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2015 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

19. The Nucleolus

verfasst von : Hans Peters

Erschienen in: Game Theory

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Abstract

The core of a game with transferable utility can be a large set, but it can also be empty. The Shapley value assigns to each game a unique point, which, however, does not have to be in the core. The nucleolus assigns to each game with a nonempty imputation set a unique element of that imputation set; moreover, this element is in the core if the core of the game is nonempty. The pre-nucleolus exists for every essential game (and does not have to be an imputation, even if the imputation set is nonempty), but for balanced games it coincides with the nucleolus.

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Fußnoten
2
See also Chap.​ 11 Here, we repeat some of the definitions for convenience.
 
3
Observe that this game has a non-empty core and therefore the nucleolus and pre-nucleolus coincide and are elements of the core. Cf. Problem 19.8.
 
4
Under appropriate restrictions this program is feasible and bounded.
 
5
We write v(123) instead of v({1, 2, 3}), etc.
 
Literatur
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Zurück zum Zitat Snijders, C. (1995). Axiomatization of the nucleolus. Mathematics of Operations Research, 20, 189–196.CrossRef Snijders, C. (1995). Axiomatization of the nucleolus. Mathematics of Operations Research, 20, 189–196.CrossRef
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Metadaten
Titel
The Nucleolus
verfasst von
Hans Peters
Copyright-Jahr
2015
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7_19

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