2007 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
The Theory of Maximal Social Welfare Feasible Coalition
verfasst von : Laor Boongasame, Veera Boonjing, Ho-fung Leung
Erschienen in: New Trends in Applied Artificial Intelligence
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.
Wählen Sie Textabschnitte aus um mit Künstlicher Intelligenz passenden Patente zu finden. powered by
Markieren Sie Textabschnitte, um KI-gestützt weitere passende Inhalte zu finden. powered by
This paper proposes a new theory for forming a maximum-value-cooperation coalition known as
the Maximal Social Welfare Feasible Coalition
. This theory can give such solution because it does not assume that each player requesting to join a coalition knows information of other players. However, all players’ private information requesting to join the coalition is known by an honest coordinator. This allows the coordinator to select a coalition structure with maximal value of cooperation among successful players so as they get at least at their required minimum values. Not only this maximal value is shown to be equal to or larger than the value of a core coalition but also the value allocation is shown to be Pareto optimal.