided to stay outside the EU, yet they are members of the European Economic Area. Among its Nordic EU peers, Finns have gained the reputation of being the most pro-integrationist in comparison to the opt-out obsessed Danes who joined the EU in 1973 and self-reliant Swedes who joined in 1995. Finland is the only Nordic EU member which has adopted the euro.

The election of Emmanuel Macron as President of France in May 2017 was clearly a defence of the EU project in front of sceptical opponents. There are now high expectations that France will have the ability to propose and lead new European initiatives.

Germany’s European policy is conditioned by three challenges. First, the negotiations on the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) contextualise Berlin’s considerations on how to tackle a post-Brexit budget with growing demands for more European spending. Given that Germany will hold the Presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half of 2020, the government must combine its priorities with its role to broker the end-game. Second, the European Parliament elections in May 2019 display the uncomfortable context of any “big reform” debate on the EU. Brexit forces countries to compensate for London’s share of contributions to the EU’s resources. Combine Brexit with the uncertainty surrounding the future alliances of the Italian 5Star Movement and Macron’s “en marche” and you realise the major dynamics in the various political groups. In any event, Berlin’s ability of yesteryear to project its grand coalition into a similar alliance within the EU-Parliament is more than uncertain when the Parliament is likely to mutate into an imponderable, if not erratic, actor that risks blocking major reform initiatives. Against this backdrop, ideas to escape this unknown future by combining differentiated integration with the means of intergovernmental procedures and institutions may flourish. Macron’s related proposals for a eurozone budget, a European Finance Minister, and the safeguarding of such core’s decisions by national parliaments represent a traditional French strategy to bypass supranational actors such as the Commission, the Court of Justice, and the Parliament and to decide within the core by unanimity. While Merkel might continue to support ideas for such a differentiated, intergovernmental Europe, the SPD and others are likely to block attempts that risk structural segregation and a de facto dismantling of the EU’s supranational strength. Third, the bullying Trump administration’s trade-war policy displays Germany’s economic weakness. Export giants are vulnerable to protectionist action by third countries. If Trump follows up on his repeated threats to slap tariffs on imports, the EU will realise that Germany is the weakest link in protecting the EU’s economy on a global scale.

The debate over “The Future of Europe” is of preeminent – not to say of existential – importance for Greece if the country is to resume its progress after too many years in deep financial, economic, and increasingly social crisis.

Hungary and Poland were the two countries that started the tremendous transformation process in Central and Eastern Europe by the late 1980s. Their names have been commemorated in the well-known acronym of the PHARE programme (Poland-Hungary Aid to Economic Reconstruction).

Iceland is closely associated with the European Union through its membership in the European Economic Area (EEA) and the Schengen Agreement, as well as other cooperation agreements. The structure of the EEA Agreement makes it difficult for the EFTA (European Free Trade Association)/EEA states to shape the future direction of the EU and the EEA. Their future direction is inherently intertwined due to the hegemonic role of the EU and its member states vis-a-vis the EFTA/EEA states within the EEA framework.

Public support for EU membership in Ireland is amongst the highest of any member state, and it has been steadily growing. In a recent poll, it was found that 88% of Irish people think that the country should remain a member of the EU. The same poll showed that 87% of people believed that Ireland has benefited from its membership in the EU. That these two numbers are almost identical is neither coincidental nor surprising. Although it would be unfair to characterise the Irish approach to the EU as transactional, it would be equally mistaken to say that Irish support for the EU is based purely on ideology and values. Ireland has traditionally taken a pragmatic approach to the EU and the integration process.

Italy has moved from being one of the most pro-European countries to one of the most Eurosceptic. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty opened a new era in Italy-EU relations. The Treaty introduced new, radical macro-economic criteria for entering the newly instituted Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) that asked for a substantial overhaul of the Italian budgetary process. The Italian negotiators of the Treaty accepted them on the assumption that Italy needed an “external constraint” for introducing domestic reforms. Their strategy worked successfully but it was also costly. Indeed, after the sacrifices of the late 1990s, the 2000s were a decade of postponed reforms of both economic and administrative structures. When the financial crisis exploded in 2008-2009, its consequences struck a powerful blow to the unreformed Italian system. The following decade constituted the most dramatic period in the economic life of the country, as the financial crisis’ harsh social repercussions were comparable only to wartimes. Constrained by EMU decisions and approved intergovernmental treaties, Italy had to introduce reforms that not only, after long last, called into question vested corporate interests, but also generated dramatic social problems. Not surprisingly, a Eurobarometer survey released in August 2017 reported that a total of 86% of Italians considered their economic situation as “rather” or “very” bad (compared to an average of 51% in the EU28), or only 36% of Italians said that they trust the EU (compared to an average of 42% in the EU28). The same Eurobarometer recorded that, for the Italians, unemployment and immigration constituted the most pressing issues the country faces, issues where the role of the EU was either complicit or marginal. Finally, the elections of March 4, 2018 showed the dramatic impact of those issues on the political behaviour of the voters. The elections led to the spectacular success of the 5Stars Movement in the south, which proposed a guaranteed basic income for the unemployed, and of the League in the north, which called for the expulsion of 600,000 illegal immigrants.

Geopolitical considerations continue to define Latvia’s foreign policy priorities, including Latvia’s strategic positioning in relation to and within the EU. Economic and social convergence is also among the drivers behind Latvia’s persistence to stay in the core of the EU. Latvia’s public opinion shows high levels of support for the membership, and none of the notable political forces are positioning the country to exit the EU. Officially, Latvia stands for a strong union of independent states. In line with this, Latvia has been an ardent supporter of deepening the single market and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). However, Latvia has shown little appetite to see integration in such areas as taxation and social protection standards. In Latvia’s view, deepening in these areas would infringe upon the country’s economic competitiveness, coherent economic development, and productivity-based wage increases. Should there be a motion towards greater unity in sensitive areas, Latvia’s acceptance would be conditional on either adequate compensatory mechanisms or a strong commitment from other EU member states to help each other when in serious trouble. Equal political and economic standing of the member states within the EU is of paramount importance to Latvia. Hence, a multi-speed Europe with objectively unsolvable differentiation tied to the economic, geographical, or cultural areas in the short term should be avoided at all costs.

Lithuania has been focusing on several European policy priorities since its accession in 2004: support for reforms and closer relations between Eastern neighbours and the EU, completing its infrastructural integration with particular attention paid to energy and transport networks between the Baltic States and the remaining EU (Northern and Central Europe), dealing with so called ‘left-overs’ from accession, membership in the Schengen area and the eurozone, and economic convergence with the rest of the EU.

Luxembourg is one of the founding states of the EU and one of the most pro-European member states today. According to recent Eurobarometer surveys, 89% of Luxembourgers feel that they are ‘citizens of the EU’, and public support for key EU policies is higher than in any other member state: 96% of Luxembourgers are in favour of the free movement of citizens in the EU, and even after the years of crisis, 85% are in favour of a European Economic and Monetary Union with a single currency.

Malta is the smallest EU member state in terms of territory, population, and economy. Malta, in the centre of the Mediterranean, was a British colony until 1964, and its political and economic system bear a link to the British period. In the post-WWII drive to free the economy from its dependency on British military spending, successive governments cultivated tourism as well as manufacturing, in particular electronics and pharmaceuticals, as economic industries to bolster the country. In 1990, the Christian Democrats applied to join the EC with the issue of membership becoming divisive in this two-party state as the Socialists opposed. The issue was resolved in the 2003 EU referendum with a vote in favour, and Malta joined in 2004.

Despite its shifting reputation from a relatively supportive to a more eurosceptic country, the Netherlands has been pragmatic and constructive throughout the euro and the migration crises. Some issues stand out from the Dutch debates: the EU is of fundamental importance for economic and security reasons, and the euro needs to be stabilized. Although sometimes met with serious reservations, the Netherlands pragmatically supported Juncker’s ambitious investment plans (the European Fund for Strategic Investments [EFSI]), the rescue mechanisms (the European Financial Stability Facility [EFSF] and European Stability Mechanism [ESM]), and strengthening the Commission’s economic supervisory roles. In addition, the Netherlands was one of the major architects of the ‘Turkey deal’ on migration.

Imagine that Albert O. Hirschman, the late political economist and intellectual, was asked to assess the developments in Europe and its future. How would he interpret the situation, and what would he have said?

The recent refugee crisis generated perhaps the most serious debate in the EU for many years, which touched upon the half-forgotten question of European values. Perhaps not quite unexpectedly, it was Eastern Europe that made it clear that Europe must again reflect on the very foundations of its integration and on what it means to be European. The value of solidarity came to the fore.

On one of his last visits to Brussels, Prime Minister António Costa claimed that 2017 was “a particularly tasty year for Portugal”. Well, Salvador Sobral won the Eurovision song contest, Cristiano Ronaldo was awarded his fifth Ballon dʼOr, and Mário Centeno was elected Eurogroup president. But what about a serious discussion on European Union matters? And the country’s inputs on several matters? Besides the usual public speeches on “our place” in Europe, “30 years of membership” and others related to current ʻcrisesʼ, such as those on refugees and populism (two “no” problems in Portugal), no proper or serious discussion is being held in the country, even after the European Commissionʼs White Paper on the Future of Europe. Obviously, the Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out which scenarios were convenient for the country and which ones were not. The Prime Minister even tweeted that this document was a “good start for an indispensable debate”, but the beginning of the debate is still to be seen at the governmental level. If it weren’t for two series of conferences organised by civil society, no discussion on the present and future of the EU or and the country would have been had.

Romania will host a special summit dedicated to the future of the European Union in Sibiu on May 9, 2019 after the United Kingdom will have left the Union. It is a moment when, as announced by the European Commission’s President Jean Claude Juncker in his speech on the state of the EU (2017), EU leaders are expected to take the necessary decisions for a more united, stronger, and democratic Europe. The five scenarios on the future of the EU launched by Brussels were not received with much enthusiasm in Bucharest, as President Klaus Iohannis announced that he does not support the multispeed Europe. 2019 will also be the year when, for the first time, Romania will hold the rotating presidency of the Council of the Union.

Slovakia has achieved several milestones since its accession to the European Union in 2004, in the area of political discourse, perception of EU-membership, and also with regards to the performance of the country on the “European parquet”. It was not clear at the end of the 1990s whether Slovakia would overcome its integration deficit and whether it would become a member of the western-democratic clubs with other post-communist countries. Slovakia had entered the EU with enthusiasm and the feeling that “we got it”.

Since Slovenia’s independence in 1991, accession to the EU and NATO has been a key focus of the country’s external politics. The 2003 referendum on EU membership received nearly 90% support. Yet this enthusiasm has dwindled over the years, and by 2017, only 45% of its citizens think that EU membership is a good thing for the country.

Despite a recent recession, the period in which Spain has been a member of the EU has been the most stable, dynamic, and successful in the country’s modern history. Consolidation of an advanced democracy, economic convergence with western countries, and a more influential foreign policy are developments inextricably connected with the country’s Europeanisation. The EU is widely perceived as beneficial, supporting domestic governance. It is considered an essential part of the country’s national narrative, following José Ortega y Gasset who argued already in 1910 that Spain itself was a problem and ‘Europe its solution’.

Centripetal and centrifugal forces are simultaneously operating within the EU. While the eurozone states have tighter cooperation, several non-eurozone states are pondering what position to take in this new context. The Swedish aim has been to minimise divisions within the Union while simultaneously being loyal to the efforts made by the eurozone to save the currency. Furthermore, there is a considerable degree of hesitancy towards delegating authority to the European level over issues closely related to sovereignty. In sum, this calls for quite a delicate balancing act.

Switzerland is a non-member state without membership aspirations. In fact, less than one in five Swiss have been in favour of EU membership in recent years. Switzerland’s stake in the future of the European project is thus generally limited to managing and developing “bilateralism” – its unique relationship with the EU. At the same time, the politics of EU-Swiss relations are typical of the difficulties of non-members (and the exiting UK) in finding a viable relationship with the EU within the constraints of domestic Euroscepticism and international economic interdependence.

“Europe” has been the most popular yet most volatile buzzword in Turkish politics for decades. It gained a particular momentum with the 1963 Ankara Agreement and then in 1999 during and after the Helsinki European Council when Turkey was officially accepted as an EU candidate. As a part of the pre-accession strategy, the Turkish government engaged in a substantial reform wave between 1999 and 2005 and amended almost 51 articles of the Constitution in order to meet the EU’s concerns with Turkish democracy. After opening accession negotiations on October 3, 2005, we have seen a decrease in the intensity of the reforms; i.e. “reform fatigue”. After 2005, “Europe” has no longer emerged as the lingua franca in Turkey.

Given that the United Kingdom now appears on course to leave the European Union in March 2019, there is little expectation that British preferences or concerns will play any direct role in the future evolution of the Union. For a number of years, British policy towards the European Union had anyway largely consisted of the search for ever more exceptions and opt-outs, leaving others, particularly the members of the eurozone, to direct the broader evolution of the Union.

The original version of this book was inadvertently published without the following disclaimer: