The informal definitions emphasize the importance of consent of the people for legitimacy, also called ‘willing obedience’ (Levi et al.
2009, p. 355). Consent does not necessarily mean agreement, but more importantly the willingness to accept decisions and to use the channels offered by the democratic system to express (dis)content, for example by means of voting or protesting. Since support of democracy is based on consent of the people, it is not static but may change over time as a response to the varying economic and social performance of governments. A decline of support of democracy may lead to instability of a political system due to decreasing trust and support. This may have far reaching consequences for the ways in which elites and masses interact. If authority is accepted by citizens as just there is no need for much coercion. Instead there is compliance with public regulation and enacted governmental policies in a non-coercive authoritative manner. This enables the government to steer economy and society without much force (Beetham
2013).
Since support of democracy is multi-facetted, most definitions put a different emphasis on the formal and informal aspects. Some emphasize the formalized procedures to safeguard liberties and constraining public contestation, others tend to stress the need of popular participation and (fair) representation of interests and regions. Beetham (
2013), for example, argues that an authority is considered legitimate if its exercise of power is established and exercised in accordance with legal rules, justified by shared beliefs of the population, and acquired through the consent of citizens.
Legitimacy is mainly found in (liberal) democracies which are characterized by the rule of law and civil and political rights of the individual (Dahl
1989). This is the formal situation. In practice there may be ample variation in the degree of legitimacy between these countries due to different degrees of popular acceptance and consent with the political regime. This variation implies that perceptions and trust are important for the evaluation of the legitimacy of democratic systems. If citizens are disappointed or disagree with policy outcomes, but at the same time feel that the elites and institutions are functioning well, discontent will not undermine the legitimacy of the system (Levi et al.
2009). Often this situation is more complex than either being supportive or not supportive of the democratic system. If large parts of the population do support the system, but hardly participate, there is a legitimacy problem. If there is support, this should be expressed by political behaviour like voting. If there is discontent, like during an economic crisis, this should activate citizens to protest against the austerity policies. If there is an increase in disaffection and this is translated into protest, the legitimacy will be less affected then when disaffection goes hand in hand with apathy and lack of interest. These different ways of expressing support imply that the impact of the economic crisis on the legitimacy of advanced democracies in Europe may vary. It may be at danger in particular regions or countries, but it may also remain largely unaffected by the crisis in other countries (Hernández and Kriesi
2016). It is not only the impact of the crisis itself that matters, but also the behaviour of international actors (such as international financial institutions and the EU) and of national actors (such as parties and interest groups) and the institutional infrastructure (such as the type of welfare regime) that affect the capacity of governments to cope with the economic crisis.
It is not obvious how to conceptualize the consent of the people. Often it is conceptualized as support of the democratic system and the government. Easton (
1975) has made the distinction between specific and diffuse support of democracy. Specific support refers to the support and evaluations of the perceived decisions, policies and actions of actors and institutions. Diffuse support refers to a more common feeling of ‘generalized attachment’ to the democratic regime (Easton
1975, p. 444). Specific support relies on the evaluations of particular institutions, parties or leaders and the perceived performance of policies. It is based on a rational calculation of costs and benefits that are derived from evaluations of performance. Diffuse support, on the other hand, is the firm belief and trust of citizens that the democratic institutions are put in place on their behalf and are basically part of their way of living. Whereas specific support is inherently volatile, diffuse support is more stable as its determinants are related to political values and attachments. Diffuse support is important for the stability of democratic systems because it helps citizens to accept decisions to which they are opposed (Easton
1975). This does not mean that diffuse support will remain stable in all circumstances. It may change due to sudden shocks, a deep crisis or continuous malfunctioning of the system (indicated by stalemates, cabinet crises, polarisation etc.). The economic crisis starting in 2008 is certainly a development that might have shocked both specific and diffuse support of national democracies. The degree of economic misery matters for citizens’ trust and evaluations of actors and institutions (Armingeon and Guthmann
2014). More misery often implies more dissatisfaction which may (ultimately) affect legitimacy. Many researchers have shown that people in democratic regimes tend to support democracy when governmental performance is good (Magalhães
2014; Keman
2014). The core argument is that discontent with the way the regime works and/or its policy outcomes erodes the citizens’ support of it (Pharr and Putnam
2000). Thus, frustration with government performance and/or an economic recession can affect the core support of democracy (Cordero and Simón
2016).
2.1 Hypotheses
Since specific support is closely linked to government performance, it is likely that this type of support is most affected by the economic crisis (H1). The diffuse support is expected to be less affected because the non-democratic alternatives for democratic regimes are by most citizens perceived to perform much worse than democratic systems given the circumstances (as is argued by Easton’s theory of political support (Easton
1975) (H2)). Diffuse support is mainly affected in countries where the crisis did strike relatively hard (indicated by the Economic Crisis Index = GDP Growth – Unemployment + Deficit-Surplus, see Kriesi
2013, p. 307) and where governments imposed far-reaching restrictive policies that meet strong resistance among interest groups and the population at large.
In addition to support of democracy, the trust in politics and politicians is important, i. e. the belief that political authorities and institutions do not seek to benefit themselves but produce outcomes that benefit large parts of the population (Newton
2008; Sztompka
1999). The concept of political trust is multi-facetted. It can be divided into forms like thick, interpersonal, and systemic or institutional trust (Newton
2008). Given these diverse forms of trust there is overlap with the concepts of specific support and diffuse support. The main commonality is that trust links ordinary citizens to institutions that represent them (Fagerland Kroknes et al.
2015). If citizens trust these institutions this will enhance both the legitimacy and the perceived effectiveness of democratic government. Both political trust and diffuse support are essential for the stability of democracy and both are a basic prerequisite for the legitimacy of those being in power. If trust in political authorities and institutions is declining this may endanger their legitimacy since low levels of trust hamper the government to perform its tasks because citizens are less likely to obey the law or to accept decisions. Some degree of distrust towards political authority is healthy for democracy because it puts a pressure on elites to perform better (Sztompka
1999; Nye
1997). However, an extended period of distrust could have negative consequences, especially if the reason for distrust is corruption. The trustworthiness of political authorities is important for the legitimacy of elites because the democratic process of representation assumes that people trust that political authorities are honest and not corrupt and that they will deliver on their promises (Beetham
2013). Economic prosperity has been identified as especially important in this regard because it signals the degree to which elites do deliver as promised (Keman
2014). The more the economic crisis has had a negative impact on people’s lives, the more they may lose trust in their national parliament, which happened most pronounced in Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece (Roth et al.
2011). In order to assess the impact of the crisis on citizens we need to take into account the socio-economic differences, in particular education. The higher educated will remain more satisfied and will keep more institutional trust than the lower educated (Schäfer
2013). We hypothesise that the Great Recession will lead to lower levels of trust, in particular of the lower educated and in countries with that are hit hard by the crisis (H3).
Some research has signalled an increase in dissatisfaction and a decline in political trust (e. g. Armingeon and Guthmann
2014; Dalton and Wattenberg
2000). There is one important exception. If austerity measures are imposed on governments by external actors like the EU and the IMF, governments have far less room to manoeuvre to cope with the crisis. In that case the blame is likely not on the government but on the external actors. We hypothesize that countries in which austerity measures are imposed by external actors the support of the national system may increase (H4). This statement is not supported by all researchers. Some authors agree that the support of democracy is gradually weakened, but this trend is unrelated to the Great Recession because politics itself is becoming more and more discredited due to the acceptance of neo-liberal ideas by both parties and voters that do not regard the state as competent problem-solver (Hay
2002). Other researchers state that democracy is not at stake at all because parties succeed in fulfilling their functions in ways that congruent with the median voter (Budge et al.
2012; Sanders et al.
2014; Dalton et al.
2011). Finally, a group of researchers arrives at a more nuanced conclusion that the trends are not uni-directional. The cross-national and longitudinal variations show examples of both rising and declining satisfaction with governments and democracy (Norris
2011; Thomassen
2015). According to them there is no systemic decline in the degree of satisfaction with democracy, neither before, during or after the economic crisis. On average the levels of satisfaction remain at a high level.
There has been a long-standing debate in the academic literature on the different types of welfare regimes in Europe and beyond. Although there is no consensus on these types, it is generally accepted that most countries in the main regions of Europe have similar welfare state regimes. This is reflected in the names which are being given to these clusters, like Nordic welfare states, Southern welfare states, East European welfare regimes etcetera (see for an overview of the debate on welfare regime differences: Arts and Gelissen
2002). These countries resemble each other in the degree of universalism, egalitarianism and de-commodification (Esping-Andersen
1990). Countries belonging to the same welfare regime have in common that they provide a similar type and degree of welfare to citizens. These differences matter for the degree of social inequality and the support of democracy since the more social protection is provided, the less threatening are the effects of the economic recession (Albano and Barbera
2010). The more gentler and kinder a society is regulated and the more welfare and well-being is achieved, the more legitimate governance is expected to be.
We do not stand alone in making this causal claim. In the literature on welfare states it has often been argued that the rise of social provisions and services intends to compensate for the risks and inequalities that are involved in capitalism (Van Kersbergen and Manow
2014). Moderate levels of inequality are necessary for democracy to thrive. Democracy and the welfare state have become intertwined. Most established democracies are also advanced welfare states. Citizens living in welfare states wholeheartedly support democracy because it offers the conditions for safeguarding the level of social welfare and income, especially in times of economic crisis. Now that economic growth has slowed down or even halted or decreased, we expect that this has affected the satisfaction with democracy. It is assumed that dissatisfaction with democracy is growing relative fast in countries that are hit hard by the crisis and in which the welfare states cannot compensate for that. Dissatisfaction will not increase in countries that are hit less hard by the crisis and/or in which the welfare state is able to provide sufficient levels of welfare, work and income for all social groups despite the Great Recession.
Legitimacy is thus systematically related to the variations in socio economic performance and the type of welfare state. Most countries with similar welfare states have similar levels of social and economic welfare, cultural heritage and traditions and phase of democratic development (Bodor et al.
2014). The vast amount of literature of welfare state classifications provides an excellent source of the main socio-economic similarities and differences between these regimes (see for an overview: Arts and Gelissen
2002). These characteristics may make countries more or less vulnerable to the effects of the Great Recession. The Nordic countries are expected to have the highest developed welfare regimes and levels of socio-economic welfare and are least affected by the crisis. The Southern countries are expected to have an intermediate level of collective welfare provisions and are strongly affected by the crisis. The Eastern countries have the lowest level of socio-economic welfare, but the degree to which they are affected by the crisis varies (see for an overview: Honkapohja and Korhonen
2013). The continental countries have intermediate levels of socio-economic welfare and most of them are modestly affected by the crisis. Finally the two countries with liberal welfare regimes (the UK and Ireland) have been hit relatively hard by the crisis (Kriesi
2013). We hypothesise that the type of welfare state and socio-economic performance have a moderating effect on the degree to which citizens satisfied with democracy during the Great Recession (H5). This does not mean that the welfare regime approach offers the only explanation of the support of democracy. Alternative explanations do exist like those that stress the impact of austerity policies by the EU, the IMF and the ECB (e. g. Armingeon and Guthmann
2014; Armingeon et al.
2016; Cordero and Simón
2016). In addition there are approaches that stress the individual-level variation within welfare states (see for an overview of this argument: Kumlin
2002). These alternative explanations will be examined by incorporating the most relevant indicators into the analysis (namely whether a country is bailed out and EMU-membership).