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2013 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

The Impact of Different Rankings of Large Shareholders to the Rate of Return

verfasst von : Jian Su, Xiao-ming Ji

Erschienen in: Proceedings of 20th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Abstract

The paper investigates whether and how the power’s balance can affect the performance of Japanese listed companies. With sample data of companies listed on Tokyo Stock Exchange, it was interpreted that ROA (Return on Assets) could be regressed on Z (the radio of large shareholders) and L, I, F (the dummy variables of different large shareholders). By the empirical result, the dummy variable of institutional investors in any ranking is always positive related to ROA. The dummy variable of legal investors is negatively related to ROA at 1 % significant level only when they are the largest shareholders. In the other rankings, legal shareholders have no significant impacts on ROA. As the largest shareholders, the foreign investors’ dummy variable is positively related to ROA. When the foreign investors are the second largest shareholders, their dummy variable has not impacts on ROA.

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Metadaten
Titel
The Impact of Different Rankings of Large Shareholders to the Rate of Return
verfasst von
Jian Su
Xiao-ming Ji
Copyright-Jahr
2013
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40072-8_74

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