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Erschienen in: Public Choice 3-4/2016

27.09.2016

When to expect a coup d’état? An extreme bounds analysis of coup determinants

verfasst von: Martin Gassebner, Jerg Gutmann, Stefan Voigt

Erschienen in: Public Choice | Ausgabe 3-4/2016

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Abstract

Over the last several decades, both economists and political scientists have shown interest in coups d’état. Numerous studies have been dedicated to understanding the causes of coups. However, model uncertainty still looms large. About one hundred potential determinants of coups have been proposed, but no consensus has emerged on an established baseline model for analyzing coups. We address this problem by testing the sensitivity of inferences to over three million model permutations in an extreme bounds analysis. Overall, we test the robustness of 66 factors proposed in the empirical literature based on a monthly sample of 164 countries that covers the years 1952–2011. We find that slow economic growth rates, previous coup experiences, and other forms of political violence to be particularly conducive to inciting coups.

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Fußnoten
1
We use the terms “coup” and “coup d’état” interchangeably here. “Military coups” are based on a narrower definition, as the perpetrators would have to include the military.
 
2
As Plümper and Neumayer (2015) point out, this standard approach does not deal systematically with model uncertainty regarding distributional assumptions, measurement error processes, and so on. Thus, the results of an EBA can be considered “robust” only in such a narrow sense.
 
3
We are aware of three studies of coup determinants that use monthly data: Thyne (2010), Bell (2016), and Johnson and Thyne (2016). Johnson and Thyne report similar findings when using country-day and country-year data. Eventually, they opt for using country-month data to increase precision without unnecessarily reducing standard errors by inflating the number of observations.
 
4
Given that resources can be used to protect the incumbent regime from threats, it is very plausible that coups frequently will be unsuccessful (Crespo Cuaresma et al. 2011).
 
5
In the literature, linear probability models, logit, and probit models are roughly equally common. Calculation speed, the absence of convergence problems, the ability to include country-fixed effects as well as the possibility of interpreting the resulting coefficients directly strongly favors the linear probability model in our EBA.
 
6
Sala-i-Martin (1997) proposes using the integrated likelihood to construct a weighted CDF. However, missing observations for some variables pose a problem. Moreover, Sturm and de Haan (2002) show that the goodness-of-fit measure may not be a good indicator of the probability that a model is the true model and that weights constructed as in Sala-i-Martin (1997) are not invariant to linear transformations of the dependent variable. Hence, changing scales can result in different estimates and conclusions. We therefore employ the unweighted version of the CDF.
 
7
This criterion eliminates coups in Argentina (12/1975), Bolivia (05/1981), Congo (08/1968), Haiti (04/1989), Sierra Leone (03/1967), Sudan (12/1966) and Togo (10/1991).
 
8
We followed a very similar procedure for the years after 2008, which are not covered by Cheibub et al. (2010). In many cases, we were able to rely on codings by Bormann and Golder (2013).
 
9
We run F-tests for the joint significance of the fixed effects. To summarize these tests, we calculate the average p-value of the tests for all regressions run. The results are: 0.218 (regions), 0.170 (decades), 0.544 (months).
 
10
The average p-values for the F-tests of the fixed effects are: 0.616 (months) and 0.303 (decades).
 
11
The average p-value for the test of joint significance of the three coefficients is 0.089 and the median is 3.4E-06.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
When to expect a coup d’état? An extreme bounds analysis of coup determinants
verfasst von
Martin Gassebner
Jerg Gutmann
Stefan Voigt
Publikationsdatum
27.09.2016
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Public Choice / Ausgabe 3-4/2016
Print ISSN: 0048-5829
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7101
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-016-0365-0

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