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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

9. The Irrelevance of Balanced Budget Amendments

verfasst von : David J. Hebert

Erschienen in: James M. Buchanan

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Today, the debate about public indebtedness has reached a fervor not often seen among professional economists and the general public. This has renewed considerations of requiring Congress to balance its budget, through either a Constitutional amendment or some other legislative or statutory means. But what effect would such a requirement have on the actual practice of federal spending? Conventional approaches to answering this question are typically empirical in nature, perhaps looking at the budgets of individual states and the patterns of spending before and after balanced budget requirements were put into practice. This paper takes a different tack, instead exploring the process by which figures of federal revenues and expenditures are constructed and what effect requiring these constructed figures to be equal would have on actual underlying fiscal realities.

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Fußnoten
1
Wagner (2012) points to “clubs, churches, and other groups” which are able to balance their budgets despite their group-decision-making nature, at least over a sufficiently long period of time.
 
2
Thus, this contracting-out method can appear advantageous even if it ultimately costs significantly more than Congress simply building/buying the building themselves.
 
3
To be sure, sunsets are not always used to play budgetary games. The Byrd Rule, among other things, makes it necessary to sunset certain bills in the event that a 60 vote majority in the Senate cannot be achieved.
 
4
Schick (2007), especially Chapters 4 and 6, provides a much more thorough investigation.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
The Irrelevance of Balanced Budget Amendments
verfasst von
David J. Hebert
Copyright-Jahr
2018
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03080-3_9