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Political Corruption and Valence Issues Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

2. The Ideological Incentive for Campaigning on Corruption Issues: The Two-Party Case

verfasst von : Luigi Curini

Erschienen in: Corruption, Ideology, and Populism

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

In this chapter the theoretical model employed to identify the relationship between ideological positions and the incentives of a party to campaign on political corruption is introduced for a two-party system. The conclusion is that the more parties or candidates present a similar policy programme, the more such incentives grow. The empirical implications of the model are then controlled for by focusing on three countries: a ‘pure’ two-party system like the United States, and Italy and Japan during their respective long periods of no-cabinet alternation. Although these two latter democracies cannot be considered as two-party systems, they can be analysed using the theoretical framework proposed. Moreover, focusing on these two countries allows deeper investigation of the negative side of valence campaigning on corruption by a perennial opposition party.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Political Corruption and Valence Issues
Nächstes Kapitel The Ideological Incentive to Campaign on Corruption Issues: The Multi-party Case
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Metadaten
Titel
The Ideological Incentive for Campaigning on Corruption Issues: The Two-Party Case
verfasst von
Luigi Curini
Copyright-Jahr
2018
Buch
Corruption, Ideology, and Populism

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-56734-1

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-56735-8

Copyright-Jahr: 2018

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56735-8_2