3. The Hoover Plan, Reparations and the French Constructive Plan

Arthur Cecil Temperley, The Whispering Gallery of Europe (London: Collins, 1938), 199, 202. Stimson had told the United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 6 January 1932, that a situation in which a relatively disarmed Germany found herself surrounded by more militarily powerful states would create ‘a condition of instability in Europe and in the world…in regard to which “energetic steps ought to be taken to try to carry out the original plan [of Allied disarmament] so far as it can be done.”’ Lippmann et al., United States in World Affairs, 247.

Temperley, The Whispering Gallery of Europe, 200–3, and Vaïsse, Sécurité d’abord, 227–8. Maurice Vaïsse notes that the others present at the meeting at Bessinges in April 26 were the Americans Norman H. Davis and Hugh L. Gibson; Charles Vane-Tempest-Stewart, 7th Marquess of Londonderry, the British secretary of state for air; and Bernhard von Bülow, the German foreign secretary.

Temperley, The Whispering Gallery of Europe, 203, and Vaïsse, Sécurité d’abord, 228. Vaïsse points out that accounts of the meeting at Bessinges of April 26 differ in respect to the figures proposed in relation to the increase in the size of the Reichswehr and the reduction in the period of enlistment. He further notes that they differ in respect to the proposals concerning the size of and period of service in a militia. See also John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Disarmament Deadlock (London: Routledge, 1934), 32, and Thomas R. Davies, ‘France and the World Disarmament Conference of 1932–34,’ Diplomacy & Statecraft 25, no. 4 (2004): 765–80, 767.

Ibid.

Ibid., 230–1.

Ibid., 229, 234. See also David K. Varey, ‘Diplomacy and Disarmament: British Security in Europe and the Anglo-French Connection, 1932–1934’ (PhD diss., Royal Military College of Canada, 2006), 79.

Vaïsse, Sécurité d’abord, 228. Thomas R. Davies writes that although not making any specific commitments, ‘both Anglo-Saxon leaders agreed that…[Brüning’s]…proposals could form the basis of a settlement.’ Davies, ‘France and the World Disarmament Conference,’ 767.

Ibid., 231–2, 234. See also Davies, ‘France and the World Disarmament Conference,’ 771. For reflections of the view that Tardieu’s failure to attend the proposed meeting of 29 April was a momentous opportunity wasted, see Wheeler-Bennett, The Disarmament Deadlock, 33–4, and Temperley, The Whispering Gallery of Europe, 203–4.

David K. Varey notes the following: ‘Hindenburg, re-elected with support of the political Left, blamed Brüning for his loss of support on the Right; furthermore he was annoyed by Brüning’s decision to ban Nazi storm troopers but not left-wing associations.’ Varey, ‘Diplomacy and Disarmament,’ 79. See also Temperley, The Whispering Gallery of Europe, 201, 294, and Wheeler-Bennett, The Disarmament Deadlock, 34.

Lippmann et al., United States in World Affairs, 248, and G. M. Gathorne-Hardy, A Short History of International Affairs, 1920 to 1939, 4th ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), 349.

Ibid., 236–7.

Ibid., 237, and John W. Wheeler-Bennett, ‘The Lausanne Conference,’ Bulletin of International News [hereafter BIN] 9, no. 1 (1932): 3–15, 7. See also Varey, ‘Diplomacy and Disarmament,’ 64. The British Foreign Office considered that the origins of the Hoover Plan concerned domestic factors.

Lippmann et al., United States in World Affairs, 237–8. See also Gathorne-Hardy, A Short History of International Affairs, 349, and Wheeler-Bennett, ‘The Lausanne Conference,’ 7.

Journal of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, 1932, quoted in Lippmann et al., United States in World Affairs, 238. See also Wheeler-Bennett, ‘The Lausanne Conference,’ 7.

Thomas R. Davies states the following: ‘Although committed to reducing its materiel in the same way as any other country, the US army was comparatively unaffected. The Hoover Plan envisaged a one-third reduction only to the “defence” component of armies, while the forces necessary for domestic policing were to be left alone. As a result, only countries with large “defence” components—such as France—had to make substantial reductions under the scheme.’ Davies, ‘France and the World Disarmament Conference,’ 775. Pierre Bernus observed the following at the time: Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union ‘multiply emulously military formations…because, for some motives which have no relation with the affirmation of peace, they are looking, under the guise of working for disarmament, to render themselves proportionally stronger and to augment their means of pressure in view of overturning’ the current European order. Pierre Bernus, ‘La question du désarmement: mise au point,’ Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (a), 9 July 1932.

Davies, ‘France and the World Disarmament Conference,’ 772–3. Philip Noel-Baker declared that Sir John Simon ‘effectively “killed the Hoover Plan,”’ observing that Simon’s statement of 7 July was ‘a flat rejection of almost everything Hoover had proposed.’ Philip Noel-Baker, The First World Disarmament Conference, 1932–1934, and Why It Failed (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1979), 106. Varey writes that the statement by Simon earned Britain ‘widespread opprobrium; but when the conference set out later that month to summarise its progress to date. Simon was obliged to make adjustments only on the matter of air armaments. The popularity of Hoover’s prohibition on aerial bombing, with even the French appearing to waver, had trumped earlier arrangements’. David K. Varey, ‘The Foreign Office, the World Disarmament Conference, and the French Connexion, 1932–1934,’ Diplomacy & Statecraft 24, no. 3 (2013): 383–403, 388. See also Lippmann et al., United States in World Affairs, 239.

Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (a), 9 July 1932.

H. L., ‘The French “Constructive Plan”—II,’ BIN 9, no. 11 (1932): 3–8, 3. See also Lippmann et al., United States in World Affairs, 239.

Davies, ‘France and the World Disarmament Conference,’ 770–1.

H. L., ‘The Problem of Inter-Governmental Debts,’ BIN 9, no. 12 (1932): 3–11, 3. On the relation between reparation payments and war debts, see Lippmann et al., The United States in World Affairs, 16n.

Armstrong, ‘France and the Hoover Plan,’ 26.

Armstrong, ‘France and the Hoover Plan,’ 26.

Ibid., 29. ‘[I]t was decided that Germany should make these payments, but that France at the same time would loan an equal sum to the German Railway Company. France also asked that special arrangements be made regarding the completion of the Guaranty Fund required under the Young Plan, which stipulated that in case Germany asked for a moratorium France must make deposits to the value of 500,000,000 marks with the Bank for International Settlements to compensate the other creditors who would be affected by the suspension of conditional payments’ (ibid.).

Ibid., 14n, 17, 22.

Ibid., 14.

H. L., ‘The Report of the Young Plan Advisory Committee,’ BIN 8, no. 14 (1932): 3–11, 3. See also Lippmann et al., United States in World Affairs, 14.

Pierre Laval, 1932, quoted in BIN 8, no. 14 (1932), 4n. See also Advocate of Peace Through Justice 94, no. 1 (1932): 14.

BIN 8, no. 14 (1932), 3, and Lippmann et al., United States in World Affairs, 16–7.

‘Chronology,’ BIN 8, no. 14 (1932): 12–28, 27 and Lippmann et al., United States in World Affairs, 11.

Amendment to the War Debt Moratorium Bill, 1932, quoted in BIN 8, no. 14 (1932), 27. Herbert Hoover signed the War Debt Moratorium on 2 December, subsequently issuing the following statement: ‘our suggestion for a year’s suspension of inter-Governmental debts averted a catastrophe which would have caused the American people a loss many times the amount involved. The American people have contributed to maintain courage and hope in the German nation, and to give an opportunity to other European peoples to work out their problems’ (ibid., 28). See also Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means on House Resolution 123, Parts 1 and 2, 15–17 December 1931, quoted in Lippmann et al., United States in World Affairs, 2.

BIN 8, no. 14 (1932), 5, and Lippmann et al., United States in World Affairs, 17.

BIN 9, no. 12 (1932), 5. Lippmann described the congressional amendment to the War Debt Moratorium Bill as an announcement of congressional ‘opposition to a continuation of the policy implied in the President’s proposal of June and in the Hoover-Laval statement of October 25’. Lippmann et al., United States in World Affairs, 12.

Ibid., 22.

Ibid., 16.

BIN 8, no. 14 (1932), 4. Gathorne-Hardy pointed out that the London Conference of July 1931 ‘broke down through the intransigence of France, who insisted upon unacceptable political as well as financial guarantees as the terms on which she was prepared to afford the assistance required.’ He added that on August 19, ‘following upon the publication of the report of the International Bankers’ Committee at Basle (the Layton-Wiggin Report), a Standstill Agreement was initialled by the representatives of the bankers, providing for a six months’ prolongation of all banking credits in Germany, expressed in terms of foreign currencies, which were thereby “frozen”.’ Gathorne-Hardy, A Short History of International Affairs, 271.

German Note to the BIS, 1932, quoted in BIN 8, no. 14 (1932), 4–5, and Advocate of Peace Through Justice 94, no. 1 (1932): 15–6.

BIN 8, no. 14 (1932), 5, and BIN 9, no. 12 (1932), 3. According to the provisions of the Young Plan, ‘after constituting themselves into a committee, the seven ordinary members “may, if they so desire, co-opt not more than four additional members,” who, “during the course of the proceedings and until the report is made, shall be equal in all other respects to the ordinary members.”’ The position of chairman of the committee was initially offered to Walter Stewart of the Chase Property Bank in keeping with ‘the long tradition of appointing an American to preside over committees inquiring into reparation problems.’ However, Stewart declined the position and so a second election was held. ‘Since neither the French, Belgian nor German delegates could very well hold the scales and so delicate a matter, in which each was materially interested, and since there was no question of electing the Japanese delegate, the choice finally lay’ between the British delegate, Sir Walter Layton, and the Italian delegate, Alberto Beneduce, president of the Consorzio de Credito. The latter was unanimously elected to the position. Advocate of Peace Through Justice 94, no. 1 (1932), 15, 17. For the BIS’s endorsement of the German declaration, see Lippmann et al., United States in World Affairs, 17–8.

Advocate of Peace Through Justice 94, no. 1 (1932), 15. See also BIN 8, no. 14 (1932), 5.

Report of the Special Advisory Committee Appointed by the Bank for International Settlements, 1932, quoted in Lippmann et al., United States in World Affairs, 18.

BIN 8, no. 14 (1932), 11, and Report of the Special Advisory Committee Appointed by the Bank for International Settlements, 1932, quoted in Lippmann et al., United States in World Affairs, 138n.

Report of the Special Advisory Committee Appointed by the Bank for International Settlements, 1932, quoted in BIN 8, no. 14 (1932), 10–1. See also Advocate of Peace Through Justice 94, no. 1 (1932), 20, and Report of the Special Advisory Committee Appointed by the Bank for International Settlements, 1932, quoted in Lippmann et al., United States in World Affairs, 19.

According to one account, the French government favoured a later date for the conference because ‘it took the position that many of the controversial points could be more easily settled by means of unofficial discussion and negotiation.’ Advocate of Peace Through Justice 94, no. 1 (1932), 20. See also Lippmann et al., United States in World Affairs, 2. Lippmann observed that the main reason for the French insistence that the conference be postponed was the disarray of the French cabinet caused by the death of André Maginot, the minister of war, and the illness of Briand.

Guido Enderis, ‘Reparations Ended, Bruening Declares, Paris Is Perturbed,’ New York Times, January 10, 1932. See also ‘Reparations: Germany’s Case: British and French Views,’ Sydney Morning Herald, January 12, 1932, 11.

‘Foreign Banking and Business Conditions: Final Act of the Lausanne Conference,’ Federal Reserve Bulletin (August 1932): 497–504, 497, and Lippmann et al., United States in World Affairs, 23.

Lippmann et al., United States in World Affairs, 24, 132. See also BIN 9, no. 12 (1932), 10.

Ramsay MacDonald, 1932, quoted in Wheeler-Bennett, ‘The Lausanne Conference,’ 4.

Ibid.

Wheeler-Bennett, ‘The Lausanne Conference,’ 4.

‘Foreign Banking and Business Conditions: Final Act of the Lausanne Conference,’ Federal Reserve Bulletin, 497. See also Lippmann et al., United States in World Affairs, 141–2. Payments of approximately 45 million dollars fell due between 1 and 15 July.

Wheeler-Bennett, ‘The Lausanne Conference,’ 4.

Ibid., 5. Charles W. Chappius notes that the German foreign minister, Baron Konstantin von Neurath told Simon in early June that ‘while he did not intend to bang his fist on the table or unilaterally denounce reparations, Germany could not pay.’ Charles W. Chappius, ‘Germany and the Anglo-French Accord of Confidence, July 1932,’ German Studies Review 2, no. 2 (1979): 211–24, 212.

German Ministerial Declaration, 1932, quoted in Wheeler-Bennett, ‘The Lausanne Conference,’ 3.

Wheeler-Bennett, ‘The Lausanne Conference,’ 3.

Wheeler-Bennett, ‘The Lausanne Conference,’ 6.

Wheeler-Bennett, ‘The Lausanne Conference,’ 5, and 268 Parl. Deb. H. C. (5th series) (12 July 1932), 1142.

Chappius, ‘Germany and the Anglo-French Accord,’ 212.

Ibid., 139.

Ibid., 142, and Wheeler-Bennett, ‘The Lausanne Conference,’ 5.

Édouard Herriot, 1932, quoted in Wheeler-Bennett, ‘The Lausanne Conference,’ 5.

Wheeler-Bennett, ‘The Lausanne Conference,’ 5, and Chappius, ‘Germany and the Anglo-French Accord,’ 214.

Wheeler-Bennett, ‘The Lausanne Conference,’ 5.

Franz von Papen, 1932, quoted in Wheeler-Bennett, ‘The Lausanne Conference,’ 8.

Wheeler-Bennett, ‘The Lausanne Conference,’ 8.

Wheeler-Bennett, ‘The Lausanne Conference,’ 10.

Ibid., 10, 12.

Ibid., 11.

Ibid., 11–2. See also Chappius, ‘Germany and the Anglo-French Accord,’ 214.

Wheeler-Bennett, ‘The Lausanne Conference,’ 12.

268 Parl. Deb. H. C. (5th series) (12 July 1932), 1136. Neville Chamberlain told Herriot at Lausanne that when the reparations question was settled ‘everyone would say: “Thank God that chapter is over.” Europeans could then turn to the United States which would be too ashamed not to make a contribution.’ Neville Chamberlain, 1932, quoted in Chappius, ‘Germany and the Anglo-French Accord,’ 214.

Wheeler-Bennett, ‘The Lausanne Conference,’ 6. Davies states that it is ‘possible to argue that the Hoover Plan was more an attempt to divert attention from America’s obdurate policy on war debts at the Lausanne Conference rather than a sincere attempt to bring the Disarmament Conference to a successful conclusion.’ Davies, ‘France and the World Disarmament Conference,’ 773.

Wheeler-Bennett, ‘The Lausanne Conference,’ 13.

Chappius, ‘Germany and the Anglo-French Accord,’ 213.

Chappius, ‘Germany and the Anglo-French Accord,’ 216. See also ‘A Lausanne et à Genève: l’attentat contre le paix,’ Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires, July 8, 1932, and Le Matin (a), 9 July 1932.

Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 75.

Chappius, ‘Germany and the Anglo-French Accord,’ 216. See also Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 75.

Chappius, ‘Germany and the Anglo-French Accord,’ 217.

Ibid., 213.

Sir J. Simon to Baron von Neurath, and Enclosure, June 9, 1932, doc. no. 128, in E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler eds., Documents on British Foreign Policy [hereafter DBFP] 1919–1939, 2nd ser., vol. 3 (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1949), 161–2.

Chappius, ‘Germany and the Anglo-French Accord,’ 213.

Ibid., 213–4.

Ibid., 217.

Great Britain and France: Notes of a Conversation held on Tuesday, July 5, 1932, at 9 a.m.: Agreement of the Six Inviting Powers, Annex III to doc. no. 172, in Woodward and Butler, eds., DBFP 1919–1939, 2nd ser., vol. 3, 373.

Chappius, ‘Germany and the Anglo-French Accord,’ 218.

Great Britain and France: Notes of a Conversation held on Tuesday, July 5, 1932, at 9 a.m., doc. no. 172, in Woodward and Butler, eds., DBFP 1919–1939, 2nd ser., vol. 3, 368–9. Chappius observes the following: ‘The shadow of the forthcoming Ottawa Conference hung over Lausanne. No one knew what economic changes would result. The uncertainty, the British feared, might drive the French to an economic arrangement with Germany.’ Chappius, ‘Germany and the Anglo-French Accord,’ 218.

Great Britain and Germany: Notes of a Conversation held on Tuesday, July 5, 1932, at 10.45 a.m., in Woodward and Butler, ed., DBFP 1919–1939, 2nd ser., vol. 3, 376.

Great Britain and France: Notes of a Conversation held on Tuesday, July 5, 1932, at 5:15 p.m., doc. no. 175, in Woodward and Butler, eds., DBFP 1919–1939, 2nd ser., vol. 3, 383, 385. See also Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 75; Chappius, ‘Germany and the Anglo-French Accord,’ 219; and ‘L’article 231 et la responsibilité de l’Allemagne,’ Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (a), July 9, 1932.

Wheeler-Bennett, ‘The Lausanne Conference,’ 3.

Wheeler-Bennett, ‘The Lausanne Conference,’ 3. Isaac Alteras notes that the British came to accept the French view, ‘arguing that the question of disarmament should be settled at Geneva.’ Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 75. Chappius writes that MacDonald told Herriot that the Germans ‘were not submitting new conditions ; they were simply commenting upon the consequences of a new financial regime,’ by which was meant presumably, that the end of reparations implied the abrogation of the war-guilt clause. However, he adds that MacDonald ‘of course, omitted the slight detail that the German formula included a reference to equality of rights which was what the French objected to.’ Chappius records that Papen was surprised at the French refusal to accede to abrogation of the war guilt clause as the German ‘proposal on war guilt was very close to the one drafted by a member of the French delegation.’ Chappius, ‘Germany and the Anglo-French Accord,’ 219–20.

Chappius, ‘Germany and the Anglo-French Accord,’ 220.

‘L’accord est conclu à Lausanne,’ Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (b), July 9, 1932. See also Chappius, ‘Germany and the Anglo-French Accord,’ 218.

Le Matin (a), July 9, 1932; Le Temps (a) July 9, 1932; and Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (a), July 9, 1932.

Ibid., and ‘L’accord est conclu à Lausanne sur un chiffre de 3 milliards et sans conditions politique,’ Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (c), July 9, 1932.

‘A la conférence de Lausanne: M. Herriot déclare à M. von Papen il n’accepte aucune clause politique,’ Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (a), July 8, 1932. See also Le Temps (a), July 9, 1932, and Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (a), July 9, 1932.

Pierre Bernus, ‘Les derniers marchandages à Lausanne: le rôle de M. MacDonald,’ Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (b), July 8, 1932. See also ‘Revue de la Presse,’ Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires, July 9, 1932. According to an account appearing in Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires, Saint-Brice (the pseudonym of the writer Louis de Saint Victor de Saint Blancard), understood that MacDonald had wanted to hasten a solution and it was his intervention that lead Papen to bargain in regard to political conditions.

Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (a), July 8, 1932, and ‘Déclaration du Chancelier von Papen,’ Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires, July 8, 1932.

Ibid. See also Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (b), July 9, 1932.

Le Temps (a), July 9, 1932. See also Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (b), July 9, 1932.

Le Temps (a), July 9, 1932; Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (b), July 9, 1932; and ‘A Genève: La commission générale étudie les propositions Hoover,’ Le Temps, July 9, 1932.

Le Temps (a), July 9, 1932, and Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (b), July 9, 1932.

Le Temps (a), July 9, 1932; Le Matin (a), July 9, 1932; Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (b), June 8, 1932; Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (b), July 9, 1932; and Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (c), July 9, 1932.

Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (b), July 9, 1932: Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (a), July 8, 1932; and Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (b), July 8, 1932.

Chappius, ‘Germany and the Anglo-French Accord,’ 220–1.

Le Matin (a), July 9, 1932, and ‘L’accord s’est fait sur un forfait de trois milliards de marks or, sans conditions politique,’ Le Temps, July 9, 1932.

BIN 9, no. 2 (1932), 3–4, 16. See also ‘Foreign Banking and Business Conditions: Final Act of the Lausanne Conference [Agreement with Germany],’ Federal Reserve Bulletin, 498–500. MacDonald told Parliament that one of the tests of any scheme devised at Lausanne was as follows: ‘whatever imposition was to be put on Germany, it must not be of a character to damage her credit and to keep the German community a festering financial and commercial sore in the middle of Europe.’ 268 Parl. Deb. H. C. (5th series) (12 July 1932), 1141.

Ibid., 144.

Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 77.

For the instruments annexed to the Final Act of the Lausanne Agreement, see BIN 9, no. 2 (1932), 4–6, and ‘Foreign Banking and Business Conditions: Final Act of the Lausanne Conference,’ Federal Reserve Bulletin, 497. The other four instruments annexed to the Lausanne Agreement appeared under the following headings and were annexed in the following order: ‘Transitional Measures Relating to Germany’; ‘Resolution Relating to Non-German Reparations’; ‘Resolution Relating to Central and Eastern Europe’; and ‘Resolution Relating to the World Economic and Financial Conference.’ For an account of the signing ceremony at Lausanne, see ‘La séance de clôture: Les conventions de Lausanne sont signées,’ Le Temps, July 10, 1932. See also BIN 9, no. 2 (1932), 6. The agreement’s signatories used the seal of the City of Lausanne which had been first used in 1525.

‘Foreign Banking and Business Conditions: Final Act of the Lausanne Conference [Procès-verbal],’ Federal Reserve Bulletin, 503.

BIN 9, no. 2 (1932), 6. MacDonald stated in the House of Commons that the German chancellor had ‘stoutly declined throughout to admit to me that War Debts were any affair of his. He did not care about War Debts. He had nothing to do with them. He had nothing to do with them; he would not take them into account. If I said, “Now you really must give a sixpence,” he said, “No; I do not know what the sixpence is wanted for. I have no interest in it, and, on principle, I refuse absolutely to recognise that Reparations and War Debts should be mixed up together.”’ See also 268 Parl. Deb. H. C. (5th series) (12 July 1932), 1136.

Henry de Korab, ‘La signature des textes des accord de Lausanne aura lieu ce matin,’ Le Matin (b), July 9, 1932. See also ‘Foreign Banking and Business Conditions: Final Act of the Lausanne Conference [Note to the Chancellor of the German Reich, 9 July 1932],’ Federal Reserve Bulletin, 503.

Great Britain, France and Germany: Notes of a Conversation held on Wednesday, June 29, 1932, at 4 p.m., doc. no. 152, in Woodward and Butler, eds., DBFP 1919–1939, 2nd ser., vol. 3, 293.

‘Foreign Banking and Business Conditions: Final Act of the Lausanne Conference [Extract from the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the Lausanne Conference, held on July 8],’ Federal Reserve Bulletin, 503. See also 268 Parl. Deb. H. C. (5th series) (12 July 1932), 1138, and BIN 9, no. 2 (1932), 8.

‘Foreign Banking and Business Conditions: Final Act of the Lausanne Conference [Extract from the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the Lausanne Conference, held on July 8],’ Federal Reserve Bulletin, 503; 268 Parl. Deb. H. C. (5th series) (12 July 1932), 1138; and ‘La conférence de Lausanne: L’accord sur la reliquait forfaitaire des réparations,’ Le Temps (b), July 20, 1932.

‘Foreign Banking and Business Conditions: Final Act of the Lausanne Conference [German Chancellor to Sir John Simon, 9 July 1932],’ Federal Reserve Bulletin, 503.

Le Temps (b), July 10, 1932; Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (b), July 9, 1932; ‘La conclusion de l’accord de Lausanne,’ Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires, July 10, 1932; and Albert Julien, ‘A la conférence de Lausanne: l’accord est fait’ and Pierre Denoyer, ‘Aux États Unis,’ Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires, July 9, 1932. See also BIN 9, no. 2 (1932), 8n, and ‘Gentlemen’s and other Agreements,’ Manchester Guardian, July 13, 1932. The Manchester Guardian editorialised in relation to the Gentlemen’s Agreement that ‘[s]tatesmen should have realised by now that secret diplomacy is not only pernicious; it is, in view of the relations between the French Government and the press, impracticable.’ See also 268 Parl. Deb. H. C. (5th series) (12 July 1932), 1158.

Chappius, ‘Germany and the Anglo-French Accord,’ 221.

268 Parl. Deb. H. C. (5th series) (12 July 1932), 1140.

Ibid., 1146.

Ibid.

Ibid., 1140–1.

Ibid., 1146. See also Chappius, ‘Germany and the Anglo-French Accord,’ 221.

268 Parl. Deb. H. C. (5th series) (12 July 1932), 1142.

Petrie, ‘Foreign Affairs,’ 192.

Lippmann et al., United States in World Affairs, 146. See also BIN 9, no. 12 (1932), 5, and ‘Anglo-French Consultative Pact: Revives the Entente Cordiale—Gentlemen’s Agreement Bars Separate Debt Settlement,’ Barron’s 12, no. 29 (1932): 4.

268, Parl. Deb. H. C. (5th series) (11 July 1932), 947–8; BIN 9, no. 2 (1932), 10; and Lippmann et al., United States in World Affairs, 147, 151. On 11 July in the House of Commons, Neville Chamberlain sought to demonstrate that the Gentlemen’s Agreement was not intended to create a united front.

Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (a), July 9, 1932.

Le Temps (a), July 10, 1932, and Le Temps (b), July 10, 1932.

Le Matin (a), July 9, 1932; Le Matin (b), July 9, 1932; and ‘Foreign Banking and Business Conditions: Final Act of the Lausanne Conference,’ Federal Reserve Bulletin, 498.

Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (a), July 9, 1932.

Pierre Bernus, ‘La conclusion de l’accord de Lausanne: un fin qui est une préface,’ Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (a), July 10, 1932. See also ‘Le discours de M. Herriot,’ Le Matin, July 9, 1932.

Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (a), July 10, 1932. On 9 July, Bernus had quoted approvingly the following statement appearing in an article by Ludwig Bauer which had been published in the Européan in the morning of the same day: ‘It is necessary that we know what is preferable, disarmament or peace. The pacifists á la Mussolini and á la Hitler prefer disarmament. And with them all those who—wrongly—believe themselves to be secure: they are ready to pay the highest price, at the expense of the security of others and through the revision of foreign property.’ Bernus stated in relation to this observation that it furnished Herriot and Paul-Boncour with a useful theme on which to meditate ‘in waiting for Germany to demand at Geneva this Gleichberechtigung that they could not obtain at Lausanne.’ Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (a), July 9, 1932.

‘A Berlin avant l’accord,’ Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (e), July 9, 1932. See also Chappius, ‘Germany and the Anglo-French Accord,’ 220.

Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (e), July 9, 1932.

The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung declared that the agreement paved ‘the way for the world’s economic reconstruction.’ BIN 9, no. 2 (1932), 12. It should be noted that this newspaper represented ‘the great industrialists of Western Germany who…[were]…anxious to get their works started again.’ Wheeler-Bennett, ‘The Lausanne Conference,’ 14n.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Chappius, ‘Germany and the Anglo-French Accord,’ 215.

Ibid.

268 Parl. Deb. H. C. (5th series) (13 July 1932), 1374.

Ibid., 222.

268, Parl. Deb. H. C. (5th series) (13 July 1932), 1375–6. See also BIN 9, no. 12 (1932), 4–5. Alteras notes that the British interpreted the word equitable to mean ‘“fair play” and in no way did it recognize any political claim.’ Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 77.

Chappius, ‘Germany and the Anglo-French Accord,’ 222.

Ibid., 211. Chappius notes that Britain and France ‘also reached an understanding, not included in the text of the announcement, to consult each other prior to responding to any German initiative for revision of the Treaty of Versailles’ (ibid.).

268 Parl. Deb. H. C. (5th series) (13 July 1932), 1376, and Wheeler-Bennett, ‘The Lausanne Conference,’ 12.

Chappius, ‘Germany and the Anglo-French Accord,’ 223.

BIN 9, no. 2 (1932), 14, and BIN 9, no. 12 (1932), 5.

Le Temps (a), July 10, 1932. See also Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires (c), July 9, 1932. In the course of a debate concerning the Lausanne Conference, Lloyd George observed that the existence of a document additional to the Lausanne Treaty by which he meant the Gentlemen’s Agreement, had been revealed ‘on Sunday [10 July 1932] to the French newspapers, first of all the “Temps,” which is very much in touch, as everyone knows, with the French Foreign Office, the “Matin” and the “Journal”.’ 268 Parl. Deb. H. C. (5th series) (12 July 1932), 1158.

BIN 9, no. 2 (1932), 14, and BIN 9, no. 12 (1932), 5.

Sir J. Simon to Lord Tyrrell (Paris), 11 July 1932, doc. no. 189, in Woodward and Butler, eds., DBFP 1919–1939, 2nd ser., vol. 3, 437–8.

Ibid., 14–5. See also BIN 9, no. 12 (1932), 4–5 and Barron’s 12, no. 29 (1932), 4.

Chappius, ‘Germany and the Anglo-French Accord,’ 222.

Ibid., 152.

BIN 9, no. 2 (1932), 15, and Barron’s 12, no. 29 (1932), 4.

Chappius, ‘Germany and the Anglo-French Accord,’ 221.

Ibid., 223.

Ibid. and Chappius, ‘Germany and the Anglo-French Accord,’ 223–4.

Alteras, ‘The Geneva Disarmament Conference,’ 114.

Chappius, ‘Germany and the Anglo-French Accord,’ 224.

Ibid., 248–9.

Ibid., 249.

Ibid.

Ibid., 244.

Henry L. Stimson, ‘The Pact of Paris: Three Years of Development,’ special supplement, Foreign Affairs 11, no. 1 (1932): 1–9, 7–9, and Lippmann et al., United States in World Affairs, 223, 244.

Charteris, ‘Germany and the Disarmament Conference,’ 76. See also Stimson, ‘The Pact of Paris: Three Years of Development,’ 8–9.

Ibid., 250.

Ibid., 250–1.

Davies, ‘France and the World Disarmament Conference,’ 775.

BIN 9, no. 11 (1932), 3, and ‘Bulletin du jour: Le plan d’organisation de la paix,’ Le Temps, November 16, 1932.

‘Discours de M. Édouard Herriot,’ Le Temps, July 24, 1932.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Davies, ‘France and the World Disarmament Conference,’ 770.

Mathias Schulz, ‘The League of Nations, the Great Powers and the International Economic System from Reconstruction to the Great Depression 1919–1933,’ The League of Nations 1920–1946, 40, and Hanfried Schliephake, The Birth of the Luftwaffe (London: Ian Allan, 1971), 13.

Schulz, ‘The League of Nations, the Great Powers and the International Economic System,’ 40.

Ibid.

Ibid., 14.

Ibid., 18–9.

Le Temps, July 24, 1932. See also BIN 9, no. 11 (1932), 3.

Ibid.

Ibid., 4.

Ibid., 5.

Ibid.

Ibid., 6. The General Act for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes was open for signature in 1928. It was ratified by Great Britain in 1930, albeit with reservations.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Gathorne-Hardy, A Short History of International Affairs, 347, and Le Temps, 5 November 1932.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

BIN 9, no. 10, 9, and Le Temps, November 5, 1932.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

BIN 9, no. 10, 10. See also Le Temps, November 6, 1932.

Le Temps, November 6, 1932, and BIN 9, no. 10, 10.

BIN 9, no. 11, 3, 5. See also ‘Le plan français de la sécurité et de désarmement,’ Le Temps, November 16, 1932.

BIN 9, no. 11, 5. Emphasis added. See also ‘Le plan français de la sécurité et de désarmement,’ Le Temps, November 16, 1932.

‘Le plan français de la sécurité et de désarmement,’ Le Temps, November 16, 1932, and BIN 9, no. 11, 6.

‘Le plan français de la sécurité et de désarmement,’ Le Temps, November 16, 1932. Emphasis in the original. See also BIN 9, no. 11, 6.

‘Le plan français de la sécurité et de désarmement,’ Le Temps, November 16, 1932. See also BIN 9, no. 11, 6.

‘Le plan français de la sécurité et de désarmement,’ Le Temps, November 16, 1932, and BIN 9, no. 11, 6.

BIN 9, no. 11, 6. See also ‘Le plan français de la sécurité et de désarmement,’ Le Temps, November 16, 1932.

‘Le plan français de la sécurité et de désarmement,’ Le Temps, November 16, 1932. See also BIN 9, no. 11, 6–7. According to the French plan, in order to facilitate ‘the eventual proof or establishment of an aggression there should be set up, in each State, a commission of verification composed of diplomatic agents and naval, military and air attachés accredited to the Government of the State, the members of which would be nominated by the League Council.’ BIN 9, no. 1, 6.

BIN 9, no. 11, 8, and ‘Le plan français de la sécurité et de désarmement,’ Le Temps, November 16, 1932.

Ibid.

Davies, ‘France and the World Disarmament Conference,’ 774–5.

Ibid., 775.

Ibid., 252–3.

Lippmann et al., United States in World Affairs, 252 and BIN 9, no. 10, 5.

Horsfall Carter, ‘Naming the Aggressor,’ 142.

Davies, ‘France and the World Disarmament Conference,’ 774–5.

Ibid., 775–6. See also Le Temps, November 5, 1932, and ‘Le plan français de la sécurité et de désarmement,’ Le Temps, November 16, 1932.

Davies, ‘France and the World Disarmament Conference,’ 776.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid. Philip Charles Farwell Bankwitz points out that he was supported only by Marshal Philippe Pétain and Jean Fabry, vice-president of the Commission d’études of the Conseil Supérieure de la Défense Nationale. He adds that ‘the effect of the Marshal’s opposition was, however, blunted by deliberately conciliatory language; Fabry did not reject the Plan outright, but merely offered a number of “observations”’ (ibid.).

‘Le plan destructif,’ Le Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires, November 3, 1932. See also Bankwitz, Maxime Weygand and Civil Military Relations in Modern France, 64.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 7n.

Ibid., 254.

Ibid., 254–5.

Ibid., 255.

Five-Power Declaration, 1932, in ibid.

Gathorne-Hardy, A Short History of International Affairs, 349. The French delegates declared the following: ‘France agrees that the principle of equality of rights be accorded to Germany and other states disarmed by treaty within a general system which shall provide for the security of France and of all other states.’ The German position was as follows: Firstly, ‘(1) that German armaments should be limited for the same period by the same treaty that limited the armaments of other nations, thus abolishing the legal form of Part V of the Versailles Treaty; and (2) that the principle of equality of status should be given immediate practical effect on the qualitative side with respect to war material, replacements, and military organization. This was more than the French or the British were pre-pared to concede, since it meant in effect that Germany would begin to rearm.’ Lippmann et al., United States in World Affairs, 255–6.