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Erschienen in:
The Puzzle of Chinese Assertiveness Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

6. Theories of Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea

verfasst von : Richard Q. Turcsányi

Erschienen in: Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Based on the power analysis conducted in the previous two chapters, it will be argued here that the main hypothesis does not fully explain the Chinese assertiveness. Moreover, it is shown that although China’s perception of its power (in a twist of the main hypothesis) increased somewhat immediately in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, the increased perception was not very significant, and it seemed to decrease shortly afterwards. Hence, alternative theories need to be proposed to explain the Chinese behaviour. Subsequently, it is claimed that four out of the five assertive events can be explained as Chinese reactions to other actors’ actions, as the alternative hypothesis 1 claims. With the exception of the oil rig incident, all of the four remaining assertive cases included a direct trigger which, from China’s perspective, was the action of another actor. Furthermore, the changes in the regional international system, particularly those connected to the initiation of the US pivot policy, likely contributed indirectly to the Chinese assertive actions.
Even though the combination of the two hypotheses sufficiently explains all five instances of the assertive Chinese behaviour in the SCS, the validity of the remaining theory was also discussed. The alternative hypothesis 2 is the most complex of the alternative hypotheses, and it required discussing three separate options of how domestic politics could have influenced Chinese foreign policy towards being assertive. Two of them—the fragmentation of the leadership and domestic instability—were found not to be present in a relevant way. While the third indicator’s assumption—the growing nationalism—is met, there are no marks that would indicate that the government would have been under pressure from the nationalistic public opinion and thus decided to adopt assertive policies. On the contrary, the accounts of the assertive actions of China give signs of pre-planned, restrained, and well-controlled behaviour.

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Vorheriges Kapitel China’s International and Societal Levels of Power Sources
Nächstes Kapitel Conclusion
Fußnoten
1
Consider that already in the 1970s, China managed to forcefully get under its control all the Paracel Islands from Vietnam, and then it carried out similar operations in the 1980s and early 1990s in the Spratly Islands. Arguably, these operations were, from the military perspective, even more sophisticated than those within the present assertive behaviour. For a superb description of the historical events, see Hayton (2014).
 
2
The relevant part of Deng’s advice is ‘keep a low profile and strive for achievements’ (韬光养晦,有所作为, literally meaning ‘hide brightness and cherish obscurity, have something done’). Hence, Deng’s advice did not only advocate a ‘low profile’, as is often asserted, but it also mentioned a need for accomplishments. It is therefore not entirely correct to refer to the recent shift in Chinese foreign policy as an abandoning of Deng’s advice; it is rather a change of its interpretation. See Chen and Wang (2011), for an outline of the domestic Chinese discussion about Deng’s policy dictum.
 
3
For example, Wang Jisi of Peking University and Jin Canrong of Renmin University, cited in Yan (2014, p. 157).
 
4
A detailed description of these events was offered in Chap. 2, including an appropriate discussion about the other actors’ relevant actions. This section will therefore mostly highlight the lessons learnt without elaborating on the details again.
 
5
Deng was China’s uncontested leader for two decades although he was not a President, General Secretary, or Chairman of the Central Military Commission—he was simply able to rule because his decisions were respected. For accounts of Deng’s ruling, see, for example, Kissinger (2012, pp. 321–329).
 
6
The story of the Minister of Foreign Affairs from the Hu-Wen administration Yang Jiechi is telling. In President Xi’s administration, he was promoted to a State Councillor—the highest foreign affairs position in the system. However, he is still not a member of the 25-member Politburo, let alone its Standing Committee.
 
7
The potential impact of public opinion on foreign policy decisions will be discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter.
 
8
There have been elections on the lowest levels in China, though, but they have been largely seen as being of little relevance. See, for example, Pleschova (2009).
 
9
President Xi does not hide that his dream is about the Chinese people and nation (Xi 2015).
 
10
For one of the most recent publications on this topic, see Hillman and Tuttle (2016).
 
11
One of the early examples was the occasion in 1999 when the then Premier Zhu Rongji returned from his trip to the USA without securing the agreement about Chinese WTO membership and was criticized for that (Hughes 2006, pp. 1–2).
 
12
Note that the terms for ‘Chinese Dream’ and ‘China Dream’ are identical in Chinese (中国梦). The Chinese language does not distinguish between the adjective and noun forms of words, like in this case.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Theories of Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea
verfasst von
Richard Q. Turcsányi
Copyright-Jahr
2018
Buch
Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-67647-0

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-67648-7

Copyright-Jahr: 2018

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67648-7_6

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