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2020 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

5. The Impact of Brexit on E.U. Security

With Arnold Kammel

verfasst von : Benjamin Zyla

Erschienen in: The End of European Security Institutions?

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

As noted, the Brexit is taking place at a time when the E.U. is confronted with a variety of internal and external challenges related to its very own foundation as well as the security environment it is embedded in. Nonetheless, a set of shared values and geographical proximity suggest that both the U.K. and the remaining 27 E.U. members (that is the current twenty eight member states minus Britain) will have powerful reasons to continue cooperating on security issues after Brexit, and to limit the collateral damage to shared security interests. Thus, despite the possibility of the U.K. leaving the European Union as a consequence of the Brexit vote, we charge that it is not likely that the United Kingdom will leave European security per se, in spite of the strong political framing during the negotiations. Indeed, it is in its own (security) interest to keep and maintain a healthy relationship with the E.U.’s security institutions.

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Fußnoten
1
See Department for Exiting the European Union, Foreign policy, defence and development—a future partnership paper, September 2017.
 
2
Ibid, 22.
 
4
See Dumoulin, Andre (2016). Brexit and European defence An in-depth analysis. RHID E-Note No. 20, 2.
 
5
See Patten, Chris (2005). Not Quite the Diplomat: Home Truths About World Affair. London: Allen Lane, 159–160.
 
6
http://​www.​bbc.​com/​news/​uk-politics-eu-referendum-36619129 [03.07.2016]. See also Niklas Helwig (Ed.): “Europe’s New Political Engine: Germany’s role in the EU’s foreign and security policy”, FIIA Report, available online at http://​www.​fiia.​fi/​en/​publication/​585/​europe_​s_​new_​political_​engine/​ (accesses last on 10.5.2017).
 
7
Niklas Helwig and Isabelle Tannous. “Gemeinsame Außen-und Sicherheitspolitik”, in Werner Weidefeld and Wolfgang Wessels, Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2016, p. 343.
 
8
See Dumoulin (2016), 2.
 
10
See Riordan, Shaun (2019). Post-Brexit Relations between the EU and the U.K., AIES Fokus 1/2019, 2.
 
11
France and Germany do, but in the case of the latter those transport planes have had a long record of breakdowns and extensive repairs.
 
12
This is all in spite of the fact that the U.K. experiences significant procurement problems. For example, its Royal Air Force’s transport planes (the Airbus A400M) not only cost the UK £2.6 billion; only two of the 20-strong fleet are able to fly.
 
13
This contributed in part to an 8.5% decrease of the U.K. defence budget in real terms from 2010–2015 (Malcolm Chalmers, Decision Time: The National Security Capability Review 20172018 and Defence, Whitehall Report 1–18 (London: RUSI, 2018), 5), and resulted in an overall reduction of the U.K.’s purchasing power (International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “Europe,” Chap. 4 in The Military Balance 2018 (London: IISS, 2018), 80).
 
14
See also Peter Keith Levene, Defence Reform: An Independent Report into the Structure and Management of the Ministry of Defence (London: Ministry of Defence, 2011).
 
15
As of July 2019, these countries are the following (in alphabetical order): Estonia, Greece, Romania, Poland, United Kingdom, and the United States.
 
16
For a more detailed discussion see also Karl-Heinz Kamp, “Eine nukleare Neuausrichtung der NATO”, SIRIUS 2017; 1(4): 359–366; https://​doi.​org/​10.​1515/​sirius-2017-0086.
 
17
Ian Bond, “NATO, the EU and Brexit: Joining forces?” Insight, Brussels: Centre for European Reform, 5. July 2016.
 
18
Peter Ricketts, National Security Relations with France after Brexit (London: RUSI, 2018), 5–6.
 
19
Only Denmark is not member of the EDA.
 
20
von Ondarza, Nicolai, and Camille Borrett. Brexit and EU Agencies: What the agencies’ existing third country relations can teach us about the future EUU.K. relationship. Working Paper no. 02. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2018, p. 20.
 
21
HM Government: Technical Note: U.K. Participation in Galileo.
 
22
Ibid.
 
23
EU Commission: Permanent Structured Cooperation—PESCO: Deepening Defence Cooperation among EU Member States; “Permanent Structured Cooperation—PESCO,” European Union External Action Service, March 9, 2018.
 
24
Indeed, NATO Secretary Jens Stoltenberg considers PESCO as a means to strengthen NATO’s European pillar. See Doorstep statement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg prior to the European Union Foreign Affairs Council meeting https://​www.​nato.​int/​cps/​en/​natohq/​opinions_​160495.​htm.
 
25
This is something that the EU has called for in its own Global Strategy document. See European External Action Service. (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A stronger Europe. 26 June 2016, http://​eeas.​europa.​eu/​archives/​docs/​top_​stories/​pdf/​eugs_​review_​web.​pdf.
 
26
For an extensive review of the debate see Antonio Missiroli (Hrsg.): Towards an EU Global Strategy—Consulting the Experts, Paris 2015.
 
27
Van Ham, Peter (2016). Brexit: Strategic Consequences for Europe A Scenario Study. Clingendael Report, 15.
 
28
See De France, Olivier/Major, Claudia/Sartori, Paola (2017): How to make PESCO a Success. Armament Industry European Research Group Policy Paper No. 21, 8.
 
30
See Riordan (2019), 3.
 
31
George Allison: Less than a third of German military assets are operational says report, U.K. Defence Journal, June 21 2018.
 
32
For an extensive discussion of the Eastern European member’s perspectives see Benjamin Zyla, and Arnold Kammel (eds.). Peacebuilding at Home: NATO and its ‘New’ Member States. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2018.
 
33
Alice Pannier: Macron´s “European Intervention Initiative”: More Questions than Answers, European Leadership Network, 23 November 2017.
 
34
See Mauro, Frederic (2018). The European Intervention Initiative: Why we should listen to German Chancellor Merkel, available at https://​www.​iris-france.​org/​115776-the-european-intervention-initiative-why-we-should-listen-to-german-chancellor-merkel/​ [20.06.2019].
 
35
See Mills, Claire (2019). The European Intervention Initiative. House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper No. 8432.
 
36
Letter of Intent concerning the development of the European Intervention Initiative (EI2), June 2018, para. 9.
 
37
PQ160129, EU Defence Policy, 10 July 2018.
 
38
See “Nine states to launch joint military force as Paris pushes for post-Brexit crisis defence group”, The Daily Telegraph, 25 June 2018.
 
39
Håkon Lunde Saxi: The U.K. Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), IFS Insights 5/2018, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies.
 
Metadaten
Titel
The Impact of Brexit on E.U. Security
verfasst von
Benjamin Zyla
Copyright-Jahr
2020
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42160-1_5

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