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Social Choice and Welfare

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21.09.2022 | Original Paper

Universalization and altruism

verfasst von: Jean-François Laslier

Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare | Ausgabe 4/2023

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Abstract

The \(\kappa\)-universalization of a symmetric game is the game in which each player considers that any other player chooses with probability \(\kappa\) the same stategy as she. To any normal form game, we associate the symmetric two-stage game in which, in a first stage, the roles to be played in the base game are randomly assigned. We show that any pure strategy equilibrium of the \(\kappa\)-universalization of this extended game is an equilibrium of the base game played by altruistic players (“ex ante Homo Moralis equilibrium is altruistic”), and that the converse is false. The paper presents the implications of this remark for the philosophical nature of ethical behavior (Kantianism behind the veil of ignorance implies but is stronger than altruism) and for its evolutionary foundations.

Vorheriger Artikel Single-peaked domains with designer uncertainty

Nächster Artikel The blocker postulates for measures of voting power

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See Kim and Sobel 1992; Wärneryd 1993; Schlag 1994; Banerjee and Weibull 2000; Laslier 2003.

Applications of the Kantian approach to Economics include (Gravel and Bilodeau 2004; Kordonis 2018; Dizarlar and Karagözoğlu 2020; Van Long 2020).

To be explicit we sometimes write “pure strategy equilibrium” and the example in Sect. 3.3. will clarify the issue of universalization in mixed strategies.

Remark that the base game in this example has symmetric payoffs. This is only for the sake of simplicity that we take this example; we treat u as a standard two-player game that must not be confused with its associated two-stage extension \({\widetilde{u}}\) in which a player ex ante chooses the actions he or she plays in the two roles.

Thanks to a reviewer of this journal for raising the issue.

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Titel: Universalization and altruism
verfasst von: Jean-François Laslier
Publikationsdatum: 21.09.2022
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare / Ausgabe 4/2023
Print ISSN: 0176-1714
Elektronische ISSN: 1432-217X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01426-2

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