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Erschienen in:
2006 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Unconditional Competitive Auctions with Copy and Budget Constraints
verfasst von : Tian-Ming Bu, Qi Qi, Aries Wei Sun
Erschienen in: Internet and Network Economics
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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This paper investigates a new auction model in which bidders have both copy and budget constraints. The new model has extensive and interesting applications in auctions of online ad-words, software licenses, etc. We consider the following problem: Suppose all the participators are rational, how to allocate the objects at what price so as to guarantee auctioneer’s high revenue, and how high it is.
We introduce a new kind of mechanisms called
win-win mechanisms
and present the notion of
unconditional competitive auctions
. A notably interesting property of
win-win mechanisms
is that each bidder’s self-interested strategy brings better utility not only to himself but also to the auctioneer. Then we present
win-win mechanisms
for multi-unit auctions with copy and budget constraints. We prove that these auctions are
unconditional competitive
under the situation of both limited and unlimited supply.