2006 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
The structure of the Nash equilibrium sets of standard 2-player games
verfasst von : Lin Zhou
Erschienen in: Rationality and Equilibrium
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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In this paper I study a class of two-player games, in which both players’ action sets are [0, 1] and their payoff functions are continuous in joint actions and quasi-concave in own actions. I show that a no-improper-crossing condition is both necessary and sufficient for a finite subset
A
of [0, 1] × [0, 1] to be the set of Nash equilibria of such a game.