Skip to main content
Erschienen in: The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 2/2017

23.05.2016

The Issuer-pays Business Model and Competitive Rating Market: Rating Network Structure

verfasst von: Xiaoyang Zhuo, Guangli Xu, Yongjin Wang

Erschienen in: The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics | Ausgabe 2/2017

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

This paper develops an equilibrium model involving credit rating agencies (CRAs), issuers, regulators and investors. The model is based on two key features of the rating industry: the “issuer-pays” business model and competitive market structure. By incorporating the ratings shopping by issuers, we investigate the equilibrium decisions of CRAs and the impact of government regulation on the rating market. More importantly, an evolutionary reform plan named the Rating Network Structure, which is an alliance or a network of CRAs’ rating approaches, is proposed to improve market efficiency. Simulations demonstrate that this structure plays a significant role in increasing rating accuracy and market profits. Furthermore, this paper reveals the detrimental effect of competition on the credit rating industry.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Fußnoten
1
The two CRAs would share the total costs equally, and each inputs the amount of c /2.
 
2
Although the CRAs do not share client information, they do admit that issuers would shop for ratings.
 
3
Actually, if we consider the expected profits of CRA\(_{1}^{*}\) and CRA\(_{2}^{*}\) separately, we find that
$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} \pi_{1}^{*} = \pi_{2}^{*} &=& \frac{1}{2} \lambda z^{*} \phi+ \frac{1}{2} \left( 1-\lambda\right)\left( 1-z^{*}\right)\left( \phi- \delta p \rho \right)+ \frac{1}{2}\lambda \left( 1-z^{*}\right)z^{*}\phi\\ &&+\frac{1}{2}\left( 1-\lambda\right)z^{*} \left( 1-z^{*}\right)\left( \phi- \delta p \rho \right) -\frac{1}{2} c^{*}, \end{array} $$
and the whole market profits \(\pi _{1+2}^{*} = \pi _{1}^{*}+\pi _{2}^{*}\) are exactly the same as π in Eq. 17.
 
4
\(\frac {\partial s}{\partial z} \geq 0\) are always satisfied in the cases.
 
Literatur
Zurück zum Zitat Bar-Isaac, H., & Shapiro, J. (2011). Credit ratings accuracy and analyst incentives. Am Econ Rev, 101(3), 120–124.CrossRef Bar-Isaac, H., & Shapiro, J. (2011). Credit ratings accuracy and analyst incentives. Am Econ Rev, 101(3), 120–124.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Becker, B., & Milbourn, T. (2011). How did increased competition affect credit ratings?. J Financ Econ, 101(3), 493–514.CrossRef Becker, B., & Milbourn, T. (2011). How did increased competition affect credit ratings?. J Financ Econ, 101(3), 493–514.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bolton, P., Freixas, X., & Shapiro, J. (2012). The credit ratings game. J Financ, 67(1), 85–111.CrossRef Bolton, P., Freixas, X., & Shapiro, J. (2012). The credit ratings game. J Financ, 67(1), 85–111.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bongaerts, D. (2014). Alternatives for issuer-paid credit rating agencies. Working Paper, European Central Bank. Bongaerts, D. (2014). Alternatives for issuer-paid credit rating agencies. Working Paper, European Central Bank.
Zurück zum Zitat Faure-Grimaud, A., Peyrache, E., & Quesada, L. (2009). The ownership of ratings. RAND J Econ, 40(2), 234–257.CrossRef Faure-Grimaud, A., Peyrache, E., & Quesada, L. (2009). The ownership of ratings. RAND J Econ, 40(2), 234–257.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Goel, A.M., & Thakor, A.V. (2015). Information reliability and welfare: A theory of coarse credit ratings. J Financ Econ, 115(3), 541–557.CrossRef Goel, A.M., & Thakor, A.V. (2015). Information reliability and welfare: A theory of coarse credit ratings. J Financ Econ, 115(3), 541–557.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Griffin, J.M., & Tang, D.Y. (2012). Did subjectivity play a role in CDO credit ratings?. J Financ, 67(4), 1293–1328.CrossRef Griffin, J.M., & Tang, D.Y. (2012). Did subjectivity play a role in CDO credit ratings?. J Financ, 67(4), 1293–1328.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat He, J.J., Qian, J.Q., & Strahan, P.E. (2012). Are all ratings created equal? the impact of issuer size on the pricing of mortgage-backed securities. J Financ, 67(6), 2097–2137.CrossRef He, J.J., Qian, J.Q., & Strahan, P.E. (2012). Are all ratings created equal? the impact of issuer size on the pricing of mortgage-backed securities. J Financ, 67(6), 2097–2137.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Jaffee, D.M. (2009). Comment on: Rating the raters : are reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies? J Monet Econ, 56(5), 675–677.CrossRef Jaffee, D.M. (2009). Comment on: Rating the raters : are reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies? J Monet Econ, 56(5), 675–677.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Jarrow, R., & Xu, L. (2010). Credit rating accuracy and incentives. J Credit Risk, 6(3), 133–151.CrossRef Jarrow, R., & Xu, L. (2010). Credit rating accuracy and incentives. J Credit Risk, 6(3), 133–151.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Jiang, J.X., Harris, S.M., & Xie, Y. (2012). Does it matter who pays for bond ratings? historical evidence. J Financ Econ, 105(3), 607–621.CrossRef Jiang, J.X., Harris, S.M., & Xie, Y. (2012). Does it matter who pays for bond ratings? historical evidence. J Financ Econ, 105(3), 607–621.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Mathis, J., McAndrews, J., & Rochet, J.-C. (2009). Rating the raters: are reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies?. J Monet Econ, 56 (5), 657–674.CrossRef Mathis, J., McAndrews, J., & Rochet, J.-C. (2009). Rating the raters: are reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies?. J Monet Econ, 56 (5), 657–674.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Raboy, D. (2009). Concept paper on credit rating agency incentives. Working Paper, George Mason University. Raboy, D. (2009). Concept paper on credit rating agency incentives. Working Paper, George Mason University.
Zurück zum Zitat Skreta, V., & Veldkamp, L. (2009). Ratings shopping and asset complexity: A theory of ratings inflation. J Monet Econ, 56(5), 678–695.CrossRef Skreta, V., & Veldkamp, L. (2009). Ratings shopping and asset complexity: A theory of ratings inflation. J Monet Econ, 56(5), 678–695.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat White, L. (2013). Credit rating agencies: an overview. Annu Rev Financ Econ, 5(1), 93–122.CrossRef White, L. (2013). Credit rating agencies: an overview. Annu Rev Financ Econ, 5(1), 93–122.CrossRef
Metadaten
Titel
The Issuer-pays Business Model and Competitive Rating Market: Rating Network Structure
verfasst von
Xiaoyang Zhuo
Guangli Xu
Yongjin Wang
Publikationsdatum
23.05.2016
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics / Ausgabe 2/2017
Print ISSN: 0895-5638
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-045X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-016-9563-2

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 2/2017

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 2/2017 Zur Ausgabe