2012 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Unaligned Rebound Attack: Application to Keccak
verfasst von : Alexandre Duc, Jian Guo, Thomas Peyrin, Lei Wei
Erschienen in: Fast Software Encryption
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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We analyze the internal permutations of
Keccak
, one of the NIST
SHA-3
competition finalists, in regard to differential properties. By carefully studying the elements composing those permutations, we are able to derive most of the best known differential paths for up to 5 rounds. We use these differential paths in a rebound attack setting and adapt this powerful freedom degrees utilization in order to derive distinguishers for up to 8 rounds of the internal permutations of the submitted version of
Keccak
. The complexity of the 8 round distinguisher is 2
491.47
. Our results have been implemented and verified experimentally on a small version of
Keccak
.