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Public Organization Review

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01.06.2006

The Organization of Factions: Interest Mobilization and the Group Theory of Politics

verfasst von: Matt Grossmann

Erschienen in: Public Organization Review | Ausgabe 2/2006

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Abstract

Theories of interest group mobilization are central to political science but current research on interest organizations has not proven useful for scholars in related fields. I argue that, by adapting organizational theory to account for the particular function of interest organizations, scholars can build a widely applied theoretical framework. The key step is an analysis of the role that organizations play in the mobilization of influence: they are intermediaries, reliant on their constituents and their lobbying targets. Reviewing research on ethnic politics and political economy, I demonstrate that this intermediary view of interest organizations encourages theoretical ideas to travel between subfields.

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Lasswell (1958) outlines these broad theoretical goals. Truman (1951) presents an early interest group theory of politics.

For a discussion of context effects, see Bledsoe et al. (1995). For a review of identity and participation, see Shingles (1981).

Some scholars (e.g., Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 1984) argue that economic class structure generates policy outcomes and these policies in turn create class alignments. Neoliberal scholars (e.g., Friedman and Friedman, 1962) argue that economic competition and global markets generate domestic constituencies that affect policy but also argue that government intervention can create additional constituencies. Other scholars, following the work of Polanyi (1944), argue that politics is constitutive of the economy: the political process determines the groups than then compete for policy influence.

Tsebelis (1999) uses this concept to argue that scholars should pay attention to all groups or individuals in the political system that can block legislation.

Wolin (1993) reviews the similarities and differences between traditional pluralism and its more recent counterparts.

For further examples, see studies of social movements (e.g., McAdam et al., 2001), international non-governmental organizations (e.g., Brechin, 1997), corporatist systems (e.g., Lehmbruch, 1984), and public policy (e.g., Fernandez and Gould, 1994).

Recent analyses of American interest groups combine organizational research with traditional group theories of politics (e.g., Truman, 1951). Gray and Lowery (2004) label this research agenda the “neopluralist perspective.” Andrew McFarland (2004) also suggests a reformulation of interest group theory under the moniker “neopluralism.”

For an example, see Salisbury (1992). For an overview, see Moe (1984).

See Denhardt (1981); Bozeman (1987); Waldo (1987); Gortner et al. (1997).

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The collective action framework became prominent in many areas of social science despite its widespread failure to explain the behavior of American interest groups, the empirical terrain from which it was originally inducted. For a review of the empirical results in contradiction with the theoretical work, see Baumgartner and Leech (1998).

Selznick (1957) identifies many of the mechanisms that were later instantiated in the institutional theory of organizations. The classic theoretical statement is from Meyer and Rowan (1977).

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Brechin (1997), for example, has begun to outline how forestry organizations are dependent on their ability to adapt for successful social mobilization and inter-governmental relations.

For an account based on normative goals, see Esping-Andersen (1990). For a class-based account, see Chaudhry (1993). These perspectives are welcome, as are evaluations of current economic‐political systems. This work could benefit, however, from empirical theory on how groups attempt to affect policy outcomes.

For an example of a case study of economic policy that is not sufficiently addressed by common theories in political economy, see Johnson (1982).

One example is the coalitions proposed in the insider‐outsider theory of unemployment by Lindbeck and Snower (1988). Based on presumed interests, these scholars imagine two large policy advocacy coalitions.

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Titel: The Organization of Factions: Interest Mobilization and the Group Theory of Politics
verfasst von: Matt Grossmann
Publikationsdatum: 01.06.2006
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: Public Organization Review / Ausgabe 2/2006
Print ISSN: 1566-7170
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7098
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11115-006-0002-3

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