The Palestinian Left and Its Decline

This introductory chapter illustrates the core arguments adopted in this book to examine the decline of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) as main political expression of the Palestinian Left. After specifying the relevance of the PFLP’s decline for the overall condition of Palestinian politics, this chapter introduces the concept of “opposition-integration dilemma”, namely the underlying dynamic that interacted with additional sources of tension, affecting negatively the PFLP’s political agency. The chronological scope is also addressed as 1982 is identified as the year in which such dilemma broke out and started to induce policy fluctuation in the PFLP’s action, undermining its political effectiveness and popularity. The PFLP’s conduct during the 2006–07 Hamas-Fatah conflict represented the conclusive step in its declining trajectory. This chapter also provides a concise discussion of the relevant literature as well as a note on the sources and methodology employed. A historical prologue describes the PFLP’s ideological and organisational background, paving the way for the analysis of its agency during its declining period. A section is also dedicated to the PFLP’s action towards seminal developments in Palestinian political history before 1982. This allows to highlight the emergence of those tensions that would later mark negatively the PFLP’s agency, first and foremost its bid to challenge Fatah leadership while maintaining integration into the Palestinian hegemonic bloc.

This chapter explores the PFLP’s response to the unprecedented crisis of the PLO that followed the expulsion from Beirut and the end of the Palestinian quasi-state in Lebanon due to the 1982 Israeli invasion. The focus is on the internal split that the PLO experienced between 1982 and 1987 and that entailed the outbreak of the opposition-integration dilemma for the PFLP. Virtually deprived of the military option, the PFLP aimed at building a radical opposition coalition, alternative to Arafat’s diplomatic strategy and his leanings towards a US-sponsored peace process. As the national movement fragmented over the PLO leadership strategy, and the split within Fatah itself took the shape of military confrontation, the PFLP’s line fluctuated between its contrasting priorities: opposing and rejecting Arafat’s orientations while refusing the open armed rebellion led by Syrian-backed Fatah mutineers. This chapter shows the ineffectiveness of the PFLP’s agency in standing up to the PLO leadership as contradictions undermined its agenda. Moreover, it highlights the first step of the PFLP’s marginalisation vis-à-vis Arafat’s imposition of majority rule over the PLO and the strengthening of his position thanks to victory over Fatah rebels.

This chapter covers the same years addressed in the previous one but focuses on the regional and international projection of the PFLP’s policies. The formation of an opposition coalition on the Palestinian level corresponded to a realignment along Syrian confrontational positions on the regional one. Internationally, the identification of the USSR as privileged partner responded to the need to counterbalance the US increasing popularity among the PLO leaders. This chapter explains the reasons behind the PFLP’s realignment with Syria, illustrates the role of ideology in supporting such shift and assesses the impact of contradictions between PFLP and Syrian interests. In this process, this chapter underlines the role of regional policies in fostering policy fluctuation as the PFLP shifted from alignment with Damascus to military confrontation with its Palestinian proxies. Moreover, this chapter explores the PFLP’s attempt to forge closer ties with the USSR. What is stressed is the impossibility of building a strategic relationship due to long-standing divergences, the historical Soviet posture towards the Palestinian national movement and Moscow’s new orientations under Gorbachev. This further undermined the credibility of the PFLP’s foreign policies already seriously questioned by Damascus hegemonic ambitions.

This chapter covers the first half of the First Palestinian Intifada (1987–90) as well as the preceding entrenchment of the PLO factions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). For the PFLP, the different and more favourable political balance existing among the Palestinian factions in the OPT as well as the recovered unity of the PLO was a valuable chance to invert its marginalisation process and reassert its role within Palestinian politics. This chapter shows how several sources of pressure returned to cripple the PFLP’s effort, so that, despite a certain positive pragmatism, it ultimately continued to swing between clashing thrusts. For instance, the opposition to Fatah’s “concessions” in its diplomatic strategy and the concern for the maintenance of PLO unity resurfaced, renewing the opposition-integration dilemma. The analysis of the PFLP’s conduct during the uprising also evidences the emergence of new sources of tension for its agency. The appearance of the “inside-outside divide” and the rise to prominence of the Islamist radical alternative are some of the sources of pressure behind the PFLP’s fluctuations during this phase.

This chapter tackles the first decade of the peace process era. Its first sections discuss the PFLP’s predicament in relation to the 1991 Gulf War and the downfall of the USSR as well as its shortcomings in attaining genuine ideological and organisational renewal during its landmark Fifth National Congress. Subsequently, the chapter addresses the PFLP’s response to the 1993 Oslo accords and the implementation of the PNA’s state-building process. Such response took the form of a renewed coalition building effort with all Palestinian factions opposed to the accords. As the goal was to delegitimise the Oslo peace process, what is stressed is the PFLP’s interest in acting on the institutional level and the tensions that this produced with Islamist coalition associates. This chapter describes two levels of policy fluctuation: a macro-level, namely the PFLP’s shift from rejection to acceptance of the new political order and institution; and a micro-level as the PFLP’s line appeared inconsistent due to the tensions emerging with other opposition factions. Ultimately, this chapter demonstrates the predominance of institutional integration over opposition priority as the latter entailed a stronger dissociation from traditional Palestinian platforms.

This chapter tackles the years that asserted the PFLP’s marginalisation within the context of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, beginning in 2000, and the evolution of the Hamas-Fatah split between 2006 and 2007. In covering the Al-Aqsa Intifada, this chapter outlines the PFLP’s fluctuations and loss of relevance in relations to the dynamics marking the second Palestinian mass uprising, such as militarisation, Palestinian political fragmentation and growing Fatah-Hamas polarisation. The final part of this chapter approaches the PFLP’s efforts to integrate the post-Intifada and, more significantly, the post-Arafat political scenario. After fully accepting the Oslo institutions, testified by its participation in the 2005 presidential and the 2006 parliamentary elections, the PFLP struggled to maintain an active role in the heightened competition between Hamas and Fatah. In the conflict that followed Hamas’ victory in the 2006 elections, the PFLP oscillated between the two sides, ultimately demonstrating the primacy of integration into the PLO/PNA framework above other priorities. Ultimately, this chapter points to the PFLP’s inability to disengage from a dysfunctional institutional framework as the main liability still determining its ineffective “internal” opposition. In conclusion, this chapter questions the actual role of the PFLP within the Palestinian national movement, casting serious doubts on a revival of the Palestinian Left within the framework of its traditional, main representative.

This chapter examines the trajectory of two leftist organisations within the Middle East that experienced dilemmas and challenges similar to the PFLP’s. Its focus is on how the relinquishment or adherence to the elaboration of a counterhegemonic, leftist platform for national liberation affected the experience of Marxist movements and parties. The first parallel drawn is between the PFLP and the Egyptian communist movement. Attention is focused on the Egyptian communists’ relations with the Free Officers’ Movement (FOM) before and after the July 1952 coup. As Egyptian communists went through phases of collaboration and contrast with the ruling FOM, their relation presented some similarities with the opposition-integration dilemma experienced by the PFLP. The Egyptian communists’ decision to merge into Nasser’s Arab Socialist Union represents the ultimate choice for integration with the post-colonial, nationalist regime, despite enduring years of harsh repression. Afterwards, this chapter deals with the ideological and organisational evolution of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Unlike the PFLP, the PKK was able to formulate and embody a revolutionary, leftist case for Kurdish self-determination, emancipating from all nationalist, separatist paradigms. This allowed the PKK to pursue deep changes in accordance to historical challenges while adhering to a revolutionary platform that continued to mobilise mass support. These parallel examinations, while proving the validity of concepts elaborated throughout the book, further clarify how individual agency interrelates with external factors in producing political marginalisation.

This conclusive chapter provides a summary of the main arguments illustrated throughout this book. The goal is to show how the fundamental dynamics affecting the PFLP’s agency remained relevant throughout the period studied while interacting with the specificities of each different phase. This allows also to restate how the book contributed to academic literature on the Palestinian national movement by virtue of its original focus on the PFLP. This conclusion also outlines the implications of the points made throughout the volume for the understanding of the current situation of the PFLP and of the whole Palestinian Left. This conclusive chapter also points out the significance of the book, in terms of arguments, themes and methodology, to the debate on Palestinian political historiography and to studies approaching leftist national liberation movements but also opposition forces in state and non-state contexts.