2009 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Understanding Military Economics
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Neither the study of strategy nor of economics provides clear policy answers. They are primarily ways of thinking: analytical frameworks that identify the crucial trade-offs and illuminate the choices in a way that should help decisions. There are rarely unambiguous right and wrong answers; the trade-offs mean that you have to weigh gains against losses. This is no easy matter. The losses may be apparent and salient, the gains not so obvious, or vice versa. Who gains and who loses matters. A proposed policy may have large net benefits; but if those who lose are politically powerful, it is unlikely to be implemented. One reason strategy and economics can never provide clear policy rules is that they are largely competitive activities. If they did provide a set of rules, and you followed those rules, your economic or strategic competitor, knowing the rules, could predict your actions and thwart them. While there are sensible rules — invest in training and make sure that you have adequate supplies and reserves when you go into economic and military battles — they are rules for avoiding guaranteed failure rather providing guaranteed success. Thus there are no conclusions to this book in the usual sense, no suggestions as to how to stop the killing or save the world, rather there is a discussion of how one can understand military economic issues.